Community safety in an age of austerity: an urban regime analysis of Cardiff 1999-2015 by Cartwright, Thomas
  
 
 
COMMUNITY SAFETY IN AN AGE OF 
AUSTERITY:  
AN URBAN REGIME ANALYSIS OF CARDIFF 
1999-2015 
 
Tom Cartwright 
 
PhD 
 
Cardiff University 
School of Social Sciences 
 
September 2016
 i 
 i 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
There are a number of people to whom I owe my thanks in making this research 
possible.  
First and foremost, thank you to my supervisors, Professor Gordon Hughes and Adam 
Edwards for their help and guidance throughout the project. I am very grateful for the 
insight, knowledge and encouragement that they have provided during this time. I 
would also like to thank other members of staff within Cardiff University who have 
provided advice and guidance over the course of this research. 
I must also thank Cardiff Council, for hosting me during the research and providing the 
level of access they did. In particular, I owe my thanks to the numerous people I met 
and spoke to during the research, your help and cooperation with the research is truly 
appreciated, and without it, this research would not have been possible. 
I would also like to express my gratitude to my friends and family, for all of the 
support, motivation and the welcome distractions throughout the project. Special thanks 
must go to Esther, for putting up with me in the final months and weeks of the thesis, I 
probably wasn’t that much fun to live with. 
I would also like to acknowledge the role of the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) in funding this research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The political and economic context following the election of the Coalition Government 
in 2010 has had a significant impact upon community safety work in England and 
Wales. More specifically, the governmental austerity agenda - the term given to policies 
aimed at reducing sovereign debt through reductions in public expenditure - and the 
introduction of locally elected Police and Crime Commissioners present a number of 
challenges for community safety and the local coordination of multi-agency partnership 
practices around crime and disorder. In addition, the currently dominant discourses and 
policies of localism and a decentralisation of power have placed greater emphasis on the 
role of locally situated actors in having to choose how to respond to the external 
political and economic constraints placed upon them. 
 
Borrowing and adapting concepts from regime theory, this research employs a single-
embedded case study of community safety in Cardiff to examine how the Cardiff policy 
‘regime’ has sought to respond to the current economic and political climate. Building 
upon the analytical framework offered by regime theory, and utilising a combination of 
ethnographic observations, interviews and documentary analysis of policy texts over the 
last two decades, this thesis explores the changes to the governing arrangements in 
Cardiff, from a well resourced multi-agency community safety team, to the dispersal of 
responsibility for community safety under the guise of integration and reducing 
complexity.  
 
Demonstrating the opportunities presented by localism the research finds evidence of an 
attempt to form a governing regime around a ‘transformative’ strategic agenda 
orientated around ideas of social justice and civic inclusion. However, illustrating the 
constraints on this freedom afforded to local governing actors, the realisation of this 
strategic agenda has been compromised by changes to the governing arrangements in 
Cardiff that have resulted in a degradation of governing capacity for community safety 
and the hollowing out of community safety expertise in the city. Accordingly, the 
research finds evidence of a disparity between the transformative rhetoric of the shared 
strategic agenda, and the fragmented and divergent operational practices of community 
safety. This use of regime theory makes an original contribution to the nascent 
conceptual and empirical debate about the contested and uncertain future of community 
safety in an age of austerity. It highlights the need for further locally situated case 
studies that can disambiguate the political agency available to local policy actors and 
the external political and economic constrains placed upon them. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 CONTEXT AND PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
Recent decades have seen radical changes to the local structures and approaches 
to crime control in the UK. Under the label of ‘community safety’ greater 
emphasis has been placed on the value of local partnerships and multi-agency 
working in effectively responding to the causes and consequences of crime and 
disorder. This has been seen most prominently in the introduction and expansion 
of statutory multi-agency partnerships in every local authority in England and 
Wales under the Labour Governments of 1997-2010. The election in 2010 of the 
Coalition Government posed a number of questions for the future of these local 
arrangements and the potential for continued commitment to multi-agency 
working around crime and disorder. Principally the Coalition Government’s 
commitment to an extensive austerity programme, the policy of reducing 
sovereign debt through severe reductions in public expenditure, presented a 
fundamental challenge to local partnership working as reducing financial 
resources could incentivise a prioritisation on ‘core activities’ as opposed to 
more nebulous partnership commitments (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). 
Alongside this, the introduction of regional Police and Crime Commissioners, 
and the rhetorical commitment to localism pointed to a redistribution of power 
away from Westminster, presenting opportunities for greater local autonomy. 
This thesis provides an in-depth examination of how these wider economic and 
political conditions are being responded to by local governing regimes and the 
impact of this upon the local governance of crime and disorder. 
Although a contested and capacious concept (Hughes, 2006: 54), ‘community 
safety’ has gained increasing policy significance in recent decades, both in the 
UK and globally (Gilling, 2007; Hughes, 2007; Garland, 2001). Typically, the 
term community safety signifies a model of governing social problems through 
partnership working by seeking ‘to move beyond a police-driven crime 
prevention agenda, to involve other agencies and generate greater participation 
from all sections of the “community”’ (Hughes, 2006: 54). Its origins can be 
traced back to an increasing recognition of the limitations of the state and the 
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criminal justice system’s response to problems of crime and disorder following 
rising crime rates in the 1970s (Garland, 2001), thereby acting as an impetus for 
change to responses to crime and criminality. Noting the perceived failures of the 
reactive policing of crime, attention shifted to consider how such events could be 
anticipated and therefore prevented. Initially these prevention strategies were 
dominated by situational crime prevention measures which, building upon ideas 
of rational choice theory, sought to manipulate the environmental and situational 
conditions in which criminal behaviour occurred (Gilling, 1994). However 
problems of displacement, the presumption of rational action and the failure to 
consider the more distal causes of criminality, required an alternative idea of 
crime prevention that sought to address the underlying causes of criminality. This 
emerged in the 1991 Morgan report that made a series of recommendations for 
the pursuit of a social model of crime prevention, paramount amongst which was 
the use of statutory partnership arrangements to facilitate partnership working 
between local authorities, the police and other partner organisations to provide a 
holistic response to crime and its causes.  
These recommendations, ignored by the incumbent Conservative Government, 
formed a fundamental component of the Labour Party’s 1997 election campaign, 
typified by Tony Blair’s pronouncement that Labour would be ‘tough on crime, 
tough on the causes of crime’ (Labour Party, 1997). Shortly after their election in 
1997 the Labour Government introduced the Crime and Disorder Act in 1998, 
which, building upon the recommendations of the Morgan Report, introduced 
mandatory multi-agency partnerships across England and Wales designed to 
facilitate partnership working around crime and disorder. Under the Labour 
Governments of 1997-2010 community safety became an increasingly prominent 
part of local responses to crime, disorder and safety, facilitating multi-agency 
working. This was particularly evident in large urban centres, which saw the 
establishment of large and well resourced multi-agency teams (Edwards et al., 
2007; Gilling et al., 2013), tasked with overseeing, supporting and facilitating 
local community safety work. This expansion of community safety coincided 
with the emergent professional identity of the community safety practitioner and 
the development of a professional expertise for community safety (Hughes and 
Gilling, 2004). 
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This development and expansion of local arrangements for community safety is 
important for contemporary discussions of community safety. While by no 
means without flaws, the presence of dedicated community safety teams was 
important in driving forward partnership activity and facilitating cooperation and 
engagement from local partner organisations in the multi-agency response to 
crime and disorder. However following the 2008 global financial crisis the 
community safety infrastructure and the professional expertise that had 
developed under the successive Labour Governments have been under significant 
pressure as a result of the policies of the Conservative-led Coalition Government 
of 2010 to 2015 and that are continuing under the majority Conservative 
Government elected in 2015.  
In the 2010 general election, the need to reduce the ‘record budget deficit’ 
(Conservative Party, 2010: 7) through reductions in public expenditure formed 
the centrepiece of the Conservative party’s election campaign with the promise 
to ‘ensure macroeconomic stability’ (Conservative Party, 2010) after years of 
alleged Labour largesse and profligacy. While just short of a governing majority, 
the Conservative-led Coalition Government with the support of the Liberal 
Democrats, pursued this austerity agenda through extensive financial cuts to 
public services across England and Wales. Alongside this policy of austerity, the 
Coalition Government has sought a substantial decentralisation of power away 
from Westminster through the introduction of locally elected Police and Crime 
Commissioners and a rhetorical commitment to localism and greater autonomy 
for local authorities. As part of this the Coalition Government moved away from 
the philosophies of central public management pervasive under the New Labour 
Government (Gilling, 2007), resulting in the abandonment of central government 
targets for community safety work. This has granted greater autonomy to local 
authorities in pursuing more radical community safety agendas, however the 
freedom granted by this autonomy has been constrained by the austerity 
programme and the degradation of local governing capacity. Therefore, the 
current context of community safety is one characterised by both opportunities 
and challenges for local community safety arrangements.  
These changes are fundamental for the organisation and control of local 
governing arrangements for community safety and represent a substantial change 
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to the conditions of local partnership working. This is recognised in the work of 
Gilling et al. (2013) who distinguish between three phases of community safety 
in England and Wales. The ‘voluntary’ period (1982-1997) encompasses the 
emergence of community safety as a ‘reaction discourse’ against the narrowly 
defined ideas of situational crime prevention within certain ‘radical left local 
authorities (Gilling et al., 2013: 329), while the ‘national mandatory’ phase 
(1999-2010) constitutes the duration of the Labour Governments and the 
establishment and expansion of statutory multi-agency partnership teams in each 
local authority.  During this time community safety teams were highly resourced 
but subject to substantial centralised management (Gilling, 2007). The third 
phase, speculatively titled the ‘localised and devolved’ period of community 
safety marks the current period of community safety following the election of the 
Coalition Government in 2010. At present much is unknown about how 
conditions of austerity, the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners, and 
the commitment to localism will impact upon local governing arrangements for 
community safety and the impact of this upon local policy agendas for 
community safety. It is these issues which form the basis of this research, which 
seeks to explore this third phase of community safety and how the ideological 
commitment to austerity, the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners 
and the decentralisation of power away from Westminster have affected the local 
governance of crime, disorder and safety. 
1.2 ANALYTIC AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMING OF THE RESEARCH 
Implicit in the notion of community safety are the ideas of power, negotiation 
and compromise between partner organisations, which affect how partnership 
arrangements are organised, and the subsequent policy agendas that are pursued. 
A central concern for this thesis is how austerity, the introduction of Police and 
Crime Commissioners, and localism affect local power relationships and 
therefore the organisation of partnership arrangements. Although there is 
significant uncertainty in how these pressures will manifest themselves a number 
of possibilities have been identified. These include: a retrenchment of partnership 
working as financial pressures compromise commitments to extraneous 
partnership activity (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; Gilling et al., 2013); greater 
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roles for voluntary and community bodies in the wake of public sector decline 
(Gilling et al., 2013); and the proliferation of policies and techniques of risk 
management (Edwards and Hughes, 2012).  
Borrowing concepts originating from American urban political analysis, this 
thesis draws upon the work of Stone and regime theory (1989; 2005) to provide a 
theoretical framework in understanding the local organisation of partnership 
arrangements for community safety.  Stone and other regime theorists distinguish 
between four categories of regimes: maintenance regimes maintain the status 
quo, developmental regimes augment the status quo, progressive regimes 
progressively reform the status quo, and transformative regimes fundamentally 
alter the status quo. Using this distinction Edwards and Hughes (2012) suggested 
that these categories offered by regime theory could be reformulated for 
criminological thought in the following way: Maintenance regimes respond to 
problems of public safety through criminal justice responses and the police 
centric enforcement of crime and disorder; developmental regimes are those that 
seek to augment criminal justice responses through the identification and 
management of problematic people or places via policies and techniques of risk 
management; progressive regimes are characterised by attempts to move beyond 
criminal justice policies in actively seeking to divert people away from the 
criminal justice system, through recourse to principles of restorative justice; 
finally transformative regimes seek a radical reframing of responses to public 
safety, not as a matter of criminal justice, but rather of social justice and that of 
economic and social policies.  
To assist in the empirical enquiry into the formation of these governing regimes, 
the research utilised concepts taken from regime theory to provide an analytical 
framework for the research. This analytical framework directed attention to four 
areas of interest. Firstly there must be a clear governing agenda around which the 
regime coalesces. Secondly a governing regime must comprise a coalition of 
actors or partners formed around a particular agenda. Thirdly this coalition must 
have access to governing resources to facilitate the realisation of its governing 
agenda. Finally there must be a system in which cooperation and engagement 
from partners is encouraged and incentivised. This analytical framework allowed 
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the research to understand how local governing actors are encouraged to mobilise 
around particular agendas and through what arrangements. 
This theoretical and analytic framework provided by regime theory foregrounded 
the importance of empirical research situated within particular local contexts to 
understand how local power relations and dependencies affect the formation of 
certain governing regimes. Located in the city of Cardiff this research adopted a 
case study research design, utilising a combination of ethnographic observation, 
interviews, documentary analysis and an analysis of social media to enable a 
comprehensive understanding of the Cardiff regime and the position of 
community safety within it. The choice of Cardiff is significant for debates of 
community safety given the context of devolution in Wales and the emergence of 
a distinct Welsh agenda around social policy and the pursuit of social justice 
agendas in what many authors have labelled a ‘dragonisation’ of policy (Edwards 
and Hughes, 2009; Drakeford, 2010; Haines, 2009). The distinctiveness of the 
Welsh context is seen in this research in the advocacy of changes to local 
governing arrangements through the introduction of integrated partnership boards 
with a view to facilitating more holistic and strategic approaches to the 
governance of social problems, with Cardiff as the flagship local authority in 
pioneering this approach.  
1.3 FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH 
The findings generated in this research offer insight into how local governing 
regimes are adapting to the current economic and political climate. Within 
Cardiff there was evidence of a radical reformulation of the governing 
arrangements, through the integration of the various partnership structures 
(including the community safety partnership) into an integrated partnership 
board, known as the Cardiff Partnership Board. This reformulation of the 
governing arrangements in Cardiff can be understood in two ways. Firstly, the 
narrative of change offered by the Cardiff regime presented it as a beneficial 
adaptation to local public service delivery in that it reduced complexity and 
duplication while simultaneously facilitating better partnership working and 
more holistic approaches to local governance. On the other hand, discussions 
with local policy officers and practitioners revealed a contrasting narrative that 
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portrays the changes to the governing arrangements as a degradation of 
governing capacity for community safety. In this it is argued that the integration 
of the community safety partnership into the Cardiff Partnership Board has 
resulted in a deficit of operational oversight, responsibility and expertise for 
community safety.  
This reformulation of the governing arrangements coincided with the creation of 
a strategic governing agenda for all partner organisations within the Cardiff 
Partnership Board. Entitled the ‘What Matters’ strategy, this set out the vision for 
local governance from 2010 to 2020. The ‘What Matters’ strategy contained a 
clear transformative agenda which foregrounded the importance of addressing 
social inequalities and promoting social inclusion as a way of tackling social 
problems in the city. The emphasis on social justice and social inclusion is 
significant as it represents a departure from the crime orientated agendas of New 
Labour, and points to the opportunities posed by localism and greater local 
autonomy. However, as with the governing arrangements, the research found 
evidence of a discord between the rhetoric of the ‘What Matters’ strategy and the 
operational practice of community safety work in Cardiff. Where the ‘What 
Matters’ presented a transformative agenda, which envisioned all partners 
working to the same shared goals and outcomes, the operational delivery of 
community safety work was characterised by variance and divergent operational 
agendas. Rather than being driven by the shared vision of the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy, operational practices were more heavily influenced by more immediate 
concerns and the motivations of particular practitioners.  
This disparity between the rhetoric of a shared strategic governing agenda and 
the fragmented and disparate practices on the ground illustrates a failure of the 
Cardiff regime to mobilise cooperation around the transformative agenda of the 
‘What Matters’ strategy. In explaining this, the thesis draws attention to three 
implications associated with the changes to the governing arrangements for 
community safety work. Firstly the integration of the community safety 
partnership into the Cardiff Partnership Board, and the loss of staff it entailed, 
has resulted in the absence of clear lines of responsibility and operational 
oversight for community safety work. Related to this, the dismantling of the 
community safety infrastructure has also led to a degradation of community 
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safety expertise in the city therefore compromising the informational and 
organisational resources available to community safety work. Finally the absence 
of the community safety team has placed greater pressure on local practitioners 
to take responsibility for the delivery and coordination of community safety 
priorities. These locally situated practitioners are often not best placed to 
facilitate and develop new partnership arrangements and in some cases do not 
possess relevant expertise for orchestrating community safety activity.  Taken 
together these three factors represent a significant degradation of governing 
capacity available to community safety as a policy agenda, and contribute to the 
failure of the Cardiff Partnership Board to effectively mobilise cooperation 
around the ‘What Matters’ strategy. This failure to mobilise partnership work 
around this agenda is indicative of regime failure and points to the challenges of 
forming and sustaining a governing regime around a transformative agenda in 
times of reduced governing capacity.  
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Following this introduction chapter 2 begins with some theoretical and 
conceptual ground clearing around community safety and its conceptualisation in 
this thesis as a mode of governance. Following this, the chapter provides a more 
detailed account of the historical context of the research using the periodisation 
of community safety offered by Gilling et al. (2013), which differentiates 
between three broad phases of community safety: the voluntary period, the 
national mandatory period and the localised and devolved period. Focusing on 
the final of these periods the chapter explores why the quadrumvirate of factors 
in the form of austerity, the big society, localism and the introduction of regional 
Police and Crime Commissioners are important for contemporary discussions of 
community safety and local governance more broadly. To assist in the analytical 
dissection of these factors the chapter examines theories of governance and 
explores the contribution of regime theory in providing an analytical framework 
for researching community safety in an age of austerity. Using regime theory the 
chapter provides a series of theoretically informed propositions drawn from the 
literature which posit a number of eventualities for community safety, ranging 
from the degradation of community safety and partnership work to the pursuit of 
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more progressive and socially just agendas made possible by greater local 
autonomy and the adaptation of local governing arrangements.  
Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive discussion of the methodological choices 
made in this research. Beginning with the epistemological and ontological 
underpinnings of the research, the chapter explores the contribution of realist 
philosophies of social research in exploring the power dynamics of local 
governance.  Building upon Yin’s (2003) arguments of analytic rather than 
empirical generalisation, the chapter positions the purpose of the research as a 
contribution to the theoretical framework of regime theory and its application to 
conceptual discussions of community safety in an age of austerity rather than an 
attempt to produce generalisable findings. Given the focus on analytical 
generalisation, the chapter provides an explanation of the value of Cardiff as a 
critical case for the testing of the theoretical propositions identified during the 
literature review. The chapter then moves to examine the research methods and 
the relevance of ethnographic methods in capturing the power dynamics at play 
in local governance and their impact upon community safety. 
Chapter 4, the first of the three empirical chapters, provides a critical 
examination of the governing arrangements for community safety in Cardiff. The 
chapter starts with a brief account of the evolution of governing arrangements for 
community safety in Cardiff into the establishment of a large and well-resourced 
community safety infrastructure in the city. Linking into wider discussions of 
Welsh Government policy the chapter explores the impact of the Beecham 
review into public services in Wales and its influence on the structural changes to 
the governing arrangements that took place in 2010. Through analysis of policy 
documentation the chapter examines the changes to these governing 
arrangements through the integration of the various partnership structures into an 
integrated Cardiff Partnership Board. In justifying these changes the policy 
narrative of the Cardiff Partnership Board appealed to notions of reducing 
complexity, more joined up working and a greater dispersal of responsibility for 
community safety which would help diversify partnership engagement and 
facilitate more progressive agendas. The chapter ends with a critical examination 
of this narrative of progressive change and raises questions around the 
degradation of governing capacity for community safety work and begins to 
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identify a divergence between the policy discourses of change and the 
operational experiences of these changes. 
The second empirical chapter, Chapter 5, examines the evolution of the 
governing agenda in Cardiff. Through analysing policy documents it is argued 
that community safety in Cardiff during the Labour Governments of 1998-2010 
was characterised by developmental agendas orientated around the augmentation 
of policing agendas and policies of risk management. The chapter then assesses 
the strategic governing agenda of the Cardiff Partnership Board, the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy. This strategy places an emphasis on the importance of social 
inequalities in the city, the need to promote greater civic engagement and an 
agenda that sought to extend beyond the narrow confines of crime reduction. It is 
therefore argued that the ‘What Matters’ strategy represents at the rhetorical and 
ideological level a progressive and transformative governing agenda that seeks to 
move beyond the risk management discourses pervasive under New Labour. 
Counterpoised to this progressive and transformative narrative there was an 
emerging indication that the rhetoric of the Cardiff Partnership Board was not 
being fully realised in the prioritisation of issues for community safety. 
Examining the priorities for community safety work in the city it is argued that, 
far from the strategic socially just agenda aspired to in the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy, what is being seen is further evidence of an increasing pressure on 
governing capacity and a diminishing agenda for community safety. 
The third and final findings chapter, Chapter 6, explores how the changes to the 
governing arrangements and the development of the ‘What Matters’ strategy 
translates into the operational delivery of community safety work. Central here 
was the point that the realisation of the ‘What Matters’ strategy was dependent 
upon the ability of the Cardiff Partnership Board to mobilise cooperation and 
engagement around this agenda at an operational level. However this research 
provides evidence that the changes to the governing arrangements have had 
fundamental implications for the coordination and mobilisation of partnership 
work around community safety in the city. The chapter explores how the 
degradation of community safety expertise, and the absence of clear operational 
oversight for community safety has resulted in greater discretion and 
responsibility being afforded to the delivery leads in determining the operational 
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agendas of their activities and promoting cooperation at an operational level. 
This has culminated in the isolation and fragmentation of community safety 
activity in the city, and the pursuit of divergent operational agendas driven more 
by the immediate concerns and priorities of the lead practitioners rather than the 
strategic influence of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. As a result, operational 
practice within the city lacked a clear coherent agenda, which stands in contrast 
to the strategic ambitions of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. Through insights gained 
from ethnographic observation and interviews with practitioners the chapter 
provides an overview of these fragmented and disparate practices, and in doing 
so highlights the divergence of activity undertaken in the city and the barriers to 
the coordination of community safety work presented by the new governing 
arrangements.  
Chapter 7 brings together the three empirical chapters and, drawing upon the 
literature identified in Chapter 2 offers a critical examination of community 
safety within the Cardiff regime and its significance for contemporary 
discussions of community safety. It is argued that the progressive and 
transformative rhetoric of the ‘What Matters’ strategy is significant as it 
represents a shift away from the crime focussed agendas of New Labour. This 
draws attention to the opportunities presented by localism and the 
decentralisation of power as opposed to the intensive central management of 
New Labour that had previously restricted the more progressive ambitions of 
community safety. However the failure to realise this agenda, indicated by the 
fragmentation and divergence of operational practices, presents a failure of the 
Cardiff regime to effectively mobilise and co-opt cooperation around this 
agenda. This is significant, given the analytic framework of regime theory as it 
suggests regime failure, and moreover points to the fundamental challenges of 
forming and sustaining regimes around more radical governing agendas in times 
of austerity. In seeking to explain the cause of regime failure in Cardiff, attention 
is drawn towards the changes to the governing arrangements and the degradation 
of governing capacity it entailed. In particular three factors are identified as 
important: the absence of operational oversight and responsibility for community 
safety; the degradation of community safety expertise; and the greater pressure 
placed on individual practitioners to organise and determine community safety 
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work at an operational level. The chapter finishes with a discussion of the 
analytical significance of Cardiff for understanding the constraints placed upon 
local governing actors as a result of austerity, and some methodological 
considerations of utilising regime theory in this research.  
The final chapter, Chapter 8, explores the contribution of this thesis to 
contemporary discussions of community safety, and its significance for future 
policy and research. This research provides evidence of how local community 
safety arrangements are adapting and responding to economic and political 
conditions that commenced under the Coalition Government. More specifically it 
is argued that this research demonstrates that during this third phase of 
community safety, the ‘localised and devolved’ period, there exist opportunities 
for the realisation of more radical changes to community safety as seen in Cardiff 
in the pursuit of a more transformative agenda for community safety. However 
this research has also shed light on the barriers facing local governing regimes in 
mobilising cooperation and engagement around these agendas. Therefore this 
research contributes to theoretical and empirical debates about how and why 
certain agendas are pursued, and subsequently how and why these are or are not 
realised. In doing so it demonstrates the importance of locally situated actors in 
actively determining how local governing regimes adapt to external conditions, 
and therefore how such adaptations will be subject to significant national and 
local variation. This research therefore contributes to methodological discussions 
of how to investigate community safety, and the value of multiple-embedded 
case studies that can disambiguate the political agency open to local policy actors 
and the external constraints placed on them. 
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2. CONCEPTUALISING COMMUNITY SAFETY IN 
AN AGE OF AUSTERITY  
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter outlines the conceptual underpinnings of the thesis, beginning with 
a discussion of how community safety can be defined. Having positioned 
community safety as a mode of governance, the chapter moves to examine its 
historical context in England and Wales using the periodisation provided by 
Gilling et al. (2013) to distinguish between three phases of community safety: 
the voluntary period, national mandatory period and the localised and devolved 
period. While the voluntary period was characterised by a lack of uniformity and 
variation in community safety practice, the national mandatory period saw 
community safety pushed to the fore of New Labour policy with the 
standardisation of community safety arrangements as a result of the Crime and 
Disorder Act (1998). Following the election of the Coalition Government in 
2010, the future of community safety has been subject to much uncertainty. 
While policies of localism and a decentralisation of power away from 
Westminster have afforded greater autonomy to local governing actors in 
implementing community safety arrangements, the pressures of austerity have 
placed substantial constraints on the ability of local actors to realise the potential 
of their new found autonomy (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012).  
This contextual background for community safety and local governance therefore 
requires empirical enquiry which is receptive to both the political and economic 
conditions of local government, and the power dependencies which affect how 
cooperation and partnership working is achieved at a local level. Using concepts 
taken from American political analysis, this chapter explores the contribution of 
regime theory as a model for conceptualising how local governing regimes are 
formed and sustained around particular governing agendas. Using this framework 
the chapter finishes with a series of propositions that map four potential futures 
for community safety, ranging from a retrenchment of partnership activity and a 
return to police-led enforcement of crime and disorder, to more radical changes 
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that may enable the pursuit of social justice agendas seeking a more holistic 
approach to the local governance of crime, disorder and safety.  
2.2 CONCEPTUALISING COMMUNITY SAFETY  
A logical starting point for this chapter is some conceptual ground clearing 
around community safety in this research, because as Hughes (2006: 54) notes, it 
is a capacious and contested concept. The most fundamental distinction that can 
be made is between community safety as an outcome or product of certain 
responses to crime and disorder, and community safety as a mode of governance. 
The first conceptualisation of community safety is evident in the work of Hope 
(2001; 2005) where community safety is seen as a product of crime prevention 
strategies alongside other outcomes such as moral order and social justice (Hope, 
2001: 424). Here community safety is seen to denote a condition of safer 
communities resulting from preventative practices, which places emphasis on the 
occurrence of crimes and victimisation within certain localities. This is in 
contrast to the second conception of community safety as a mode of governance, 
which has been most typically described as a ‘strategy which seeks to move 
beyond a police-driven crime prevention agenda, to involve other agencies and 
generate greater participation from all sections of the “community”’ (Hughes, 
2006: 54).  It is this conceptualisation, rather than that of community safety as 
condition, which underpins this thesis. 
As will be seen shortly, the term community safety became increasingly 
pervasive in the UK during the Labour Governments of 1997-2010, which saw 
the creation of a statutory infrastructure to embed multi-agency practices within 
every local authority in England and Wales. During this period the more 
progressive potential of community safety was eschewed in favour of a tighter 
focus on the prevention of crime and disorder (Gilling, 2007; Gilling et al., 2013) 
and ‘served to ghettoise community safety as narrowly focussed crime 
prevention of one sort or another’ (Pease and Wiles, 2000: 25).  
Given the conceptualisation of community safety as a method and approach to 
governing issues of crime and disorder in the UK in this thesis, it is worth 
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providing some definitional clarity on the term governance and its application in 
this research. Rhodes (1996: 652) citing Finer defines governance as: 
i. The activity or process of governing or governance,  
ii. A condition of ordered rule,  
iii. Those people charged with the duty of governing or governors and  
iv. The manager, method or system by which a particular society is 
governed  
 
While this definition is helpful in providing some operational indication of what 
governance is and what it does, it is worth looking at the fundamental concept 
underpinning discussions of governance to understand its relevance to 
community safety. At the centre of the issue of governance is the concept of 
power and more specifically the limitations of state power to affect change alone. 
As outlined by Clegg (1989) an important distinction can be made between 
Hobbesian and Machiavellian conceptions of power. In Hobbesian 
conceptualisations of power the state is seen as the prime mover and has ‘power 
over’ subjects to implement change and exercise decisions. In contrast, 
Machiavellian ideas view the power of the state as ‘tenuous, unresolved 
outcomes of struggles between coalitions of public and private, formal and 
informal, actors’ (Edwards, 2006: 189). The limitations of state power are further 
noted by Kickert:  
[…] the control capacity of government is limited for a 
number of reasons: lack of legitimacy, complexity of policy 
processes, complexity and multitude of institutions etc. 
Government is only one of many actors that influence the 
course of events in a societal system 
1993: 275 
Central to this Machiavellian conceptualisation of power and governance is the 
recognition of the inter-dependencies that exist between various state and non-
state entities and the importance of ‘negotiation, bargaining, and other 
relationships of exchange’ (Edwards, 2006: 189). This emphasis on 
interdependency, cooperation and negotiation is particularly relevant to 
discussions of community safety.  The promotion of partnerships between public, 
private and voluntary sector organisations recognises ‘the multi-faceted 
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composition of social-political problems’ and the ‘the limits to ‘do-it-alone’ 
governing – ‘government’ – and the need for cooperative arrangement – 
“governance”’ (Edwards and Beynon, 2001: 157). The study of governance 
therefore draws attention to the inter-relations between different organisations 
and how these inter-relationships affect the exercise of power. As Edwards, 
describes, the focus on governance has also provided a way of understanding the 
exercise of power through self-organising networks of partner organisations 
rather than through command and control mechanisms  (2006: 189). Such 
arguments tie in with Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) notions of nodal 
governance, which emphasise the competing spheres of control beyond the state, 
and the plurality of interests that may influence upon local governance in 
particular locations.  
The concept of governance and its repositioning of the state is also important 
when considering policy and its transmission. Helpful here is the concept of 
policy networks, which focuses on principles of cooperation, interests and 
interdependence (Cope, 2001: 1). For Cope a policy network is defined by  ‘a 
highly complex and dynamic set of interdependent and consequently 
interconnected actors, cutting across different level of government and different 
sectors of society’ (Cope, 2001: 3). Studies of policy networks draw attention to 
the emergence of various actors alongside the state and how that impacts upon 
the transmission of policy. Colebatch (2002) makes a useful distinction between 
vertical and horizontal policy transmission. Vertical conceptualisations of policy 
transfer echo Hobbesian notions of power whereby authorized decisions are 
transmitted down a policy hierarchy by a legitimate authority, and are followed 
by subordinates in the policy hierarchy. As outlined above, this idea of policy 
transfer is problematic due to the limitations of state power and the positioning of 
actors outside linear policy hierarchies. Colebatch therefore draws attention to 
the horizontal dimension of policy transfer, as ‘the structuring of action’, 
emphasising the fact that policies are shared among different organisations not 
through the basis of command and control but rather through cooperation and 
shared understandings:  
[…] the implementation of authorised decision calls for 
cooperation of relevant others outside the line of 
hierarchical authority. And shared understandings reached 
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on the horizontal plane must be given effect via the 
instruments of the vertical dimension  
Colebatch, 2002: 24  
These discussions are particularly pertinent to issues of community safety that 
seek to challenge ‘the specialisation of government into discrete areas of 
functional expertise’ (Edwards, 2006: 190-191) and instead cross various policy 
areas.  We return to the concept of governance later in the chapter but for the 
moment these discussions clarify the conceptual definition of community safety 
guiding this research, and provide a basis for understanding the emergence and 
evolution of community safety as a policy agenda and the significance of the 
election of the Coalition Government for future discussions of community safety 
in the UK. In looking at the progression of community safety as a policy agenda 
the chapter employs Gilling et al.’s (2013) periodic distinction between the 
voluntary phase, the national mandatory phase and the speculatively titled 
localised and devolved period. Each phase will be outlined in turn in the 
following sections. 
2.3 THE VOLUNTARY PERIOD OF COMMUNITY SAFETY 
The concept of governance, with its recognition of the limitations of state power 
and its dependence upon other actors to achieve its aims, is important when 
considering the emergence of community safety as a reaction to the perceived 
limitations of the reactive policing of crime and disorder. An appreciation of the 
limits of the state in responding to problems of crime alone began to emerge in 
the 1950s with crime prevention publicity campaigns targeted at business 
premises in an attempt to encourage greater responsibility in mitigating the risk 
of victimisation  (Gilling, 1994). The subsequent adoption and popularity of this 
type of campaign (Gilling, 1994) highlighted the early dominance of situational 
prevention techniques preoccupied with notions of risk, vulnerability and harm 
reduction (Clarke, 1997). For Garland (1996), these developments embodied 
‘new kinds of objectives, new criminological discourses and forms of practical 
knowledge, and new techniques and apparatuses for their implementation’ 
(Garland, 1996, 450). Garland (2001) goes on to assert that this shift towards 
prevention was accelerated during the 1970s due to rising crime rates. This raised 
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questions regarding the ability of the police and other criminal justice 
organisations to adequately respond to the problems of crime and disorder, and 
culminated in the creation of the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit (Gilling, 
1994).  
The furtherance of crime prevention continued during the 1980s with a series of 
Home Office circulars, which sought to advance coordinated approaches to the 
prevention of crime (Home Office et al., 1984; Home Office et al., 1990). These 
contributed to various initiatives across England and Wales. Examples include 
the Five Towns Initiative, the Kirkholt Burglary Project and the Safer Cities 
Initiative, which were regarded as successful pioneer projects in crime 
prevention (Gilling, 1994).  Despite these proclaimed successes it was apparent 
that such initiatives were not necessarily being emulated across England and 
Wales and represented ‘the success of a group of entrepreneurial government 
researchers’ within the Home Office rather than a product of coherent central 
government policy (Tilley, 2002: 19).  As a result, Liddle and Gelsthorpe noted a 
‘relatively patchy response across the country’ (1994a: 1).  
The disparity of crime prevention provision was also recognised by Gilling who 
stated that ‘while there has been a gradual growth of crime prevention as general 
strategy, there has been an accompanying diversification of the methods 
employed in its name’ (Gilling, 1994: 239). This diversification of methods can 
be attributed to the absence of clear Central Government direction for the 
implementation of crime prevention initiatives during this period (Liddle and 
Gelsthorpe 1994b). Colebatch’s (2002) distinction between the vertical and 
horizontal dimensions of policy is helpful for understanding the significance of 
this divergence. During the early 1990s central government policy around 
community crime prevention was largely characterised by low cost voluntary 
schemes (Hughes, 1998). As such the vertical transmission of community safety 
policy was structured around a limited brief. This lack of clear direction opened 
up opportunities for discretion about how such directives were implemented at 
the local level and ‘a degree of “relative autonomy” beyond the control of the 
central state authority’ (Hughes, 1998: 85).  
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This lack of steering by central government was identified as an issue in the 1991 
Morgan Report (Home Office, 1991), which made a series of recommendations 
for the improvement of the delivery of multiagency crime prevention. 
Recommendations included mandating multi-agency partnership teams led by 
local authorities across England and Wales tasked with facilitating social crime 
prevention initiatives. The Morgan Report advocated use of the term ‘community 
safety’ as distinct from the concept of crime prevention, which was regarded to 
be ‘somewhat limiting in scope and generally police-driven’ (Hughes, 1998: 81). 
In the short-term, the impact of the Morgan report was limited as the incumbent 
Conservative Government largely ignored its recommendations. However, as we 
will see, the Morgan report became influential later on in the development of 
New Labours approach to community safety.  
In summary, while social models of crime prevention were largely avoided at the 
level of central UK government policy during the voluntary period of community 
safety, the way in which prevention policy was implemented did open up 
opportunities for local discretion and autonomy in pursuing alternative methods 
of crime prevention beyond that prescribed by the state. At the time, Hughes 
recognised that ‘local multi-agency crime prevention initiatives’ during this 
period drew on, and created  ‘agendas and projects’ which were ‘beyond the 
control of the centre’ (1998: 102). The importance and relevance of this period of 
community safety for contemporary debates around community safety will be 
demonstrated as the chapter progresses. 
2.4 THE NATIONAL MANDATORY PERIOD 
For Gilling et al. (2013) the election of the New Labour Government in 1997 
was a pivotal moment for community safety, marking the commencement of the 
national mandatory period. While the voluntary period of community safety was 
characterised by divergence in local practices and a lack of central government 
commitment to multi-agency social crime prevention, the national mandatory 
period is defined by the dominance of community safety as a policy agenda, 
mobilised via a substantial provision of resources, and significant central 
government steering control. As Gilling (2007) describes, a principle tactic used 
in New Labour’s election campaign, was its ‘preparedness to countenance tough 
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measures of crime control’ (2007: 35), and to outflank the Conservatives on their 
typical stronghold of law and order. This was most visibly seen in in New 
Labour’s declared desire to target not just crime but also its causes: 
On crime, we believe in personal responsibility and in 
punishing crime, but also tackling its underlying causes - 
so, tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime 
Labour Party, 19971 
The emphasis here on being tough on both crime and its causes, is symptomatic 
of the ‘third way’ which guided New Labour’s political programme and sought 
to ‘steer a course between the big ‘isms’ of the conservativism and socialism’ 
(Gilling, 2007: 38). New Labour’s focus on the causes of crime was also 
informed by the work of Amitai Etzioni and his ideas of moral authoritarian 
communitarianism (Hughes, 1996; Hughes, 1998) which positions the 
‘community’ as a key vehicle for restoring morality in civil institutions (Hughes, 
1998: 108). This moral authoritarian communitarianism was seen in New Labour 
approaches to addressing the causes of crime which placed emphasis on 
neighbourhood policing, zero tolerance, issues of anti-social behaviour and 
disorder (Gilling, 2007), and the ‘exclusionary targeting of the dangerous 
“other”’ (Hughes, 1998: 113). Communitarianism under New Labour was 
premised on the idea that ‘rights were to be conditional on the exercise of 
responsibility’ and that ‘a better life was to be achieved through participation not 
through expectation’ (Crawford and Evans, 2012: 797).  In seeking to realise the 
ambitions of moral authoritarian communitarianism, New Labour sought to build 
strong communities ‘backed up by an authoritarian state’ (Gilling, 2007: 45). 
This approach had substantial repercussions for the evolution of community 
safety work during this period.  
In seeking to realise their vision, New Labour produced the Crime and Disorder 
Act in 1998 which, building upon many of the recommendations of the Morgan 
report, introduced statutory multi-agency arrangements in every local authority in 
England and Wales. Known as Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships 
                                                
1 A page number is not available as this is a web archive of the 1997 Labour Manifesto available 
at: http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab97.htm 
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(CDRPs) in England, and Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) in Wales, these 
arrangements were designed to facilitate multi-agency partnership working 
around issues of crime and disorder.  In line with the Morgan report, the Crime 
and Disorder Act stipulated who was required to participate in these multi-
agency partnerships, but, departing from the Morgan Report’s recommendations, 
placed dual responsibility upon local authorities and the police to lead these 
activities.  Alongside the police and local authorities, other statutory partners 
with an obligation to participate included the local health authorities and 
probation services (Tilley, 2002). Following the Police Reform Act four years 
later (Home Office, 2002), this list of statutory members expanded to include the 
local fire authorities, police authorities and primary care trusts.   
The Crime and Disorder and Police Reform Acts implemented under New 
Labour demonstrated a clear commitment to a particular vision of community 
safety. However, this political and financial prioritisation of community safety 
work was accompanied by intensive centralised control and management over 
how these resources were to be used, in line with New Labours’ ‘enthusiasm for 
the rationalities and technologies of new public management’ (Gilling, 2007: 53). 
This was evident in the development of public service agreements, which 
stipulated what needed to be prioritised and the targets that needed to be met.   
As such the agenda for community safety during this period was highly 
prescribed by central government, seen, for example, in the prioritisation and 
increased enforcement of anti-social behaviour through the use of ASBOs 
(Gilling et al., 2013). The highly centralised agenda for community safety during 
this period has been a source of much contestation within academic discussions 
of community safety. Key critiques include the argument that the more 
progressive potential of community safety has been stifled under New Labour 
Government due to its almost exclusive focus on crime prevention (Pease and 
Wiles, 2000; Gilling, 2007; Gilling et al. 2013). This prioritisation of crime 
prevention, it is argued, has come at the expense of ideas of social inclusion and 
environmental crime, which have been advocated as part of a more 
encompassing harm reduction agenda (Pease and Wiles, 2000). In addition to 
constraining the potential of community safety Hughes and Gilling (2004) 
comment on how the pervasiveness of performance management severely 
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inhibited the discretion afforded to community safety managers. As the New 
Labour government progressed, attempts were made to limit the role of the state 
in directing practice and affording greater responsibility to local authorities, for 
example with the introduction of Local Area Agreements in 2004. However, the 
impact of these attempts was somewhat limited (Gilling, 2007).  
What was apparent, during this period, was an emerging distinction between 
what community safety could and should represent and what it actually did 
achieve under New Labour. As Edwards and Hughes state, community safety has 
the potential for: 
[…]social democratic inclusion rather than neoconservative 
exclusion, prevention rather than enforcement and 
repression, social crime prevention rather than situational 
measures, and adaptive problem solving rather than 
symbolic repression  
2008: 63  
Similarly, Johnston and Shearing argue that community safety has the potential 
to facilitate greater community engagement with democratic processes, which are 
‘fundamental to the construction of just and democratic forms of security 
governance’ (2003: 140).  However as Hughes argues the potential for greater 
civic engagement and greater community participation ‘remains a lofty and often 
righteous aspiration that is very rarely realized in practice in the work of 
partnerships’ (Hughes 2007: 64). 
Recognising that this is very brief and condensed account of two decades of 
community safety progression, and that much detail that has necessarily been 
omitted, this section has outlined how community safety evolved during the 
national mandatory and why it is important for the context of this research. 
During the voluntary period community safety was subject to little resource and 
was widely divergent in practice, but did hold opportunities for more progressive 
practices around social crime prevention. Under New Labour, community safety 
was an integral policy agenda, and accordingly was highly resourced, but was 
subject to intensive centralised management and steering which constrained the 
more progressive potential of community safety work envisioned by some 
commentators.  Just as 1997 and the election of the New Labour government 
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represented a pivotal point for community safety, 2010 and the election of the 
Coalition Government marks the transition into Gilling et al.’s (2013) third 
periodisation of community safety. 
2.5 THE COALITION GOVERNMENT AND LOCALISED AND DEVOLVED 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Where crime and disorder formed a key cornerstone of the 1997 New Labour 
election campaign, the emergence of global and European financial crises in 
2007 and 2008 ensured that economic issues took centre stage in the 2010 
general election. Accordingly, the Conservatives campaigned on a platform of 
austerity and the need for financial responsibility to reduce the budget deficit that 
had resulted from a rise in public spending from the Labour Government 
(Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: 23). In May 2010 the Conservatives formed a 
Coalition Government with the Liberal Democrats, and upon formation they 
described state finances as ‘one of the most challenging fiscal positions in the 
world’ (Cmnd-7942 2010: 5).  In response, the Coalition Government 
immediately signalled its aim to ‘set the country on course for recovery’ (HM 
Treasury, 2010), by reducing the level of public debt through a drastic and 
prolonged commitment to austerity. The plans proposed by the Coalition 
Government were of ‘exceptional scale, speed, composition and distributional 
impact’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2012: 63). A significant component of the austerity 
strategy was cuts to the public sector as stated in the Coalition agreement:  
We will significantly accelerate the reduction of the 
structural deficit over the course of a Parliament, with the 
main burden of deficit reduction borne by reduced 
spending rather than increased taxes. 
Coalition Government, 2010: 15 
The extent of these cuts to public services was estimated at around £30 billion 
over a period of four years (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012), mainly affecting local 
government (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: Taylor-Gooby, 2012).  The scale of 
funding reductions to the public sector is consistent with the Conservative 
Party’s policy talk during its election campaign, which focused on the 
minimisation of public sector waste and bureaucracy. Particular emphasis was 
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placed on removing, or at least reducing, the scope of quasi autonomous non-
governmental organisations (quangos) which were argued to represent 
inefficiency: 
Government has been far too profligate for far too long. 
Billions are wasted each year on pointless bureaucracy and 
failed projects while taxpayers are left to foot the bill. The 
explosion of unaccountable quangos, public sector 
‘nonjobs’ and costly bureaucracy is an indictment of 
Labour’s reckless approach to spending other people’s 
money. 
Conservative Party, 2010: 69 
The need for austerity was a central aspect of both the Liberal Democrat and 
Conservative election campaigns, and much weight was placed upon the need to 
reduce the growing deficit, thereby justifying ‘fast and deep’ cuts to public 
services (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: 23). However, in addition to the 
economic rationale for austerity, this quote also reveals the Conservatives’ 
ideological reasons for austerity as a vehicle for the realisation of a smaller, less 
bureaucratic government. As noted by Bach (2012), ‘even before the full 
ramifications of the crisis were evident, the Conservative Party was committed to 
shrinking the state’ (2012: 400). Austerity, therefore, cannot just be regarded as a 
necessary burden to bear in order to put public finances back on track, but rather 
results from an ideological stance on the role and size of the state. Where New 
Labour sought to expand the role and reach of the state, the Conservatives, and as 
a result the Coalition, have sought to reverse this and shrink the scope of the state 
governing apparatus. As already described, the rise of community safety under 
New Labour came hand in hand with the expansion of the state, thus the 
Coalition Government commitment to a smaller state have had, and are likely to 
continue to have, significant ramifications for community safety work.  
Austerity can be seen to impact upon community safety in three principal ways. 
Firstly, over the course of the New Labour term of government the prioritisation 
of community safety as a policy agenda resulted in the development of 
significant governing infrastructures for the facilitation of multi-agency 
partnership work in each local authority, particularly in larger urban areas. It has 
been speculated that this infrastructure is under threat from austerity and broader 
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political shifts potentially compromising local governing capacity for community 
safety (Edwards and Hughes 2012; Gilling et al., 2013). This threat is said to 
emanate from an apparent apathy to the community safety agenda within the 
Coalition Government, as indicated within the Coalition agreement (Coalition 
Government, 2010). Where the discourses of partnership working and 
community safety were prevalent features of New Labour policy, the Coalition 
agreement reverts to a more police-centric policy response to crime and disorder. 
No mention is made of partnership working or community safety, and instead the 
onus for crime and disorder is placed squarely with the police. This antipathy to 
community safety as a policy agenda is further evidenced in the substantial 
spending cuts allocated to the community safety fund (Home Office, 2011a), the 
eventual removal of ring-fencing around the community safety fund, and its 
integration into the Police and Crime Commissioners policing budget.  
Secondly, in addition to the direct threat of shrinking funds for community 
safety, community safety work is also being affected by wider cuts to public 
services. As outlined previously, community safety is reliant upon partnership 
working and the participation and cooperation of partnership agencies. 
Therefore, as Lowndes and Pratchett argue, the financial pressures upon public 
sector agencies will likely act as a deterrent upon partnership working, as 
tightening budgets lead to an increased focus on core activity as agencies go into 
‘defensive mode’ (2012: 30). In this sense, austerity and the associated pressures 
upon partnership working can be seen as detrimental to community safety work.  
The final way that austerity can be seen to impact upon community safety is 
through welfare reforms and reduced funding to welfare and support services. As 
highlighted by Taylor-Gooby (2012) the welfare reforms sought by the Coalition 
Government are likely to ‘impose real costs on poorer and more vulnerable 
groups’ (2012:77), and that cuts to local government will ‘impact most sharply 
on poorer authorities’ (2012: 65). Such reforms and cuts will likely lead to 
reduced support services provided to the most vulnerable in society (Bochel, 
2011). Whilst this third factor lies beyond the scope of this thesis, the first two 
form the foundations for this research.  
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As outlined at the outset of this chapter, community safety has been 
conceptualised as a mode of governance that foregrounds partnership working 
between a plethora of state and non-state actors and places emphasis on issues of 
cooperation, inter-dependency and negotiation. The election of the Coalition 
Government in 2010 is significant is because much of the rhetoric and changes 
proposed by the Coalition Government have had a substantial impact upon 
community safety and the pursuit of multi-agency approaches to the prevention 
of crime. Before going into more detail about how community safety may adapt 
to conditions of austerity, it is worth exploring the other Coalition Government 
policies that are relevant to discussions of community safety and local 
governance.     
2.6 THE BIG SOCIETY, LOCALISM AND THE POLICE AND CRIME 
COMMISSIONERS 
For the Conservatives, and accordingly, the Coalition Government, the repealing 
of the state was to be combined with greater civic engagement and civic 
responsibility, termed the ‘Big Society’: 
Social responsibility not state control; the Big Society not 
big government  
Conservative Party, 2010: 35   
The Big Society has been described as an integral policy of the Coalition 
Government (Norman, 2010), and as an equivalent of New Labour’s ‘third way’ 
(Bach, 2012). Echoing the previous discussions of the Coalition approach to 
austerity, the ‘Big Society’ represented an ideological commitment to a less 
intrusive state but shares some similarities with the moral authoritarian 
communitarianism of New Labour (Sage, 2012). The Big Society aspires for 
greater civic engagement, and increased emphasis on individual and community 
responsibility:   
[…] a society with much higher levels of personal, 
professional, civic and corporate responsibility; a society 
where people come together to solve problems and 
improve life for themselves and their communities.  
Redistributing power from the state to society; from the 
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centre to local communities; giving people the opportunity 
to take more control over their lives 
Conservative Party, 2010 
Like communitarianism under New Labour, the communitarianist underpinning 
of the Big Society envisages homogenous communities and makes appeals to 
collective action as seen in the pronouncements that ‘we’re all in this together’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2010:1). Where New Labour drew on communitarianism to 
justify an expansion of the state to facilitate these stronger communities, 
communitarianism in the Big Society under the Coalition Government has been 
used to ‘legitimise public service reform’ (Bach, 2012: 403).  As Bach (2012) 
highlights, the Big Society has been framed as a response to the perceived 
failures of New Labour’s approach to generate civic engagement and community 
responsibility, and to free communities from ‘the technocratic systems of new 
public management’ (Bach, 2012: 404).  
However, for all of the talk surrounding the Big Society and its prominence in 
the early discourse of the Conservatives election campaign and the early stages 
of the Coalition Government, it has been subject to scepticism, and criticised as 
merely a ‘smokescreen’ for the realisation of the austerity agenda (Bach, 2012). 
Ed Milliband, leader of the opposition during the Coalition Government, 
criticised the Big Society as ‘cynically attempting to dignify its cuts agenda, by 
dressing up the withdrawal of support with the language of reinvigorating civic 
society’ (cited in Watt, 2010). Indeed, many commentators have remarked upon 
the potentially oppositional nature of the austerity agenda, suggesting that the 
relatively short-term objectives of austerity are incompatible with the longer term 
aims of fostering a stronger civil society. (Coote, 2010; Sage, 2012; Lowndes 
and Pratchett, 2012; Morgan, 2012).  Furthermore, Coote (2010) highlights the 
challenges posed to voluntary sector and charitable organisations in times of 
austerity, whose roles would be essential in realising the goals of the Big Society. 
Morgan takes the argument further, to undermine the validity and efficacy of the 
Coalition government’s commitment to fostering civil society: 
[…] were the government seriously committed to the 
concept of the Big Society, so the argument goes, they 
would place more emphasis on: stimulating economic 
growth and job creation; building more low-cost 
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opportunities for further education and training for school-
leavers; more tightly regulating the banks and finance 
houses; and so on.  
Morgan 2012: 468 
As part of the Coalitions’ plans for the Big Society, a significant emphasis was 
placed on the decentralisation of power and granting greater autonomy and 
responsibility to local authorities, based on ideas of ‘devolution, localism, 
restored discretion, partnership working, and responsibility’ (Morgan, 2012: 
467).  This apparent commitment to localism and the reduced role of the state 
was intended to enable more innovative, effective and efficient services: 
The Government is committed to passing new powers and 
freedoms to town halls. We think that power should be 
exercised at the lowest practical level - close to the people 
who are affected by decisions, rather than distant from 
them. Local authorities can do their job best when they 
have genuine freedom to respond to what local people 
want, not what they are told to do by central government. 
In challenging financial times, this freedom is more 
important than ever, enabling local authorities to innovate 
and deliver better value for taxpayers’ money.  
Department for Communities and Local Government, 
2011: 4 
The Coalition Governments’ commitment to localism was manifest in the 2010 
Localism Bill, which sought to free local governance from the tethers of New 
Labour control. This bill mandated the dissolution of central regulatory functions 
in addition to the ‘relaxation of targets’ and ‘the dismantling of central and local 
planning apparatus including the regional government offices, the Audit 
Commission, PSAs [Public Service Agreements] and Local Area Agreements’ 
(Joyce, 2011: 9). Keohane’s (2011) distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative 
liberty’ for local government is useful here. Keohane argues that for the proper 
realisation of the aims of localism, it is not enough to get central government out 
of the way, but initiatives have to be put in place to foster local democracy 
(2011). Of the various initiatives introduced by the localism bill, the most 
prominent were proposals to introduce locally elected Police and Crime 
Commissioners (PCCs) to:  
[…] make the police more accountable through oversight 
by a directly elected individual, who will be subject to 
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strict checks and balances by locally elected 
representatives 
Coalition Government, 2010: 13  
Consistent with the broader narratives of the Big Society and localism, PCCs 
were presented as a solution to the problems of accountability associated with the 
Police Authorities which had been weakened by ‘centrally imposed targets’ that 
‘placed central concerns above local needs and considerations’ (Joyce, 2011: 7). 
It was also hoped that PCCs would combat the emergence of a counting culture 
in British Policing (Loveday and Reid, 2003). In addition to breaking down the 
controls from the centre, PCCs were seen as a vehicle for promoting the aims of 
civic engagement by putting ‘power directly into the hands of the public’ (Home 
Office, 2011b: 10).  
However, following the first PCC elections, it was apparent that this power had 
been placed into fewer public hands than desired, with only 14.7% of the 
electorate turning out to vote (Joyce and Wain, 2013: 12; the Economist, 2012). 
Possible explanations for this low turnout include public disapproval of the 
policy, and ignorance as to the purpose and role of PCCs (Electoral Reform 
Society, 2012; Newburn, 2012). Others have pointed to problems of 
implementation, with suggestions that the election process had been conducted 
‘on the cheap’ (James, 2012) without adequate provision of information to the 
public (Joyce and Wain, 2012). Whatever the causes, such a low turnout raises 
questions about the legitimacy of the candidates and the underlying rationale of 
citizen empowerment and local democratic participation.  
The introduction of PCCs has also been opposed by some local government 
organisations (WLGA, 2011). In my MSc dissertation, a survey of community 
safety practitioners indicated concern regarding the impact of PCCs on 
community safety work (Cartwright, 2012). Participants attributed their concerns 
to both the transition of financial control for the community safety fund from the 
local authorities to the PCC, and to uncertainty about how PCCs would integrate 
with local actors and their impact upon governing agendas. The concerns of these 
practitioners echo Maguire’s summation that local service delivery could be 
subject to extreme changes ‘depending on the priorities and judgements of each 
individual PCC’ (Maguire, 2012: 489).  
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More fundamentally, the Coalition commitment to localism has been questioned 
on the grounds that austerity measures have disproportionately fallen upon local 
government (Taylor-Gooby, 2012). Stoker (cited in Lowdnes and Pratchett, 
2012: 28), describes local government finances as the ‘elephant in the room’, 
explaining that ‘until local government gets access to a wider variety of revenue 
raising sources and funds more of its own services it is difficult to say that 
localism has arrived’.  On the one hand the Coalition Government is granting 
greater responsibility and autonomy to local government as part of an agenda of 
decentralisation and localism, but with the other, they are imposing debilitating 
financial cuts, which inhibit the ability of local government to do anything with 
their new found freedom.  As a result, critics from the opposition have criticised 
the Coalition Government’s ‘commitment to localism as cynical and unfair’ 
(Brown, 2010).   
These discussions of austerity measures, the ‘Big Society’, localism, and PCCs 
lay important groundwork for my research in two key areas. Firstly, the changes 
in policy implemented by the Coalition Government are likely to have substantial 
implications for the future of community safety. Austerity measures, in 
combination with the loosening of central government control, present significant 
challenges for the pursuit of partnership work. Without centralised steering and 
management of community safety, there is potential that local governing actors 
pull back from the commitment to partnership working in an attempt to cut costs 
and save money, as cautioned by Lowndes and Pratchett (2012) and Gilling et al. 
(2013). Simultaneously however, despite austerity, decreasing central control of 
community safety may open up space for more progressive agendas due to the 
greater emphasis it places upon local political agency. Such opportunities are 
dependent upon local governing actors being able to adapt effectively to the 
challenges posed by austerity. This leads to the second reason why these 
discussions are important. Coalition Government proposals place greater 
emphasis upon the ways in which local partnership arrangements are organised 
and sustained at a local level, without the significant central government support 
previously provided under New Labour. Accordingly, the chapter now returns to 
the issue of governance, and specifically the usefulness of regime theory for 
contemporary discussions of community safety in a period of austerity.  
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2.7 COMMUNITY SAFETY AND REGIME THEORY 
The origins of regime theory can be traced to studies of urban political economy 
in the United States through the work of Elkin (1987) and Stone (1989). A 
central aspect of regime theory is the recognition of the limitations of state 
power, and the dependency on other actors that this leads to. For both Elkin 
(1987) and Stone (1989), regime theory facilitated an understanding of the 
interplay between state and non-state actors, and how under certain conditions 
regimes can form around particular governing agendas. Early developments 
focussed upon the interdependencies of the state and the private sector as 
described by Davies: 
[…] regime theory subscribes to this notion of a division 
of labour between state and market in which ownership of 
productive assets rest largely in the hands of the private 
sector while the machinery of government is subject to 
public control  
2002: 3  
For Stone this recognition of the interdependencies between state and non-state 
actors draws attention to the important distinction between discussions of ‘power 
over’ and ‘power to’. The concept of power over represents a misconception that 
preferences are static entities and that certain courses of action are followed 
because A has more power than B and can force B to follow A’s interests (Stone, 
2006).  This, Stone argues, obscures the reality of governing relations, which 
entail compromise, rather than actors having immutable preferences. Instead, he 
advocates the view that preferences are susceptible to change: continuing the 
example above, ‘we have now left the realm of A getting B to do what B would 
not otherwise do because the preferences of A and B have both given way to 
involvement in activity X’ (2006: 36). Regime theory is concerned, therefore, 
with how this interdependence and cooperation takes shape within local arenas of 
governance and how these relationships impact upon the pursuit of certain 
activities over others. In this way regime theory ‘emphasises the provisional 
political power as an ongoing struggle rather than an accomplished state 
formation’ (Edwards and Hughes, 2012: 436). 
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Originally confined to the context of urban governance in the United States, there 
has been expanding recognition of regime theory as a useful conceptual 
framework for examining various policy issues within the arena of local 
governance in the UK (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994; Davies, 2002; Edwards 
and Hughes, 2012). This wider appropriation of regime theory has been 
questioned by Mossberger and Stoker, who highlight that the increasing use of 
regime theory has put it at risk of ‘concept stretch’ (2001: 811). Davies (2002; 
2003) goes further to argue that the theoretical framework offered by regime 
theory is not compatible with the context of local governance in the UK:  
[…] where urban regimes are comparatively autonomous 
and informal networks, regeneration partnerships are 
bureaucratic structures under strong central government 
control…it seems unlikely in the context of a centralised 
UK government that they are the seed from which regime-
like coalitions might grow 
 Davies, 2003: 3 
The cornerstone of Davies’ critique of the application of regime theory to the UK 
is the presence of strong central government control and centralised UK 
government, which at the time of Davies’ writing was characteristic of the New 
Labour Government. However, as this chapter has described, such centralised 
and controlling tendencies are being reversed through Coalition Government 
reforms. The shift towards localism, reduced central government control, and a 
greater diversity of service provision as part of the Big Society, all act to create a 
context which is more suitable for the application of regime theory and its 
emphasis on local politics and interdependencies at local levels (Edwards and 
Hughes, 2012).  Conditions of austerity and the ideological push for reduced 
state control further directs attention towards the way in which local state actors 
interact with other stakeholders at a local level and how these competing interests 
play out. These conditions necessitate a conceptual framework that is receptive to 
the power relations that exist at a local level, the competing agendas that result 
from this dispersal of power beyond the state and how these power relations and 
competing agendas may impact upon the position of community safety within 
local governing agendas.  
 33 
In departing from Hobbesian notions of power, regime theory, as a sub-set of 
governance studies, provides a suitable theoretical framework to understand 
these relationships of power and their impact on governing agendas. A possible 
alternative conceptualisation from the field of governance studies is Bayley and 
Shearing’s (2003) concept of nodal governance. Bayley and Shearing draw 
attention to the competing sources of power beyond the local state, and how 
these different ‘nodes’ may interact with each other. However, given the legacy 
of the dual responsibility of local authorities and the police for community safety 
under New Labour, it is important that the role of local government is 
foregrounded in this research due to their constitutional-legal mandate to lead 
local community safety arrangements.  
Regime theory offers an examination of the ‘normative and empirical 
distinctiveness of public authority as an object of inquiry’ (Edwards and Hughes, 
2012: 444). This is in contrast with studies of governance that have a tendency to 
focus on alternative forms of governance beyond the state (Edwards and Hughes: 
2012: 444).  Therefore, while governance studies enable an understanding on the 
fragmentation of power in local governance and position of the local state within 
that, regime theory offers this but in addition allows an examination of ‘the 
legitimacy and governing capacities of public authorities embedded in particular 
political-economies’ (Edwards and Hughes, 2012: 444). Regime theory provides 
a conceptual basis for investigating and understanding how the local authority 
and the police adapt to conditions of austerity, and how cooperation is sought 
from other state and non-state actors and the impact of this upon community 
safety work within certain localities. 
The theoretical framework provided by regime theory facilitates the empirical 
investigation of local governing arrangements.  Stone (2005) sets out four core 
components of regimes: First, there must be a governing agenda that is structured 
around particular issues. These agendas can be subdivided into four conceptual 
categories that Edwards and Hughes (2012: 448) apply to discussions of 
community safety:  
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• Maintenance agendas entail a focus on criminal justice where 
community safety policies are seen to ‘augment criminal law 
enforcement’ (Edwards and Hughes, 2012: 448).  
• Developmental agendas can be characterised as approaches that seek 
to identify and mitigate risks, through situational preventative 
measures and early interventions with problematic groups, and the 
responsibilisation of citizens to take greater precautions for their own 
safety.  
• Progressive agendas are concerned with restorative justice and 
attempts to divert offenders away from the criminal justice system.  
• Transformative agendas are aligned to aims of social justice through 
improving social inclusion and reducing inequalities.  
A more detailed discussion of how these categories were operationalised in this 
research is found in the next chapter. The second necessary component of a 
regime is a governing coalition that forms around a particular agenda, which is 
likely to include both state and non-state actors. Third, regimes must have access 
to governing resources, which enable the realisation of the governing agenda. 
These governing resources can be differentiated into constitutional legal, 
financial, organisational, informational and political. Finally, a governing regime 
needs a way of inducing cooperation from the various actors and the sharing of 
resources, which Stone (2005) terms the schemes of cooperation and represent 
the ways in which partnership and collaboration is incentivised.  Together, these 
four components provide a framework for investigating and understanding the 
formation of regimes, and therefore direct empirical enquiry towards these 
issues. By using this framework, it is possible to identify a series of propositions 
that outline the potential futures for community safety in a period of austerity.  
2.8 POTENTIAL FUTURES FOR COMMUNITY SAFETY 
While the broader structural context of austerity cannot be ignored, as it ‘affects 
both the network structure and the resources that actors have to utilise within the 
network’ (Cope 2001: 17), it must be recognised that how local governing actors 
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choose to respond to these pressures is not predetermined. It is important to 
recognise, therefore,  ‘the possibility of actors making their own history albeit 
not in conditions of their own choosing’ (Edwards and Hughes 2012: 436).   The 
importance of appreciating the role of local actors in determining how to respond 
to structural conditions is further emphasised by Marsh and Smith: 
We need to acknowledge that network structures, and the 
resource dependencies, which they entail, are not fixed. 
What is more agents choose policy options, bargain, argue 
and break up networks. So, agents can, and do, negotiate 
and renegotiate network structures. As such, any 
explanation of change must emphasise the role of agents, 
while also acknowledging that the broader context within 
which the network operates affects the interests and 
actions of network members 
2000: 7 
Consequently, while austerity does represent a significant challenge to the 
governing capacity of local regimes and the pursuit of community safety 
agendas, how this plays out in particular contexts is uncertain and requires 
empirical investigation. To aid this empirical enquiry, it is helpful to provide a 
series of theoretical propositions for the future of community safety using the 
conceptual framework provided by regime theory. As Fox et al. (2011) assert, 
such predictions about the future are limited due to the uncertainty within the 
academic literature regarding the potential impact of austerity strategies upon 
local governance and community safety more specifically.  Nevertheless, such 
speculation is useful due to its provision of a series of scenarios to compare this 
research against. Therefore, using the available literature, it is possible to identify 
four potential futures for community safety in an age of austerity. These 
propositions are organised around the four types of agenda for community safety 
identified described by Edwards and Hughes (2012) in relation to community 
safety:  
• Maintenance: A retrenchment of partnership activity and a return to a 
maintenance agenda. 
• Developmental: A rise of smarter governance and emphasis on risk.  
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• Progressive: More progressive agendas and the continuation of 
partnership activities made possible by minor adaptations to the 
governing arrangements.  
• Transformative: Radical change through the integration of 
partnership structures and the mainstreaming of community safety 
culminating in more transformative agendas. 
2.8.1 THE RETRENCHMENT OF PARTNERSHIP ACTIVITY AND A RETURN TO A 
MAINTENANCE AGENDA 
The first theoretical proposition is one of degradation and the breaking down of 
local partnership arrangements around crime and disorder, and a return to 
predominantly police-led enforcement of crime and disorder. As outlined 
previously, austerity has resulted in significant reductions to public spending, 
especially in the area of local government (Bach, 2012).  Lowndes and Pratchett 
(2012) argue that reduced financial resources represent a challenge to the 
governing capacity of local authorities, and can result in the degradation of 
partnership work. The proclivity of partners to work together may be impeded by 
an increase in defensive thinking about budgets and a prioritisation of core 
priorities (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012). Similar speculations are shared by 
Gilling et al. who suggest that austerity measures may generate ‘a centripetal 
force that encourages a focus on ‘core business’ and therefore a climate that is 
less supportive of partnership working in peripheral areas’ (2013: 329).  
In addition to the pressures of austerity, the introduction of PCCs has 
compounded the uncertainty around the local governance of crime and disorder 
(Maguire, 2012), as shifting responsibilities for the allocation of funding removes 
control from local authorities. Gilling et al. (2013) build on this, positing that the 
introduction of PCCs risks sacrificing progressive multi-agency-based prevention 
and community safety expertise in favour of ‘deploying resources first and 
foremost for reactive, old-fashioned police led “crime fighting”’ (2013: 5). This 
concern about the potential prioritisation of more visible and more publically 
appealing reactive approaches to crime at the expense of progressive multi-
agency partnership approaches is shared by Edwards and Hughes who state that: 
‘the immediate wrongs of an offence and the harms experienced by particular 
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victims are more intelligible for most citizens that the relatively nebulous 
concepts of social and political exclusion’ (2012: 20).   
Community safety may be at heightened risk to budgetary cuts compared to other 
policy areas since reductions in this area are unlikely to result in public 
disapproval.  In looking at this, Garland’s (1996; 2001) distinction between the 
instrumental and emotional rationalities behind political decisions is helpful. For 
example, Zimring (2001) and Spark (2007) suggest that the emotional and 
symbolic value of criminal justice policies is more important than instrumental 
concerns of effectiveness. Similarly, Frieberg (2001) argues that this is a problem 
for crime prevention more broadly: potentially effective crime prevention 
strategies are unlikely to gain political support, as they do not fulfil the emotional 
components of crime control.  These considerations highlight the difficulties for 
the community safety agenda with regards to the limited political resources 
available to it compared to other policy agendas that may generate greater public 
support.  
Gilling et al. (2013) are clear that such conditions of austerity and uncertainty are 
likely to have significant impact upon the governing capacity of local authorities 
to pursue community safety work.  They describe how diminishing financial 
resources is leading to the abandonment of the Community Safety Partnership 
model in some local authorities, as only minimal compliance with the 
requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act is sought. As noted earlier in this 
chapter, these predictions are consistent with the findings of my own MSc 
research (Cartwright, 2012), which indicated emerging concerns from key 
community safety practitioners in the National Community Safety Network. 
These concerns centred on the perceived decline in the number of community 
safety officers, and the future of community safety in light of austerity and the 
introduction of PCCs.   
The speculations of Gilling et al. (2013) and Lowndes and Pratchett (2012) on 
the challenges posed by austerity to the continuation of partnership activity in 
local governance point to the potential for the degradation of multi-agency 
activity for the prevention of crime and disorder. Without the support of the 
community safety infrastructure there is the potential that a distinct community 
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safety agenda, as separate from an enforcement orientated policing agenda, will 
disappear. In such a situation, it is suggested that local responses to crime and 
disorder will revert back to reactive police led enforcement, whereby any 
remaining partnership activity is likely to be limited to supporting or assisting in 
the policing of crime and disorder.  
2.8.2 A RISE OF SMARTER GOVERNANCE AND EMPHASIS ON RISK  
The second proposition relates to the potential for a greater emphasis on ideas of 
risk management and the targeted provision of services. As Edwards and Hughes 
(2012: 451) argue, the structural conditions of austerity may ‘further reduce the 
scope for social justice agendas, and possibly for the resource-intensive agendas 
of criminal justice, while prioritizing risk management agendas that claim to 
minimize the opportunities for crime’.  For Edwards and Hughes (2012), the 
potential resurgence of risk management narratives in periods of austerity are 
possible due to the preoccupation with reducing financial resources. The 
argument being that targeting crime prevention initiatives at those most at risk 
will enable the more efficient use of increasingly limited resources. This notion 
of ‘smarter governance’ is evident in recent literature, which also highlights the 
need for more targeted provision of limited resources and a system for 
identifying those most at risk (Taylor et al., 2015). For Taylor et al., such an 
approach is favourable as it would ‘improve operational efficiency and 
effectiveness through targeted and coordinated provision of preventative 
measures’ (2015: 346).  
 This emphasis on risk management is further seen in Edwards and Prins’ (2014) 
research on the policing agenda in London under former Mayor Boris Johnson.  
Edwards and Prins (2014) document how the agenda in London has largely 
ignored the wider social and economic context of criminality as evidenced in the 
foregrounding of enforcement strategies for problems of gang violence while 
‘abstracting street violence from its social and economic contexts of poverty, 
diminishing welfare provision and exclusion for legitimate labour markets’ 
(2014: 76). Edwards and Prins define London as an example of a developmental 
agenda where ‘smarter forms of governance and risk management’ (2014: 71) 
augment police led enforcement strategies. It is apparent then, that austerity and 
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the associated reduction in financial resources may encourage a greater focus on 
identifying and mitigating risk.  
Furthermore, given the aims of the Big Society to give a greater role to the 
commercial sector in local delivery, it is important to consider how private sector 
engagement may further facilitate a more risk-focussed agenda. Rogers and 
Gravelle suggest that partnership working in the UK may begin to resemble the 
European approach, where ‘a significant amount of partnership working tasks are 
contracted out to private companies and industries’ (2011: 30). However, this 
vision is reliant on the ‘assumption…that private contractors are able and willing 
to carry out the necessary partnership function’ (Rogers and Gravelle 2011: 30), 
and as Edwards and Hughes (2012) state, the role of the private sector is likely to 
be limited to instances where there are profit incentives. The most obvious 
example of this is in the management of the night-time economy, where private 
sector engagement in security and safety is conducive to the generation of profit 
and where bouncers are viewed as ‘the dominant providers of order’ (Hobbs et 
al. 2005: 171). However, such arrangements are fractious with an uneasy 
relationship between the competing interests of the state and the commercial 
sector (Hobbs et al. 2005). Moreover this contingency of private sector 
involvement, dependent upon profit incentives, limits the scope of such mutually 
beneficial arrangements where easily identifiable profit incentives are not 
apparent. In such cases the role of the private sector may be limited to 
contractual arrangements such as the provision of private prisons (Jones and 
Newburn, 2005), but even these arrangements ‘raise questions about principles of 
justice, and contain risks for all parties concerned’ (Maguire, 2012: 1).   
Due to these constraints on private sector engagement, the increased emphasis on 
individual responsibility coupled with austerity measures and a retrenchment of 
public services, may lead to a proliferation of individualised security and the 
personal management of risk by citizens themselves. For Farrell et al. (2011), the 
increased use of private security devices (e.g. electronic gates, personal alarms, 
security lights, motion sensors, CCTV), has been instrumental in achieving the 
crime drop in recent decades. While the increased popularity of private security 
devices, and the associated responsibilisation of risk management to citizens is 
beyond the scope of this research, the implications of such a shift is worth 
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considering as part of the larger narrative of the potential retrenchment of the 
state. Hughes outlines how ‘situational measures can, by reassigning costs of 
prevention to potential victims, exacerbate the segregation of urban environs into 
zones of high and low risk’ (1998: 143). Morelle and Tadie recount such a 
problem in the context of Caracas:  
[…] economic policies have an impact on the production 
of security…austerity packages and structural adjustments 
signalled the end of certain public initiatives, with 
consequences on both the action of police forces and the 
living conditions of city-dwellers. The pauperization of 
many inhabitants increased perceived insecurity and gave 
rise to private initiatives to ensure the safety of wealthy 
neighbourhoods, which the poorer ones could not afford  
2011: 7 
While the commodification of security and safety is not new in the UK (Atkinson 
and Flint, 2004; Farrell et al., 2011; Hughes, 1998), it has coincided with wider 
preventative strategies implemented within community safety partnerships. 
Therefore, should the governing infrastructure of the community safety 
partnerships disappear as cautioned by Gilling et al. (2013), the possible 
reassignment of costs to potential victims will likely result in the ‘abandonment 
of non-profitable populations and locations by both the State and the market’ 
(Edwards and Hughes, 2012: 451).  
2.8.3 OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADAPTATION AND PROGRESSIVE AGENDAS  
This third proposition focuses on the opportunities afforded by the Coalition 
Governments’ push for localism and a decentralisation of power. Lowndes and 
Pratchett describe this agenda as an opportunity for local actors to have ‘greater 
freedom to be innovative in the way that they work with and support their 
communities’ (2012: 25). Similarly, in relation to the devolution of powers to 
Wales, Drakeford (2010) and Muncie (2011) highlight the merits of greater 
discretion and decentralisation in Wales, and the enabling of a more progressive 
agenda around youth justice. Such a dispersal of power can ‘open up spaces for 
reworking, reinterpretation and avoidance of national and international 
directives’ (Muncie, 2011: 52). There is, therefore, the potential that, as a result 
of greater discretion, local authorities will be able to pursue more progressive 
agendas for community safety that extend beyond the narrow confines targeted 
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under New Labour, leading to more diversionary approaches to offending 
behaviour. However, given the extent of austerity, such opportunities are reliant 
on adaptations being made to the local governing arrangements that allow for the 
continuation of partnership activity.  
For Houghton (2012), austerity does not necessarily translate into a retrenchment 
of partnership activity, and instead may incentivise partnership working as a way 
of providing cost efficiency in local service delivery through economies of scale 
and reducing duplication of work and services. As partner agencies strive to 
maximise efficiency, the benefits of shared resources and information may 
become increasingly attractive, incentivising participation. When considering 
how to address ‘problem families’, Houghton contends: 
[…] the partnership approach allows for agencies to come 
together in teams and deal with these families in a 
coordinated and coherent fashion…such an approach will 
reduce costs and if properly focused can address 
dysfunctional families’ problems  
2012: 109   
Moreover, following a decade of sustained partnership working as part of the 
New Labour approach to community safety, O’Neil and McCarthy (2014) argue 
that partnership approaches to crime and disorder have become engrained in the 
operational activity of the police. It may be possible therefore that partnership 
activity is more resilient to pressures of austerity due to the perceived merits it 
has for improved practice and the sharing of resources. 
It is also possible that the Coalition Government’s vision for a greater role of 
community and voluntary sectors (Gilling et al., 2013) may enable the 
continuation of partnership work. As Maguire states, the Big Society envisioned 
‘the enhanced contribution to criminal justice services anticipated from voluntary 
(or ‘third’) sector organizations (TSOs)’ (2012: 483). Advocates for the growing 
use of commercial and voluntary sectors argue that such organisations may be 
more ‘innovative and flexible’ and better able to engage service users, 
introducing an element of competition to enable the best service delivered at the 
lowest cost (Maguire, 2012). Alongside the greater role of the voluntary sector 
organisations, the communitarian values of the Big Society are also calibrated to 
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empower ‘communities to take over state-run services’ (Lowndes and Pratchett, 
2012: 26). It has been suggested that such engagement of local communities in 
service delivery will benefit partnership working in five key ways: empowering 
communities; action-orientated communities; decentralised power; greater social 
enterprises; and information ability (Cabinet Office, 2010).  It is important to 
state that the push for greater engagement of the voluntary sector and 
communities themselves was not represented as ‘the next best thing’ in the 
absence of public service provision, but rather as a way of improving service 
delivery. Indeed, Edwards and Hughes note how the engagement of the voluntary 
sector may be encouraged through a shift towards more progressive agendas, 
since ‘restorative justice has also attracted significant interest from voluntary or 
‘third sector’ organisations’ (2012: 449). In particular, restorative justice chimes 
with religious notions of repentance and recompense (Edwards and Hughes, 
2012).   
However, relying on voluntary sector and community engagement to mitigate the 
effects of public sector cuts is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
aspirations for community engagement are hardly novel in the field of 
community safety, and in the past have largely failed to be actualised (Hughes, 
2007). Instead, communities tend to be passive recipients of community 
strategies, a problem accentuated in areas of socio-economic disadvantage 
(Taylor, 2003). Secondly, Considine (2011), cautions against the push for civic 
engagement through the potential introduction of the ‘good Samaritan’ law. This 
law, consistent with the populist, neo-liberal Conservative ideology of devolved 
legal authority, offers immunity to those who intervene to stop criminal activity. 
For Considine, whilst such a law ‘has the virtue of being cheap’ and promotes 
‘the value of civic responsibility’ (2011: 94), it could result in growing 
vigilantism in response to crime. This type of law could also be corrupted leading 
to what Edwards and Hughes call ‘authoritarian gangsterism’ (2012: 451).  
Thirdly, it has been argued that the potential of greater civic engagement, as part 
of the Big Society, has been ‘overshadowed by the severe cuts in public 
expenditure’ and ‘the growing tide of unemployment’ (Morgan, 2012: 465). The 
assumption that budgetary cuts will be eased by an increase in unpaid volunteers 
(Rogers and Gravelle, 2011: 29) seems overly optimistic: the training, 
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recruitment, organisation and professional supervision of volunteers ensure that 
they cannot be considered a ‘free good’ (Morgan, 2012). This issue was evident 
in Liverpool, a former ‘Big Society vanguard area’, which withdrew from the 
pilot as ‘government funding reductions were forcing cuts in support to the 
voluntary sector’ (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: 30).  
2.8.4 RADICAL CHANGE, INTEGRATED PARTNERSHIP WORKING AND 
TRANSFORMATIVE AGENDAS 
The final proposition relates to the claims of Edwards and Hughes that ‘major 
political-economic shocks’, such as the implementation of austerity measures 
under the Coalition government, provide ‘the structural context for regime 
change’ (2012: 453). Faulkner outlines how the prospect of cuts can open up 
opportunities for improvements which, whilst fully justifiable ‘on their own 
merits’, would be  ‘politically difficult in more favourable economic 
circumstances’ (2012: 22). Put simply, austerity, and the conditions it creates, 
holds the potential for more drastic reforms which would be difficult to achieve 
in less turbulent times. Evidence of this may be seen in the growth of strategic 
thinking about how localities can be governed in a joined up way recognising 
‘interrelationships between crime, health, education, employment, housing, 
provision for young people’ (Edwards and Hughes, 2012: 21).  
Such strategic ambitions are not in themselves new as in England Local Strategic 
Partnerships (LSPs) have been part of the governing arrangements of local 
authorities since 2000. Their equivalents in Wales, Local Service Boards (LSBs), 
have been piloted in Cardiff since 2007. While Lowndes and Pratchett (2012) 
argue that the Coalition government has neglected the partnership agenda, recent 
years have seen the emergent emphasis on the value of such strategic thinking in 
responding to the problems facing local governance. At a national level George 
Osborne (Chancellor of the Exchequer 2010-2016) has pursued devolution 
settlements in large urban centres in the United Kingdom (BBC, 2015). Within 
Wales, LSBs have been pushed to the fore, to take a more prominent role in local 
governing arrangements. This is visible in the Welsh Government ‘Shared 
Purpose – Shared Delivery’ paper that advocates the streamlining of partnership 
plans to reduce complexity and the role of LSBs as the ‘appropriate forum for 
formulating and reviewing single integrated plans’ (Welsh Government, 2012: 
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8). The merits of the creation of an integrated partnership plan were stated as 
follows: 
A single integrated Plan represents a significant 
simplification. It is the view of the Welsh Government that 
a single integrated plan should replace at least four of the 
existing statutory plans and strategies (the Community 
Strategy, the Children and Young People’s Plan, the 
Health, Social Care and Well-being Strategy and the 
Community Safety Partnership Plan (which incorporates 
the 3 crimes and disorder strategies)), thereby reducing 
complexity and duplication, and freeing up resources 
Welsh Government, 2012: 4 
In Wales, LSBs have been presented as a way of reducing the complexity of 
partnership arrangements, cutting costs and improving efficiency. Indeed, the 
Partnership Council for Wales assert that this rationalisation and streamlining of 
partnership plans would enable them and their partners to ‘focus more effectively 
on improving outcomes’ (Partnership Council for Wales, 2011: 1). These plans 
are not only presented as a way of reducing expenditure in times of austerity, but 
also as a way to improve delivery.  At the time, the Welsh Local Government 
Association (WLGA) reported that responses to these proposed LSBs were 
largely positive about their potential to facilitate the ‘prevention, early 
intervention and better handling of transition between service providers’ 
(WLGA, 2012: 1).  
The implications of this increasing emphasis on strategic thinking for community 
safety are evident within the Welsh Government paper (2012) and the WLGA 
response (2012), where it is highlighted that the governing arrangements of the 
Local Service Board and single integrated strategy would be sufficient to meet 
the statutory requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act (CDA). According to 
the Welsh Government, these statutory requirements ‘should not prevent LSBs 
from reviewing and streamlining partnership structures to make them fit for 
purpose’ (2012). This is reminiscent of Gilling et al.’s claims that some local 
authorities are abandoning the community safety partnership model and are 
seeking ‘only minimal compliance with the Section 17 of the CDA’ (2013: 329). 
Yet, in contrast to this idea of minimal compliance this integration of partnership 
arrangements is argued to improve delivery. This potential to improve service 
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delivery is consistent with early discussions of the CDA and the opportunities 
presented by section 17 and the ‘mainstreaming’ of community safety. For Moss 
and Pease (1999), section 17 was the most radical aspect of the CDA and had the 
potential to facilitate more holistic approaches to local governance. This section 
of the Act specified that:  
Without prejudice to any other obligation imposed on it, 
it shall be the duty of each authority to which this section 
applies to exercise its various functions with due regard 
to the likely effect of the exercise of those function on, 
and the need to do all that it reasonably can to prevent, 
crime and disorder in its area 
Home Office, 1998 
The implications of this statement are significant: responsibility for issues of 
crime and disorder ceased to be the sole domain of the police, and instead all 
actors involved within local government should consider the possible 
implications of their actions on crime and disorder (Deane and Doran, 2002). 
However, as Moss (2001) argues, in reality the implications of Section 17 and 
the mainstreaming of community safety have been less significant than expected, 
due, in part, to the absence of any legal backing to enforce its directives. Others 
argue that the potential of section 17 has been hampered by the dual 
responsibility placed on the local authorities and the police, leading to 
community safety operating under a ‘policing agenda’ and stifling participation 
from other agencies (Crawford and Evans, 2012).  
It could, therefore, be argued that Welsh Government recommendations 
regarding the integration of partnership plans, may be conducive to the more 
effective realisation of Section 17 and the mainstreaming of community safety 
facilitating a more holistic approach to the governance of crime, disorder and 
safety. In this way, the loosening of central government control, in combination 
with the financial pressures of austerity, may incentivise more integrated 
approaches to strategic governance. This, in turn, may reduce cost and potentially 
lead to more transformative agendas around crime and disorder. The integration 
of community safety partnerships into LSBs may not actually reduce governing 
capacity for community safety, but may instead facilitate more holistic 
approaches to crime prevention in line with a more transformative agenda around 
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social justice.  However, as Edwards and Hughes state, ‘whether there is the 
political acumen to build a shared purpose around a social justice agenda for 
public safety remains an issue for empirical investigation’ (2012: 454). 
2.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has sought to provide the contextual and conceptual underpinnings 
of the thesis. Using the periodisation of community safety provided by Gilling et 
al. (2013), it has been possible to examine how community safety, as a way of 
governing social problems, emerged during the second half of the 20th century 
and rose to prominence under New Labour from 1997 to 2010. The contested 
nature of community safety (Hughes, 2006) has been a persistent issue since its 
conception. Conceptualisations have ranged from a mere synonym for crime 
prevention but with ‘fluffy overtones’ (Wiles and Pease, 2000) to those that 
emphasise its more radical potential to promote an encompassing social model of 
crime prevention.  During the national mandatory period of community safety 
under the New Labour Government, central government control restricted the 
more progressive potential of community safety in favour of a narrow focus on 
crime and disorder (Wiles and Pease, 2000).  Under New Labour, community 
safety was highly resourced, enabling the establishment of multi-agency teams 
and an emergent professional identity of community safety practitioners.  
It is in this context that the developments following the election of the Coalition 
Government must be considered. A commitment to sustained austerity, an 
ideological belief in smaller government, and a greater emphasis on localism, 
raise important questions for the future of community safety and multi-agency 
approaches to crime prevention. This third phase of community safety represents 
a significant departure from the national mandatory period. It is characterised by 
reduced central control of the community safety agenda, in favour of greater 
autonomy of local governing actors.  However, as a result of austerity measures, 
the potential benefits of this autonomy must be realised against a backdrop of 
severe cuts to public sector expenditure.  
As has been demonstrated, these conditions foreground the importance of 
understanding local governing arrangements when looking at community safety 
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in a period of austerity. Using regime theory, which places emphasis on the 
power relations of local governing actors, it has been possible to formulate a 
series of theoretical propositions about how different community safety agendas 
may be realised in certain local economic and political contexts. These 
propositions offer insight into the type of community safety agendas that may be 
adopted, and the governing arrangements that may facilitate them. In summary, 
these propositions were as follows:  
1. The degradation of partnership work and the return to a maintenance 
agenda organised around reactive policing and enforcement of 
criminal behaviour;  
2. The emergence of a developmental agenda around ideas of risk 
management made possible by a desire to prioritise on resources on 
those most at risk and through the greater engagement of the private 
sector; 
3. The pursuit of a progressive agenda around restorative justice made 
possible by the discretion afforded as part of localism but due to 
reducing financial resources reliant on community and voluntary 
sector participation; 
4. The potential for transformative agendas that seek a more holistic 
preventative approach to social problems may be made possible 
through an increased emphasis on strategic governance and the 
development of integrated partnership structures.  
These propositions are not exhaustive but do provide a series of theoretically 
distinct scenarios which can were to orientate this research. In reality such clear 
distinctions are unlikely, and it is very possible that community safety regimes 
may contain elements of all of these propositions, or may even fail to achieve 
any coherent regime (Edwards and Hughes, 2012). Having provided this 
conceptual and contextual backdrop, Chapter 3 explores how the importance of 
understanding local governing arrangements has influenced the research design 
and methodological choices of this study. 
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3. RESEARCHING SAFER AND COHESIVE 
COMMUNITIES IN CARDIFF: A CASE STUDY 
APPROACH  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this research was to assess how local governing actors have 
responded to Coalition Government policies of austerity and the impact of this 
upon the local governance of crime, disorder and safety.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Coalition Government policies of austerity and the 
decentralisation of power away from Westminster, have granted greater 
autonomy to local governing actors while simultaneously posing challenges to 
local governing capacity. These conditions present a spectrum of possibilities of 
how local actors may respond to such conditions, and the impact of this upon 
community safety work. This ties in with the claims of Edwards and Hughes that 
‘certain localities are not simply victims of; or politically defensive redoubts 
against, global forces but are, in relation to other localities, the origins of these 
forces’ (2005: 346).  The recognition of the uncertain future for community 
safety, highlights the importance of empirical research situated within particular 
local contexts. Through locally situated case studies it is possible to understand 
how local power relations and dependencies affect the formulation of particular 
governing regimes, their arrangements, agendas and the schemes of cooperation 
used to sustain partnership work. This framing of the research problem was 
critical in influencing the choices and decisions made regarding the research 
strategy, design and methods as will be explored over the course of this chapter.  
3.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
The increased emphasis on localism, and the decentralisation of power following 
the election of the Coalition Government, places greater importance on situating 
changes to community safety arrangements within particular local political and 
economic contexts. This necessitates a conceptual and analytical framework that 
facilitates the empirical investigation of local governing conditions and their 
affect on the formation of governing regimes. Regime theory, as discussed in 
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Chapter 2, draws attention to the political and economic context of local 
governance, and how these conditions impact upon the formation of particular 
governing regimes, and how these regimes may be sustained or may 
subsequently fail. As noted in the previous chapter, a key concept underpinning 
regime theory is interdependency and its relation to the power relationships that 
exist at a local level. For Stone (2006), what is of interest is why, under particular 
conditions, some agendas are pursued and others are not, and how the interaction 
of local governing actors impact upon these decisions.  Ideas of compromise, 
negotiation and interdependence form key aspects of Stone’s the arguments 
around the  ‘power to’ govern (Stone, 2006). For Stone, the power to govern is 
dependent upon the coercion and encouragement of actors behind a shared 
agenda, rather than the command and control arrangements understood in 
Hobbesian discussions of power noted in Chapter 2. Regime theory provides a 
conceptual framework to consider the local political and economic context, 
which shape these interdependencies and influence local governing practices.  
This conceptual framework is organised around four components: an agenda, 
governing arrangements made up of a coalition of local actors, governing 
resources and schemes of cooperation.  
This emphasis on the local context of governance implicit in regime theory may 
run the risk of, what Young termed, hermetic localism (2003 cited in Edwards 
and Hughes, 2005: 349). Similarly, Sayer has highlighted the limitations of 
research too deeply rooted in particular ‘geo historical context’ that the findings 
cannot be applied elsewhere (2000:133). This research did not seek to make 
generalisations from the findings generated here, nor did it seek to follow the 
interpretivist tradition advocated by Young (2011), whereby explanations of 
social phenomenon are rooted within the confines from which they originate. 
Instead this research adopts a realist perspective, which recognises the ‘culturally 
mediated’ nature of reality but acknowledges the existence of an objective reality  
(Edwards, 2012). This acknowledgement that there is an objective truth to be 
known, ‘implies that some descriptions will be “better” or more “realistic” than 
others’ (Williams, 2009: 8). This is a key point for realism, while it is 
acknowledged that there is an objective reality, we are only able to understand it 
through the application of particular descriptions. As Bhaskar states: ‘things exist 
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and act independently of our descriptions, but we can only know them under 
particular descriptions’ (1978: 250).  For Bottoms (2000) and Sayer (2000) 
research cannot be conducted in the absence of theory, and in this sense regime 
theory forms the ‘theoretical lens’ of this research. Given the theory driven 
nature of this research, the purpose of this study was not to extrapolate these 
findings to broader contexts, but rather to achieve what Yin calls ‘analytic 
generalization’ (2003: 32). In this sense, the purpose of this research was to 
contribute to wider theoretical understandings of community safety in the 
‘localised and devolved’ period. In doing so, the research demonstrates the value 
of regime theory for better understanding how and why local community safety 
regimes are formed, and following the arguments of Layder (1998), adapting this 
theory where necessary. It is acknowledged that the design and methods used in 
this research are but one way of conducting this study. In the following 
discussions I will outline why the research design and methods were considered 
appropriate given the research aim and its theoretical underpinning. 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Using the conceptual framework offered by regime theory, this research aimed to 
assess the extent to which Coalition Government policies of austerity have 
affected local governing agendas, arrangements, resources, and schemes of 
cooperation for community safety work.  To accomplish this, a case study 
approach was employed, with the governing regime of the Cardiff Partnership 
Board serving as a single embedded case. In employing a case study design, Yin 
(2003: 42-43) makes a distinction between different types of ‘case’, which 
include: the typical case, the longitudinal case, the critical case, the exemplary 
case, and the unique case.  In this research, the case was defined as a ‘critical’ 
case as Cardiff was considered analytically significant for the testing of the 
theoretical propositions outlined at the end of Chapter 2. The significance of 
Cardiff as a critical case site will be discussed shortly, but first it is necessary to 
consider the nature of this case study in more detail. 
The following sections offer a more detailed examination of the case study used 
in this research, why it was applicable and how it was defined and 
operationalised in relation to the research aims. To facilitate this, the discussion 
 51 
of the research design will be structured around the five key elements of case 
study work, identified by Yin (2003: 21), which are:  
i. The study’s questions 
ii. The study’s propositions 
iii. The study’s units of analysis 
iv. The logic linking the data to the propositions  
v. The criteria for interpreting the findings.  
 
3.3.1 THE STUDY’S QUESTIONS 
For Yin (2003), the choice of research design is dependent upon the questions 
that are being asked. Yin notes that questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ are most 
appropriate for case study research. This was reflected in the underlying aim of 
this research, which was: 
How have Coalition Government policies of austerity, localism, and the 
introduction of PCCs affected local community safety arrangements? 
Taking into account the analytical framework offered by regime theory, it was 
possible to operationalise this question in line with the four components of 
regime theory. Doing so enabled the overarching aim of this research to be 
phrased in a way that facilitated a clear empirical focus, and assisted in the 
creation of theoretically driven research questions. Using regime theory it is 
possible to rephrase the research aim as follows: 
How have Coalition Government policies of austerity, localism and the 
introduction of PCCs affected the governing resources available to the local 
governing regime in Cardiff and what impact has this had upon the agenda, 
governing arrangements, and schemes of cooperation pertaining to the local 
governance of crime, disorder and safety? 
When presented in this way, it was possible to separate this research aim into 
four theoretically driven, and empirically examinable, questions that enabled a 
more focused identification of the core questions in the research: 
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1. How have the governing arrangements for community safety changed 
and how can these changes be understood?  
2. How have the changes to the governing arrangements affected the 
governing agendas within Cardiff?  
3. How have these changes to the governing arrangements and agenda 
been realised in the actual delivery of community safety work? 
4. What do the changes to local governance say about the regime in 
Cardiff and why is this analytically significant for discussions of the 
local governance of crime, disorder and safety? 
3.3.2 THE STUDY’S PROPOSITIONS 
The research questions are important as they capture the key points of interest 
within the research, yet Yin argues that the research questions ‘do not point to 
what you should study’ (2003: 22). For this Yin advocates the provision of 
theoretical propositions, as these ‘direct attention to something that should be 
examined within the scope of the study’.  As has been stated already, this 
research was concerned with testing a number of predefined theoretically driven 
propositions, drawn from the literature. These propositions, drawn from the 
literature, were outlined at the end of the Chapter 2 and sought to explore the 
range of possible futures for community safety in the ‘localised and devolved’ 
period of community safety (Gilling et al., 2013).   
Four theoretical propositions were identified within the literature. Using Edwards 
and Hughes’ (2012) typology of community safety agendas, these propositions 
were principally organised around the potential governing agendas that may 
develop and the governing arrangements that may facilitate them. The first 
proposition outlined the potential for a reversion back to police led maintenance 
agendas, where community safety work is subordinated to the role of supporting 
the police in a narrow agenda organised around the enforcement of crime and 
disorder. Proposition two, explored the possible emergence of developmental 
agendas around ideas of risk, which seek to realise smarter governance and the 
more targeted use of resources by identifying people or places who may be at 
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risk, or themselves risky, and mitigating this risk through targeted interventions 
or preventative measures. The third proposition considered the potential of more 
progressive agendas around restorative justice and the diversion of offenders 
away from the criminal justice system, which may result from the increased 
autonomy granted to local authorities and the increased role of community and 
voluntary organisations. The final proposition, speculated a more transformative 
agenda around principles of social justice, addressing inequality and citizen 
inclusion, enabled by more radical changes in local governing arrangements.  
While these categories of agenda were briefly described during the literature 
review, it is worth being explicit in how these categories were operationalised 
within this research using Edwards and Hughes (2012) typology.   
For Edwards and Hughes (2012), maintenance agendas in regime theory can be 
equated to a criminal justice agenda in community safety, whereby community 
safety practice is seen to assist traditional methods of law enforcement and public 
order policing. In translating this into a coherent, analytical construct for the 
research, it was proposed that a maintenance agenda was identified if there was a 
sole focus on the policing of volume crimes, traditional police priorities, such as 
theft, violence, and anti social behaviour. Moreover, for a maintenance agenda to 
be present, partnership work would have to be framed in terms of its utility in 
assisting the police in their function. Finally, a maintenance agenda would be 
characterised by an explicit focus upon the product or outcomes of the crimes 
and their response, rather than the causal conditions that might precede these 
offences.  
As an analytic category for the research, developmental agendas would be 
characterised by a focus on traditional definitions of crime. However, rather than 
assisting law enforcement strategies, developmental agendas would seek to 
augment traditional policing methods with risk management strategies (Edwards 
and Hughes, 2012). This management of risk, could entail the identification of 
those at risk of offending, or particular environmental factors that present risks to 
particular people or places. A developmental agenda would then seek to mitigate 
these risks, either through situational preventative methods or through 
intervention work with those groups deemed at risk of offending. Finally, while a 
developmental agenda would evidence an appreciation of the immediate 
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environmental and situational factors that may contribute to crime, a 
consideration of the broader social and structural causes of criminality would be 
absent. 
Where maintenance and developmental agendas sought to see a continuance or 
augmentation of criminal justice agendas, progressive agendas are defined by 
their aspiration to move away from a law and order stance and from punitive or 
repressive practices. For this research, progressive agendas have been equated 
with ideas of restorative justice and the diversion of individuals away from the 
criminal justice system, in line with the arguments of Edwards and Hughes 
(2012). While the actual priorities of community safety work may not differ from 
those of the maintenance and developmental agendas, how these problems of 
crime and disorder are responded would be different under a progressive agenda.  
Transformative agendas are characterised by attempts to fundamentally change 
the way in which social problems are governed, by emphasising values of social 
justice and citizen inclusion (Edwards and Hughes, 2012). Unlike the other three 
categories, transformative agendas recognise the structural and social causes of 
social problems, such as criminality, and seeks to ameliorate these problems 
through political and social inclusion. For this research a social justice agenda 
was determined by the aims to improve access to services, attempts to engage 
communities and the public by local state actors, and recognition of the social 
and structural precursors to criminality.  
These four types of governing agendas, transposed into criminological thought 
by Edwards and Hughes (2012), helped organise the four propositions drawn 
from the literature at the end of Chapter 2. These agendas, and the four 
propositions structured around them, aided the research by acting as sensitising 
devices for the collection and analysis of data during the fieldwork. As 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) note, when commencing fieldwork researchers 
can face a deluge of information, so much so, that it is impossible to note down 
everything that is seen, heard and experienced. These propositions assisted the 
research by acting as a conceptual filter for the mass of data collected during the 
fieldwork, and helped focus my observations, thereby making the recording of 
fieldnotes more manageable.  
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3.3.3 THE STUDY’S UNITS OF ANALYSIS 
For Yin (2003), an effective case study design requires a clear elucidation of 
what the ‘case’ is.  As briefly noted earlier, the study was conducted in Cardiff, 
but more specifically the ‘case’ was the governing regime of the Cardiff 
Partnership Board. Given the analytical focus of the research on local governance 
and the formation of governing regimes in certain places under certain 
conditions, the Cardiff Partnership Board was chosen due to its status as the lead 
partnership arrangement in the city. While the organisational boundaries of some 
of the governing actors extended beyond the Cardiff Partnership Board, it was at 
the level of the Cardiff Partnership Board that their interaction with each other 
was negotiated and therefore organised. Given the focus on local governance it is 
acknowledged that the findings generated in this research are contingent upon the 
geo-historical context in which they have been found. Therefore, this case was 
chosen on the basis of theoretical, rather than representative, sampling. It was not 
chosen due to its capacity to generalise to broader geo-historical contexts, but 
rather, due to its analytic significance for testing the propositions outlined earlier 
and for contributing to the theoretical understandings of the local governance of 
crime and disorder in periods of austerity. As discussed in Chapter 2, Coalition 
Government policies have placed greater importance on understanding the 
particular conditions of local governance, and how, under certain conditions, 
local governing regimes are formed and sustained. In consideration of this, 
Cardiff represents an analytically significant case for the following reasons:  
i) Firstly, Cardiff is located in Wales, in which the Welsh Government 
have sought to take advantage of the devolved powers afforded them, 
around social services, health, and education.  In doing so, some 
commentators have remarked upon the ‘dragonisation’ of social policy 
in Wales, which is distinct from the policy developments in England 
(Drakeford, 2010; Haines, 2009). This has been seen in the adoption of 
more socially just orientated approaches to issues of community safety 
and community cohesion. (Edwards and Hughes, 2008; 2009). The 
situation of the research within Cardiff, and therefore the broader 
context of Welsh Government policies of social justice, distinguishes it 
from urban centres in England. Accordingly the research demonstrates 
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how the politics of devolution may factor into wider narratives about the 
future of community safety work. 
ii) Secondly, its status as the capital city of Wales demarcates it from other 
Welsh local authority areas. Reflecting its importance, the city plays 
host to a number of cultural events including large scale sporting events, 
live music as well as co-hosting political events such as the NATO visit 
in 2014. Furthermore, it possesses a large urban centre, which attracts 
both retail commerce and a vibrant night-time economy. These put 
particular pressures on the maintenance of order in the city, and as will 
be seen in Chapters 5 and 6, represent particular challenges for 
community safety work in an age of austerity and limited governing 
capacity.   
iii) Thirdly, Cardiff has been recognised as an area of good practice in 
relation to community safety and its response to issues of crime and 
disorder. This was evidenced in the receipt of a national Tilley Award 
for innovations in developing neighbourhood led partnership working. 
This award winning reputation, further cements Cardiff as a site of 
analytic significance as it demonstrates a clear commitment to 
community safety as policy agenda. Therefore, any degradation in the 
governing capacity around community safety can less convincingly be 
attributed to a lack of commitment by the governing regime and 
therefore will more reliably point to the impact of austerity.  
iv) Finally, due to its capital city status, Cardiff represents the vanguard of 
Welsh Government policy. Following the Beecham inquiry, the Welsh 
Government implemented changes designed to facilitate more integrated 
approaches to public service delivery. Cardiff was chosen as a pilot site 
for this new way of working, and in 2007, the Cardiff Local Service 
Board was introduced. In 2010, the Local Service Board evolved into 
the Cardiff Partnership Board, which in turn, led to the development a 
single integrated agenda, the ‘What Matters 2020’ strategy. As seen in 
Chapter 5, this strategy indicated a clear commitment to a progressive 
and transformative governing agenda. Therefore, Cardiff as a case site, 
offered the opportunity to examine whether more progressive and 
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transformative agendas for community safety were possible, and how 
such regimes are formed and sustained in periods of austerity.  
 
It was important to distinguish between the ‘case’- the Cardiff Partnership Board 
- and what Yin calls, the study’s units of analysis. To inform this discussion it is 
worth clarifying what constitutes the ‘regime’ in Cardiff. As just briefly 
mentioned, the Cardiff Partnership Board was introduced in 2010 and 
represented a radical reformulation of the governing arrangements in the city. 
The Cardiff Partnership Board provided the ‘strategic management of the 
partnership activity’ in the city and was comprised of senior managers across a 
number of partner organisations. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, 
but for now it is worth noting that the core members of this board were the chief 
executives, or person of equivalent position, from:  
• Cardiff Council,  
• South Wales Police,  
• South Wales Fire and Rescue Service,  
• Cardiff and Vale University Health Board,  
• Cardiff Third sector Council and 
• Director General, Local Government and Communities, Welsh 
Government 
As this board represented the senior officials from the various partner 
organisations, and fulfilled the strategic management function of partnership 
work in Cardiff, it was argued that this was the ‘governing regime’ in Cardiff. 
Underneath the Cardiff Partnership Board, the governing arrangements were 
divided into two delivery structures, the neighbourhood management structure 
and the programme and priority workstreams. The ‘case’ in this research then, 
was the entirety of the governing arrangements for community safety in Cardiff. 
The case encompassed the strategic aspects of the Cardiff Partnership Board, and 
the delivery structures of the neighbourhood management teams and the 
programme board aligned with community safety, the safer and cohesive 
communities programme board. However, these represent three analytically 
distinct components of the governing arrangements in Cardiff.  In recognition of 
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this, the units of analysis embedded within the ‘case’, were aligned with these 
analytically distinct areas of interest.   
i) The first unit of analysis in the research encompassed the strategic 
decision making group of the governing regime called the Cardiff 
Partnership Board which was a meeting of all senior directors of the main 
governing partners.  
ii) The next unit of analysis pertinent to this research, was the safer and 
cohesive communities programme board and the workstream activities 
that constitute it. This board represented the city-wide community safety 
priorities of the Cardiff Partnership Board.  
iii) The final unit of analysis was the neighbourhood management 
programme board, which comprised the six neighbourhood management 
teams, responsible for the organisation of localised partnership activity in 
the city.  
These three units of analysis represented the key points of interest for the local 
governance of crime, disorder and safety within the case study. The governing 
regime of the Cardiff Partnership Board was responsible for determining the 
direction of strategic governance within the city, within which the strategic 
response to crime, disorder and safety were organised. The safer and cohesive 
communities programme board represented the mechanism for the governance of 
citywide priorities relating to community safety. The neighbourhood 
management teams represented the mechanism for dealing with localised 
problems or priorities identified in particular areas.  
Each of these analytic sub units was approached differently. For example the 
strategic direction of the Cardiff Partnership Board was predominantly 
determined through documentary analysis and interviews with relevant key 
strategic actors.  The work of the neighbourhood management teams and safer 
and cohesive communities workstreams were primarily addressed through 
fieldwork observations and interviews with practitioners.  Furthermore, because 
these units of analysis represented differing aspects of the governing 
arrangements, they offered contrasting insights into how partnership working 
within the Cardiff regime was being realised. To ensure that these insights could 
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be compared against each other, a level of consistency was achieved by using the 
analytic framework of regime theory. This enabled the data collection in these 
sub units of analysis to be organised around the same concepts of agenda, 
governing arrangements, resources and schemes of cooperation.  
Within these different units of analysis it was acknowledged that there would be 
variance in the knowledge and understanding of some elements of the analytic 
categories. For example, some of those working within the delivery mechanisms 
of the neighbourhood management team, or the workstream activities, may not 
have been cognisant of the broader agendas of the Cardiff Partnership Board. 
Similarly, those involved in the more strategic aspects of the Cardiff Partnership 
Board, were not aware of some of the problems and issues in relation to 
negotiating and cooperating with partners in practice. A further consideration 
here is Pollitt’s distinction between talk, decision and action (2001). This is 
particularly pertinent to this discussion of the units of analysis. The units of 
analysis that are more concerned with the strategic aspects of the study provided 
an insight into what Pollitt termed, the policy talk of the Cardiff Partnership 
Board. As Pollitt (2001) notes it should not be assumed that policy talk is 
indicative of practice on the ground or the decisions made by a governing 
regime. This formed a key consideration in the research, which influenced the 
research methods used and the analysis of data, which sought to differentiate 
between the talk of the governing regime, and how this talk was realised in 
practice. This tension between talk and practice formed a key component of the 
findings in this research, as reflected in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.   
A further consideration in this research design was the duration of the case study, 
which was particularly significant given the application of regime theory. 
Regime formation is not a static event, but rather a continuous process of 
negotiation, compromise and change between governing actors. At the point of 
commencing this research the Cardiff Partnership Board, and the strategic 
agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy, had been in place for four years and was 
reaching the midpoint of its initial vision. This research was conducted on the 
basis that, through a sustained period of immersion, the aspirations contained 
within the ‘What Matters’ strategy could be empirically examined, in order to 
make claims about the status of the regime and whether it is succeeding or failing 
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in achieving its stated aims. Given the salience of austerity measures in this 
study, the length of time during which the fieldwork took place was aligned with 
the budgetary period of the local authority. Accordingly, the research was 
conducted from February 2014 to March 2015, corresponding with the 2014-15 
budgetary cycle. By means of this year-long immersion it was possible to gain a 
snap shot of a regime in change. However, it has been necessary to acknowledge 
that the findings borne out of this research are rooted within the particular 
temporal, political and economic conditions in which the data was collected.  
3.3.4 THE LOGIC LINKING THE DATA TO THE PROPOSITIONS AND THE CRITERIA 
FOR INTERPRETING THE FINDINGS 
An important part of case study design is the logic linking the data to the 
propositions (Yin, 2003). Part of this is how the data gathered during the research 
is applied to the theoretical framework and how this impacts upon the 
interpretation of the data collected.  Yin describes how the logic to link data 
generated within a single case study data back to the theoretical propositions is 
based on the idea of pattern matching where ‘several pieces of information from 
the same case may be related to some theoretical proposition’ (2003: 26). This 
was applied in this research, by using the various data collected from the mixed 
methods approach to identify instances of convergence or divergence in the data 
gathered. Where there were examples of convergence in the data, this helped to 
increase the reliability of the claims, while any instances of divergence in the 
data, allowed an examination of why this divergence existed. In adopting this 
pattern matching approach, the research acknowledged the differences between 
the different units of analysis and how this was reflected in the data.  
Furthermore, reflecting the theoretical and analytical framework underpinning 
this research, this process of pattern matching was conducted according to the 
four components of regime theory outlined earlier.  Through this process, it was 
possible to identify the stated aims of the governing regime, and whether that 
was shared throughout the governing infrastructure. This enabled me to 
distinguish between more symbolic pronouncements about the changes and 
improvements being made regarding the agenda, governing arrangements, 
resources and schemes of cooperation and the operational realities of such 
changes.  
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3.3.5 SUMMARY 
This section has outlined the underlying strategy and design of this research, and 
why it was applicable given the theoretical framework of regime theory that 
informed the thesis. The principal aim of this research was to examine how 
Coalition Government policies have affected the local governance of crime and 
disorder. This has highlighted the need for case study research to examine how 
local political and economic contexts and conditions impact upon the formation 
of local governing regimes. Therefore, through a single embedded case study, 
this research aimed to contribute to the theoretical understanding of how local 
community safety arrangements can be conceptualised during the ‘localised and 
devolved’ period of community safety. Utilising the analytical framework 
offered by regime theory, the research was structured around four key concepts: 
an agenda, governing arrangements, governing resources and the schemes of 
cooperation. Considering this analytical framework, and the aim of the research, 
Cardiff was chosen as a critical case site for the research as it provided an 
analytically significant location in which the theoretical propositions of this 
research were critically tested.  
3.4 RESEARCH METHODS 
The chapter now moves on to discuss the specific research methods used to 
collect the data, how it was analysed and the political and ethical considerations 
that arose during the research. As noted by Bottoms (2008), a realist stance 
recognises that data collection cannot be separated from the theoretical 
assumptions of the research. In this case the research design, and the methods 
used, were contingent upon the application of regime theory and the way in 
which this framed the research problem and dictated what research questions 
were asked. This relates to the distinction made by Bryman (2006) between the 
‘epistemological argument’ and the ‘technical argument’ in social science 
research. The ‘epistemological argument’ (Bryman, 2006) posits that there is an 
intrinsic and irrefutable relationship between research methods and their 
epistemological and ontological foundations. The ‘technical argument’, on the 
other hand, calls for a more fluid consideration of research methods, in that their 
application should be dependent upon the problem to be solved rather than upon 
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epistemological and ontological loyalties. For Bryman (2006), the rise of the 
‘technical argument’ is connected with issues of pragmatism and the increased 
importance of research questions in determining methodological choices. As 
Erzberger and Kelle note, ‘the selection of adequate methods should not be made 
mainly on the basis of sympathies toward a certain methodological camp or 
school. Methods are tools for the answering of research questions and not vice 
versa’ (2003: 482).  Therefore, given the theoretical framework of regime theory, 
and the subsequent framing of the research questions in this study, a mixed 
methods approach was deemed appropriate to addressing the research questions. 
More detail will be provided shortly regarding the research methods and how 
they contribute to the study, but first it is worth noting why the research has 
taken a predominantly qualitative approach to investigating the governance of 
crime and disorder in Cardiff.  
In line with the technical arguments of Bryman (2006) and Ezberger and Kelle 
(2003), the choice of qualitative methods was justified due to the empirical focus 
necessitated by regime theory in this research. To understand the governing 
regime, it was necessary to gather data on how governing actors understood the 
political and economic climate in which they were situated, how they negotiated 
with other actors involved in local governance and the impact of this upon 
community safety work. Such concerns lend themselves to qualitative inquiry, 
which was able to capture the data on how policy officers and practitioners 
within Cardiff perceived the governing arrangements and their roles within it. It 
was recognised that through qualitative research methods the narratives that were 
collected were dependent upon who and what was being analysed. Therefore, 
using different qualitative methods enabled the comparison of data collected to 
identify areas of convergence and divergence in the narratives in a process of 
triangulation (Lilleker, 2003; Davies, 2001).  
The methodological choices made in this research, were further influenced by 
Stone’s detailed account of his methodological approach to examining the 
governing regime in Atlanta (1989). Due to the length of interest within his 
research, covering 40 years of urban governance within the city, Stone noted that 
‘exhaustive primary investigation was not practical’ (1989: 259). In its place he 
utilised a number of methods that took advantage of existing secondary data. 
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This included previous research in Atlanta (including his own), extensive use of 
local media publications, and the examination of public records. These secondary 
sources were supplemented with 93 interviews over a six year period, though 
these interviews were ‘not so much evidence about events as they were a source 
of background and context’ (1989: 260). Drawing on the insights offered by 
Stone (1989), the methods used in this research took advantage of pre-existing 
data sources in the form published records, local media outputs, existing research 
concerning the area and social media analysis, The use of pre-existing data was 
combined with a sustained period of ethnographic observation, both participant 
and non-participant, alongside semi-structured interviews. These research 
methods are now discussed in more detail to ascertain their suitability for the 
research and how they were employed.  
3.4.1 ETHNOGRAPHIC OBSERVATION 
A fundamental component of this research was the ethnographic observation of 
partnership activity relating to crime, disorder and safety within the Cardiff 
Partnership Board. This approach enabled the research to attain a detailed and 
nuanced understanding of the processes of governance and partnership working, 
but more importantly allowing the research to get beyond the official policy 
construction of the Cardiff regime. A key consideration here was the limitations 
of interviews and documentary analysis in achieving this. Through participant 
observation, it was possible to build relationships of trust with those involved in 
the daily work of the Cardiff Partnership Board, thus enabling more frank 
discussions about the realities of partnership working in the city. Through the use 
of both participant and non-participant observation, it was possible to gather a 
greater insight into the ‘backstage’ processes of partnership working, the 
complexities of such work and how the narratives presented in the strategic 
documentation and espoused by senior policy officials were realised in practice 
by those involved in the actual process of partnership activity. This approach 
enabled the research to avoid conflating the policy talk of the governing regime 
with the practices of community safety work in acknowledgement of the 
arguments of Pollitt. As Flick argues where interviews can often ‘comprise a 
mixture of how something is and how something should be’, ethnographic 
observation allows ‘the research to find out how something factually works’ 
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(2009: 222). This observation work took place over a 12-month period, 
beginning in February 2014 and ending in March 2015.  
The participant observation also acted as an aid in attaining access, as the 
contacts developed through my participation helped open doors and facilitate my 
entry into certain meetings, and acquiring interviews with more senior policy 
officials. My positioning as participant observer meant that I was given access to 
a desk and computer within the Policy and Partnership team, which provided a 
useful home base within the research site. As Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 
37) caution, it was important that I did not try to ‘see, hear and participate in 
everything’ when first entering the field as I would have been unable to make 
sense of all the data before me. As discussed briefly earlier, to mitigate this and 
to make sense of the vast amount of data presented during my observations, I 
used the framework provided by regime theory, and the theoretical propositions, 
to help make sense of my observations and to organise my field-notes. It is 
acknowledged that this may have affected the data collected in that issues that 
did not fit into the conceptual framework may have gone unnoticed. However, I 
would argue that this was a necessary process to ensure that I was not 
overwhelmed by the volume and breadth of data available to me. An ancillary 
benefit of this was that it ensured that the data I collected was pertinent to the 
research questions and the overall aim of the thesis.  
3.4.1.1 WHERE AND WHAT TO OBSERVE? 
Changes regarding community safety arrangements in Cardiff presented some 
challenges for observational research, and opened up questions of where and 
what to observe. Whereas previous research into community safety has focussed 
upon community safety practitioners and community safety teams, the 
dismantling of the community safety infrastructure in Cardiff meant there was no 
longer a dedicated community safety team to observe. In place of the community 
safety team, was the Policy and Partnership team. This team was responsible for 
supporting a broad range of partnership activity within the Cardiff Partnership 
Board, of which community safety was one aspect of its remit. This team was 
also the location of the neighbourhood management officers, responsible for 
driving forward partnership activity at a neighbourhood level. For these reasons, 
the Policy and Partnership team was an ideal base for the ethnographic 
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observation. It provided access to the supporting infrastructure for partnership 
activity in the city, and therefore, offered an insight into both the more strategic 
elements of governance and more operational issues of delivery and practice. In 
this way the Policy and Partnership team was identified as a potential ‘obligatory 
passage point’ (Callon, 1986) for observing issues from ‘above’ (The Cardiff 
Partnership Board management structure) and from ‘below’ (from the delivery 
mechanisms of the neighbourhood management teams and the safer and cohesive 
communities programme board workstreams). Access to this team, was granted 
through a key gatekeeper working within the team and who was interested in 
developing relationships between the university and the council. A key condition 
of access was that this arrangement should be mutually beneficial, in return for 
access to the field I was expected to contribute to the research capacity of the 
team. In this way I was not a passive observer of the partnership team, but rather, 
actively took part in some of the work required. The issue of access will be 
discussed in more detail shortly.  
Having commenced my observation within this team numerous opportunities for 
other sites of observation presented themselves as I became more familiar to 
those within the office. During my fieldwork I was engaged in a number of work 
activities, most of these were research based. Examples of this work included: 
working on small scales surveys to distribute as part of a neighbourhood 
management activity; a literature review to inform the potential development of a 
multi-agency safeguarding hub for issues of child protection and domestic abuse; 
reviews of literature around the harms of pay-day loan companies; a review of 
domestic violence recording practices.   Engaging in these activities helped 
develop contacts with individuals in the team, which in turn, assisted gaining 
access to various meetings, forums and individuals that would otherwise have 
been difficult. These included neighbourhood management meetings, anti-social 
behaviour problem solving groups, human exploitation workstream meetings, 
safer and cohesive communities programme board meetings. These meetings 
were important as they shed light on the practicalities of partnership working and 
its organisation. These meetings offered glimpses into the power relations within 
partnership work as it was possible to identify key contributors in the meetings 
and to observe the interactions between different governing actors regarding 
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certain agendas. Crucially however, access to these meetings was often 
contingent upon relations developed during my fieldwork. For example, I 
attended more meetings in one neighbourhood management area because I was 
involved in work led by a practitioner in that neighbourhood area chair, and 
accordingly was invited to more meetings to assist in that work.  
These observations were written down in a series of small notebooks. The overt 
recording of such observations caused few problems in the meetings, as it was 
not unusual for notes to be made by other individuals present. At the outset of 
each meeting I ensured my role as a researcher working with Cardiff Council 
was known to everyone. In most cases this caused no issues, but in one instance, 
a MARAC meeting, I was asked that the details of the meeting not be shared or 
recorded due to the sensitivities of the cases involved. In other instances, I was 
unable to make detailed notes of interactions as they occurred (Bryman, 2004); 
this was particularly the case in the recording of informal conversations. These 
informal conversations were more difficult to record in situ, as I was hesitant to 
draw attention to the recording of these events in case it affected how those 
around me behaved. In those instances where these conversations took place 
while I was at my desk, I was often able to make notes on the computer under the 
guise of doing work, and when appropriate transfer these notes to my notepad. 
On occasions where this was not possible, I was reliant on my ability to recall 
these interactions until a time I could write them down without drawing attention 
to my recording of these events. These observations recorded in the notepad were 
written up fully as soon as possible (typically in the evening following the 
fieldwork) to ensure my ability to recall the days events, in which my hand 
written notes served to trigger my recollection of the events of the day (Emerson 
et al., 2001) 
I also undertook non-participant observation of the Cardiff Community and 
Adult Services scrutiny committee meetings, due to their responsibility for 
scrutinising community safety work in the city as of 2007. The scrutiny 
committee aims to ‘to look at things from a service user and citizen perspective 
and use this to inform our observations and recommendations to the Executive’ 
(Cardiff Council, 2012: 6). This passage is useful for illustrating why the 
Scrutiny Committee was important as a research site. It offered an alternative 
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representation of community safety problems in Cardiff, and therefore acted as a 
point of comparison for the observations coming out of the Policy and 
Partnership team. Whereas my observations within the Policy and Partnership 
team focussed on the work of practitioners and officers, the observation of the 
scrutiny committee enabled an insight into the role of publically elected officials 
within the governing arrangements. In line with the focus of regime theory, and 
building on the findings of Edwards et al. (2007), the extent of participation by 
locally elected officials could be assessed and enabled the identification of 
potential frictions between the narratives of councillors and those of policy 
officers and practitioners.  
3.4.2 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
As Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) suggest, the combination of ethnographic 
observation and interviews is useful as they provide complementary forms of 
data. Therefore, alongside the observational research, semi-structured interviews 
were used in this research. While the observations constituted my interpretation 
and understanding of events and situations, the interviews enabled the collection 
and analysis of data from those who are embedded in the day-to-day 
practicalities of partnership work. At the outset of each interview, I provided a 
brief summary of my PhD, in doing so I avoided framing the research strictly in 
terms of ‘community safety’ instead referring to broader issues of the governance 
of crime, disorder and safety and partnership working. This was important given 
the structural changes in Cardiff and the dismantlement of the community safety 
team, which had resulted in lack of awareness by some participants of what was 
actually meant by ‘community safety’. The more encompassing terms of 
governance and partnership working proved to be far more effective in eliciting 
responses from respondents.  
The use of semi-structured interviews provided enough structure to the 
interviews to address the elements of the theoretical framework provided by 
regime theory but were flexible enough for the respondents to discuss what they 
though was important in relation to the questions. As Berry states ‘open-ended 
questions have the virtue of allowing the subjects to tell the interviewer what’s 
relevant and what’s important rather than being restricted by the researcher’s 
preconceived notions about what is important’ (2002: 681). This flexibility was 
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crucial to the interview process as participants were drawn from differing layers 
of the hierarchy within the Cardiff Partnership Board and from different 
organisational backgrounds and therefore the interviews had to be able to 
accommodate these differences yet stay within a broad analytic framework. 
Therefore these interviews were more in line with, what Burgess terms, 
‘conversations with a purpose’ (1984:102).  
3.4.2.1 SAMPLING 
Given the interest of the research on community safety arrangements within the 
city, and ascertaining the views of those involved in community safety work, 
there was a limited sub-set of people pertinent to the research. Therefore, a 
purposive sample was adopted, which aimed to acquire responses from all who 
were considered relevant in the new infrastructure around the governance of 
crime, disorder and safety in Cardiff.  The desired participants were drawn from 
the main components of the governing arrangements in Cardiff, including the 
Cardiff Partnership Board strategic group, the safer and cohesive communities 
programme board and workstream activities and the neighbourhood management 
teams. In identifying the potential interview respondents from these different 
aspects of the governing arrangements a number of methods were used. Firstly, 
the use of documentary evidence produced by the Cardiff Partnership Board 
helped identify key interview participants, as the documentation highlighted the 
responsible officers for the different aspects of the governing arrangements. In 
addition, I delayed the start of the interview stage of my research until 6 months 
into the participant observation; this enabled me to converse with people during 
my observation about the relevant people to speak to regarding certain activities. 
Typically, this supported the sample identified in the documentary analysis, but 
in a couple of instances highlighted where there had been changes in 
responsibility or deletion of posts. Through this process it was possible to 
generate a suitable sampling frame for the research, which targeted the lead 
responsible officers across the various elements of the governing infrastructure. 
In an effort to increase the response rate, when approaching participants for 
interview I highlighted the collaborative nature of the research between the 
council and the university and how the findings could be beneficial in 
understanding and improving partnership activity. In addition, I also sought to 
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use my existing contacts developed during my observations to help encourage 
participation. Through these strategies I was able to conduct a total of 20 
interviews across the hierarchy of the Cardiff Partnership Board. Every effort 
was made to encourage participation, but in some cases it was not possible and 
pointed towards a number of challenges in conducting research in this sort of 
environment and context. While there was no obvious pattern to the non-
participation in interviews, there are some things that may be worth considering. 
Perhaps most saliently were the practicalities of time for those working within 
the public sector during times of austerity, where practitioners were constantly 
being told to do more with less. Throughout the research I was constantly 
reminded that staff losses were a common occurrence, but that the level of work 
had stayed the same.  Therefore, time was a limited resource for those involved 
in the research and may have acted as a barrier to participation for some 
respondents. Furthermore given the context of staff losses, some of the positions 
I wanted to interview were in a period of transition, whereby members of staff 
had been lost and had yet to be replaced and as such nobody was available to 
interview in such cases. A full list of interview participants is available in 
appendix 1. 
3.4.2.2 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Given the differing responsibilities of the interview participants, and their 
varying positions in the organisational hierarchy, it was necessary for the 
interviews to reflect this and to be adequately structured to make the best use of 
the opportunities presented by the interviews and to acquire the best data. As 
Gerson and Horowitz (2002) note, spending time prior to the interview, 
constructing a schedule that is informed by a theoretical framework and is 
appropriate to the respondent, is crucial for making the most of the interview 
process. Recognising this, prior to each interview, I undertook some background 
research into the roles and responsibilities of the interview participant, to inform 
the construction of the interview schedule. Inevitably the interviews and their 
contents were dependent upon the people being spoken to, and therefore, 
comparisons between the different groups of participants had to recognise this 
fact. While differences were present in the interview schedules, a level of 
consistency was provided by ensuring that the questions asked related to the 
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same thematic concepts drawn from the theoretical framework offered by regime 
theory. Therefore, while the interview schedules differed slightly depending on 
the participant, each interview schedule was constructed around the same 
thematic framework. A generic example of the interview schedule used can be 
seen in appendix 6. 
Through the use of these thematic categories, each interview contributed to the 
analytic framework underlying this research, while being receptive to the 
particular requirements of the interview participants. While the interview was 
structured according to these thematic areas, it was also recognised that the 
interview was a co-produced activity (Fontana and Frey, 2005; Gubrium and 
Koro-Ljungberg, 2005). Therefore the interview schedule and the interview 
itself, was flexible enough to accommodate the interests of the participants and to 
allow them to discuss what they believed was important. For these reasons, a 
semi-structured approach was taken, as it provided a framework to address the 
main theoretical concepts, but within this, the respondents were able to discuss 
what they thought was pertinent to the issues.  
3.4.3 DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS 
Alongside the observation work and the interviews, documentary analysis was 
used to provide data about the Cardiff Partnership Board and the way it operates. 
Noaks and Wincup (2004) highlight the value of documentary analysis for 
looking at policy issues over time and how policy may shift. It is for these 
reasons that documentary analysis was considered particularly relevant for this 
study. In line with the comments of Noaks and Wincup (2004), documentary 
evidence was used to identify how policies regarding community safety practice 
in Cardiff have changed over time. The use of documentary evidence enabled the 
research to consider a broader time frame beyond the immediate confines of the 
ethnographic study. Therefore through, existing research, and policy documents, 
the research was able to examine the evolution of the community safety 
arrangements and agendas in Cardiff through the three analytically distinct 
periods offered by Gilling et al. (2013) This use of documentary evidence was 
influenced by the methods used by Stone, who states that ‘even the backstage 
negotiations for which Atlanta is noted find their way into the record; although 
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some details are never reported, the events themselves and their outcomes can be 
observed by the diligent and systematic observer’ (1989: 260).  
There was a plethora of documentary evidence available, including: policy 
documents, meeting minutes, scrutiny documents, scrutiny committee minutes, 
budget documentation, local media and existing research. Recognising this 
breadth of evidence, and heeding the advice of Silverman (2001) regarding the 
risks of attempting to analyse too much documentary evidence, a sampling 
criteria was employed in the first instance to draw attention to key documents for 
the research. However as the research progressed, attention was drawn to other 
documentary evidence that was outside the sampling frame, but was important 
for the research. For example, documents highlighted as important by 
practitioners and policy officers encountered in the research. Similarly as the 
research progressed and data was gathered, emerging findings would lead 
towards new interests that entailed further documentary evidence that was not 
anticipated in the original sampling frame.  
Given the importance of examining the governing arrangements and agendas in 
Cardiff, local policy documents were a core component of the documentary 
analysis. Within the voluntary period of community safety, there was limited 
policy documentation and local research pertaining to Cardiff. However for the 
national mandatory period of community safety, there was a greater availability 
of local policy documentation and research relating to Cardiff. These included 
local community safety strategies, which provided evidence of the community 
safety arrangements and priorities during the national mandatory period. For the 
localised and devolved period of community safety, the core documents were the 
‘What Matters’ strategy and its annual reviews, which set out the strategic 
agenda for local governance in Cardiff.  Alongside these policy documents and 
existing research, Cardiff Council scrutiny reports were an important source of 
information. A list of the main policy documents used for the documentary 
analysis can be found in appendix 2.  
While the use of documentary evidence enabled the identification of changes in 
the official narrative of the governing regime, there are caveats that must be 
considered in documentary analysis. First and foremost, the information 
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contained within documentary evidence is not necessarily an accurate 
representation of how an organisation works, as noted by Atkinson and Coffey 
(2004: 58). Scott (1990) provides a useful framework to consider the usefulness 
of documentary evidence, through the criteria of whether it is authentic, credible, 
representative and meaningful. Considering these criteria, it was the issues of 
credibility and representativeness that were of most relevance for the 
documentary analysis of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. As Atkinson and Coffey 
(2004) note, documents need to be considered as products of certain ways of 
thinking and as attempts to presents things in a certain way. Therefore, while the 
‘What Matters’ strategy represented the agenda of the Cardiff Partnership Board, 
or more specifically, particular players within the Cardiff Partnership Board, it 
did not necessarily reflect the interests of those not involved in the regime.  
3.4.4 SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYSIS 
The research methods discussed thus far have all been firmly connected within 
the governing regime of the Cardiff Partnership Board. This is significant for this 
research given the claims of Bachrach and Baratz (1962) regarding studies of 
governance and the importance of ‘non decisions’. In situating myself within the 
particular governing regime of the Cardiff Partnership Board, I was only 
presented with the problems as defined by the Cardiff Partnership Board. 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) argue that it is necessary to consider other problems 
that might exist but have been excluded from the narratives of the governing 
regime. To do this, the research utilised social media, specifically the social 
media site, Twitter, to ‘follow’ popular twitter accounts in Cardiff. These 
consisted of local media, community organisations, Cardiff fan pages, the twitter 
pages of public services, all of which generated data on a regular basis about key 
issues affecting Cardiff, including issues of crime, disorder and safety.  By doing 
so it was possible to identify any problems or issues in the city that were arising, 
but were not being addressed, or even discussed, by the Cardiff Partnership 
Board.  
This twitter analysis took place alongside the ethnographic observation work and 
was conducted over a twelve-month period from February 2014 to March 2015. 
In collecting the data generated by the twitter accounts, it was not possible to run 
a search of particular issues or ‘hashtags’, as this would rely on my own 
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impositions of categories thus defeating the point of the social media analysis. 
Instead I scanned through the tweets of the accounts followed on a daily basis 
and imported all relevant tweets into a word document organised by date and 
referenced the account the tweet was from. Typically this was conducted every 
morning and would extract all pertinent tweets from the previous day. While 
continuity was sought throughout the twelve-month period it was not possible to 
collect data for all 365 days. Through this process it was possible to glean an 
alternative perspective on the problems of the city, and assisted the fieldwork as I 
was often informed of events or situations before heading into the office for 
fieldwork. While this process was helpful, it did not reveal evidence of ‘non 
decisions’ in Cardiff, and therefore it did not feature in the findings of this 
research. 
Utilising this mixed methods approach enabled the collection of an extensive 
range of data produced in fieldnotes, interviews, documentary analysis and the 
analysis of local social media. These multiple forms of data provided multiple 
perspectives of the Cardiff Partnership Board, its agenda and the ways in which 
governing actors participated and contributed to this agenda with the hope of 
building a more robust study of the governing regime.  However the amount of 
data collected during this research presented challenges for the analysis of the 
data as will now be discussed.  
3.5 ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
Echoing the points of Fielding and Thomas, I began the analysis by becoming 
‘thoroughly familiar with the data’ (2008: 259). The interviews were transcribed, 
and each day of fieldwork was written up into more formal fieldnotes. This 
process of transcription and writing up of fieldnotes, was itself a useful process 
for getting to know the data and orientating myself with some of the emerging 
issues. Once the interviews had been transcribed, I listened to them again while 
reading through the transcription to ensure accuracy, but also to familiarise 
myself with the transcript and provide additional context to the written transcript. 
Similarly, as part of this familiarisation with the data, I would frequently reread 
my fieldnotes during my fieldwork, which helped crystallise my ideas before the 
more formal analysis of the data. These emerging ideas and themes that 
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developed over the course of the research, were reflected in the writing of my 
fieldnotes, which were not just observations, but were in themselves the result of 
emerging trends and themes in the research (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995) 
To assist with the analysis of the large data set, the data was imported into the 
Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) package, 
NVivo, which assisted the storage, retrieval, coding and analysis of the data. This 
included all of the transcribed interviews, written fieldnotes and documentary 
evidence. The process of inputting data into NVivo and coding was carried out 
alongside the data collection. The data was analysed using a theoretically driven 
thematic analysis, structured around the analytical framework offered by regime 
theory. As Braun and Clarke (2006: 12) state, the use of theoretical thematic 
analysis ‘tends to provide less a rich description of the data overall, and more a 
detailed analysis of some aspect of the data’. This was considered appropriate, as 
it allowed the analysis to focus in on the data most pertinent to the concepts of 
regime theory and therefore the questions that guided this research. The use of 
theoretical thematic analysis informed the way in which the data was coded and 
assisted in developing the coding framework. This framework enabled me in my 
preliminary coding to organise the data according to the key themes of regime 
theory: i) the agenda, ii) the governing arrangements, iii) schemes of cooperation 
and iv) the governing resources. These broad categories were then demarcated 
into sub codes informed both by regime theory and the data. Therefore, while 
this coding process was theoretically informed, it was not purely deductive, and 
in line with the adaptive approach (Layder, 1998) adopted within this research, 
the coding process was receptive to emergent issues within the data and the 
trends and themes that had been developed in my fieldnotes. 
The coding of data in this way has been subject to some criticism regarding the 
fragmentation of data and the potential removal of context following the use of 
code and retrieve functions (Fielding and Lee, 1998). However, when coding the 
data, I avoided coding short sentences or specific words, but typically coded 
larger passages in which the key points were located as to avoid losing context. 
Furthermore, on a practical level, due to various stability issues with NVivo, as 
part of the coding process I also engaged in the manual coding of the transcribed 
interviews, fieldnotes and key documentary evidence in line with the coding 
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framework developed using NVivo. While this was somewhat borne out of 
necessity due to the problems of the computer software it was advantageous in 
that, relating to the criticisms of Fielding and Lee (1998), the codes developed 
through NVivo were then reapplied manually into the text which allowed me to 
see how these codes fit into the particular context of the interviews and 
documentary evidence.  
Having coded the research, I was able to compare how the themes and categories 
identified in the coding were reflected across the data, as part of a process of 
‘pattern matching’ (Yin, 2003) as discussed earlier. For Yin, pattern matching 
involves the identification of how ‘several piece of information from the same 
case may be related to some theoretical proposition’ (2003: 26). Accordingly, the 
analysis was able to establish how the analytic themes of regime theory were 
reflected across the different sub units of analysis in the research.  For example, 
key differences were identified in regards to the narratives around the governing 
arrangements within policy discourses and those espoused by practitioners. The 
identification of these instances of convergence and divergence through the data 
analysis were key in structuring the findings of the research and the fundamental 
distinction made between the rhetoric of the regime and the operational practices 
of community safety work. In presenting the data in a clear and accessible 
manner, the themes and categories identified during this coding process were 
used to inform the subsequent discussions and organisation of the findings 
chapters. 
3.6 METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS 
As with any research project, it was necessary to consider its methodological 
limitations. Given the scope of the study there were significant limitations to 
what was feasible, given the time and resources available.  Firstly, due to the 
focus on the governance of crime, disorder and safety and the breadth of work 
that this entails, rather than focussing on one specific aspect of the community 
safety agenda, the research was at risk of spreading itself too thinly. This can be 
seen in relation to the interviews and the sample employed, whereby, I only 
interviewed those with senior responsibility as this enabled me to look at 
differences between workstream and neighbourhood management areas. While it 
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would have been desirable to speak to others involved in these activities, given 
the scope of the research such an approach would not have been feasible within 
the time frame. To some extent the participant observation and documentary 
analysis mitigated this problem, however it was still necessary to acknowledge 
that that the interview data was skewed to more senior positions, and therefore, 
may not reflect the opinions of those at the level delivery but who do not possess 
senior positions in these arrangements.  
A further limitation to the research concerns the use of participant observation in 
relation to community safety work in Cardiff. As alluded to earlier, changes in 
the governance structure of community safety in Cardiff has led to the 
disappearance of the community safety team and raised questions of where and 
what to observe. While the observation mostly relied upon the policy and 
partnership team as the ‘base camp’ of the observation work, it was apparent that 
community safety work was only one aspect of work for this team. Many of the 
actual processes of governing issues of crime and disorder took place through a 
range of dispersed meetings, as these were the instances where practitioners met, 
discussed and negotiated the practicalities of partnership work. While access to 
some of these meetings was straightforward due to existing contacts developed 
during my immersion within the partnership team, other meetings were more 
problematic to access, and often were made more problematic due to staff 
turnovers, changing roles and responsibilities. Moreover a condition of my 
access to the partnership team, which I shall discuss shortly, was that I would be 
engaged in work with, and for, the partnership team. As a result, I was drawn 
into work with certain people, and not others, which resulted in a differential 
level of access between different workstream activities and different 
neighbourhood management areas. However, despite these limitations, the 
combination of methods used in this research has produced a range of data that 
was used in a process of triangulation to assist in the validation of the findings. 
Furthermore given the changes regarding community safety and the governance 
of crime and disorder in Cardiff this study offers an insight into the challenges of 
researching community safety practice in this localised and devolved period of 
community safety.  
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3.7 ACCESS, ETHICS AND POLITICS 
Gaining access for the ethnographic observation was a long process, and 
highlighted the relevance of Silverman’s (2001) claims that securing gatekeepers 
to the field is crucial for developing opportunities for research and gaining access 
to research sites. In this regard, I was fortunate that my supervisory team were in 
communication with a potential gatekeeper in the partnership offices of Cardiff 
Council. Through this relationship I was able to meet with the gatekeeper and 
organise access for the observation work. In concordance with an emergent 
mutually beneficial relationship between Cardiff Council and Cardiff University, 
access to the research site was conditional upon my contribution of research 
capacity to the partnership team. As a result of this meeting I was granted a desk 
and computer within the partnership team, a Cardiff Council electronic ID pass 
to allow me access to the building and access to shared network drives on the 
Cardiff Council computer network.  Undoubtedly this level of access was a 
significant boon to the research and enabled the collection of data that would 
otherwise be unattainable.  
Access, especially in ethnographic observation work, is not a one-time event but 
rather is a continuous process throughout the research. While my discussion with 
the gatekeeper enabled entry into the partnership team, I was continually 
involved in a process of negotiation and communication to gain access to other 
areas and people.  My immersion within the partnership team did assist in 
gaining access to these other areas of practice. This was especially true as time 
progressed and I became a familiar face within the team, as I could use my 
contacts developed in my observations to assist me by inviting me to meetings, 
or contacting interview participants in advance to assure them that I was ‘ok’ to 
talk to. This was particularly helpful when trying to access more senior members 
of the Cardiff Partnership Board, whereby contacts developed within the 
partnership team assisted in identifying how best to reach certain individuals. Of 
further assistance in gaining access, was highlighting the importance of this 
research for the council and noting that senior officers had endorsed this 
research. While inevitably some respondents were still non-responsive to 
interviews and some meetings were not accessible, I would argue that through 
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the contacts developed during my research, I was able to achieve a far higher 
response rate to interviews than would be possible otherwise.  In this regard the 
arrangements for access and the reciprocal relationship developed between 
myself and the council has been greatly beneficial for the research but does 
necessitate a discussion of how such arrangements for access problematise issues 
of research ethics and the politics of social science research.  
Throughout the research process the aspiration was to become more than a 
passive observer of changes in community safety and instead aimed towards a 
position of critical friendship. Such an approach is concordant with the 
alternative evaluative criteria posed by Guba and Lincoln (1989) of authenticity, 
which aims to ‘evaluate the quality of the research beyond its methodological 
dimension’ (Morse et al., 2002: 2). While this places greater emphasis on the 
value of the research for the participants and the improvements that the research 
can enable, there have been concerns that issues of validity and reliability can be 
compromised in such cases (Morse et al., 2002). These issues are particularly 
salient in this research and relate to the exchanges between Gouldner (1968) and 
Becker (1967) around partisanship and its place in social research. Throughout 
the study I was cognisant of the importance of ensuring that I was conducting 
research of the governing regime not for the governing regime, thereby not 
compromising the validity and reliability of the research by becoming too 
aligned or too invested in the agenda of the Cardiff Partnership Board. In this 
regard, it is argued that the evaluative criteria of authenticity is not incompatible 
with ideas of reliability and validity, due to what Edwards and Sheptycki (2009) 
term, the ‘formative intentions’ that have guided this research process. In 
practice this has manifested in the use of multiple methods to help identify 
potential discrepancies within the research and to ensure that I maintain a critical 
distance from the data. 
As well as the political considerations I also acknowledged the various ethical 
considerations that arose during the research. Prior to entering the field and 
during the initial planning of the research strategy, an assessment of the various 
ethical risks took place and a framework of how to deal with these challenges 
was developed and submitted to the Cardiff School of Social Sciences Ethics 
Committee and was duly passed. Further ensuring the ethical rigour of the 
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research, the ethical guidance provided by the British Society of Criminology 
(2006) was followed within the research.  A key aspect of this guidance is the 
acquisition of informed consent by research participants. How this consent was 
obtained depended upon the research method in question and the people being 
spoken to. For instance, for the interviews I emailed participants with an 
information form that contained details regarding the research and why I would 
like to speak to them. Having informed the participants about the research, 
consent was recorded through the use of written consent forms that were signed 
prior to commencing the interview. This form included details regarding the 
voluntary participation in the interview and that they could pull out if desired, the 
recording and transcribing of the interview, storage and security of the interview 
transcripts and contact details, should they have any further questions or issues 
following the interview. A copy of the first contact email, information sheet and 
consent form are included in Appendix 3, 4 and 5 respectively. 
During the participant observation gaining written consent was impractical due to 
the unplanned nature in which conversations would arise or pertinent issues of 
observation be identified. In this case, informed consent was seen more as a 
process rather than a singular event as with the interviews. As part of this process 
while in negotiations for gaining access to the field I made sure to be clear about 
the purpose and aims of my research to the gatekeeper and upon entering the 
field I was introduced to the members of the team and told them about my 
research. Furthermore, continuing this process I made sure to talk about my 
research and what I was interested in when first speaking to people to ensure they 
knew who I was, what I was doing and how I was doing it. Therefore, while no 
written consent was granted at an individual level with members of the team, my 
fieldwork was permitted by senior individuals within the team, and those who I 
would be interacting with on a daily basis were made aware of my role and 
interests. Similarly with regards to the attendance of meetings, typically these 
meetings would start with introductions of everyone around the table, which gave 
me the opportunity of introducing myself, my research and how it was being 
undertaken. In these cases, informed consent was achieved through the process 
of informing those around me of my role and position as a researcher.    
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4. ARRANGEMENTS FOR GOVERNING SAFER 
AND COHESIVE COMMUNITIES IN CARDIFF: 
FROM STATUTORY DUTY TO ‘LOCALISED AND 
DEVOLVED’? 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Sustained periods of austerity and continued reductions to financial resources 
have presented significant challenges to the continued commitment to multi-
agency crime prevention in Cardiff. This chapter demonstrates how the Cardiff 
regime has attempted to respond to these challenges through the reformulation of 
local governing arrangements for partnership work. In contextualising these 
changes, the chapter uses documentary analysis of local policy documentation 
and existing research within Cardiff, to chart the development of community 
safety within the city. In doing so the chapter demonstrates the establishment of 
a large, well resourced community safety infrastructure in the city which enabled 
Cardiff to be recognised as a site of good practice and innovation in relation to 
the local governance of crime and disorder.  
The chapter then examines the changes to the governing arrangements in Cardiff 
as austerity measures took hold in 2010. These changes saw the dismantling of 
the community safety infrastructure and the diffusion of responsibility for 
community safety work under the guise of mainstreaming. Through analysis of 
recent policy documents, interviews with senior actors and policy officers, and 
my own observations the chapter examines a dualism in the narratives behind 
this change. At a strategic policy level, the Cardiff Partnership Board has 
presented these changes as part of a narrative of progression and improvement 
for public service delivery that facilitate greater strategic thinking and the pursuit 
of a more progressive governing agendas. However, counterpoised to this 
argument of progression, the chapter ends by exploring the impact of these 
changes, in which it is argued that the governing capacity for community safety 
work has been compromised. This is seen in the absence of clear lines of 
operational oversight for community safety and the degradation of community 
safety expertise. 
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4.2 THE ORIGINS OF COMMUNITY SAFETY IN CARDIFF: FROM 
VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENTS TO STATUTORY DUTY 
4.2.1 THE EMERGENCE OF COMMUNITY SAFETY  
Tracing the evolution of community safety in Cardiff is not a simple task given 
the historical nature of the exercise and the paucity of information available. This 
is particularly true of the period prior to 1997, in the infancy of community 
safety arrangements, where there was much local variation in partnership 
arrangements and little locally produced evidence. Despite these constraints, it is 
still possible to make some claims about how Cardiff fits into the broader 
narrative of the evolution of crime prevention and community safety in England 
and Wales based upon some, albeit limited, evidence. Existing evidence 
pertaining to the actual arrangements for the facilitation of partnership activity in 
the city during this period is scarce. The only example being the creation of the 
Cardiff crime prevention panel which is exhibited in an historical timeline 
produced by the South Wales Police Museum (South Wales Police, 2015). While 
this evidence is limited, and must be treated with a degree of caution, the 
timeline provides an overview of the changing nature of policing in South Wales 
and Cardiff in the 1970s and 1980s. It highlights the significance of the police 
force restructuring and the closure of a number of police stations across Cardiff, 
which occurred in response to financial pressures in the early 1990s. In this 
context of financial crisis the Cardiff crime prevention panel, alongside the 
endorsement of neighbourhood watch schemes, highlights the emerging 
recognition of the need to engage other actors in responding to and preventing 
crime.  
There is evidence that Cardiff Council, known then as South Glamorgan County 
Council, became more formally involved in crime prevention during the 1990s. 
This was exhibited in research regarding the provision of street lighting and its 
affects on crime and people in one neighbourhood of Cardiff (Herbert and 
Moore, 1991). This research points to the pre-eminence of situational prevention 
techniques in these times. However, it is worth noting the emergence of a 
narrative that begins to recognise the importance of social approaches to crime 
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prevention, achieved through the effective cooperation of the police and the local 
authority:  
Better lighting is one element of better control. It needs 
to be bolstered and sustained by people. A multi-agency, 
people-intensive approach which involves the whole of 
the community is the ultimate goal. Improved street 
lighting is a relatively cheap, focussed ameliorative, to 
give it lasting effect it must be part of a strategy for 
change which will cost a good deal more but will be 
justified if it improves the quality of life and reduces the 
burden upon society. The Mechanisms for achieving 
change are already largely in place. There are crime 
prevention initiatives, there are victim support schemes, 
there are policing and council services policies to deal with 
problematic areas. The lighting project is an excellent 
example of ways in which the responsibility for local 
authorities for maintenance and improvement of the 
fabric of the local community can be coordinated with 
the police. Better lighting, road safety, paved alleys, litter-
free streets, dog-control are all roles which the local 
authority can carry out towards the end of improving the 
environment. Police and social services have the heavier 
responsibility of controlling youths and the criminal 
element but they are all part of the same strategy. 
Community safety is now a planning and policy priority 
Herbert and Moore, 1991: 56-57, emphasis in original.  
This quote regarding the infancy of community safety in Cardiff resonates with 
the broader national narratives on community safety in the early 1990s discussed 
in Chapter 2, where there was an emergent recognition of the role that local 
authorities could and should take in regards to crime prevention. This quote 
demonstrates the beginning of a shift towards multi-agency approaches to 
addressing the causes and consequences of crime and the recognition that 
partnership practices should extend beyond situational preventative measures to 
encompass more holistic approaches to crime and its control. Further research in 
Cardiff and South Wales by Williamson et al. (1997) noted how youth workers 
were becoming increasingly concerned with the needs of young people and the 
value of youth work in pre-empting the onset of problematic and criminal 
behaviour. So, despite the paucity of data regarding the voluntary period of 
community safety in Cardiff, what data exists does point to an alignment of the 
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experiences of Cardiff and the broader national narrative of the evolution of 
community safety as a policy agenda outlined in Chapter 2. 
4.2.2 STATUTORY PARTNERSHIPS AND COMMUNITY SAFETY INFRASTRUCTURE 
Following the 1997 election of the Labour Government and the introduction of 
the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (CDA), community safety arrangements in 
Cardiff became formalised. Building upon the recommendations of the Morgan 
Report, the CDA introduced the mandatory requirement to implement multi-
agency partnerships orientated around ideas of crime and its prevention in all 
local authorities in England and Wales. Accordingly, the Cardiff community 
safety partnership was established in 1998 and, as further stipulated by the CDA, 
produced community safety strategies setting out the strategic vision for 
community safety. These documents provide an insight into the evolution of the 
governing arrangements of community safety during the national mandatory 
period. The first of these, the 2002-2005 Cardiff community safety strategy, is a 
16-page document that provides evidence of the community safety infrastructure 
and priorities in the early days of the statutory period of community safety from 
the creation of the partnership in 1998 to 2005. This document, reflecting the 
infancy of arrangements in this period, provides an overview of the basic 
governing arrangements and community safety priorities but offers little detail 
regarding the schemes of cooperation and governing resources afforded 
community safety in this time.  
In accordance with the CDA, the dual responsibility of the local authority and the 
police in leading the community safety arrangements in Cardiff was evident, with 
the deputy leader of Cardiff Council and the divisional commander of Cardiff 
BCU occupying key leading roles for the community safety partnership. The 
governing arrangements for community safety in this early period were 
characterised by two key groups. The first, the Community Safety Statutory 
Partners Leadership Group, fulfilled the statutory requirements set out in the 
CDA in relation to the participation of the local authority, the police, and the 
probation, health and fire services and was responsible for the strategic 
coordination of community safety work.  
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The second group, the Community Safety Stakeholder group, comprised 
members of the statutory partners group but also ‘stakeholders from the wider 
community’ (Cardiff Community Safety Partnership, 2002: 2). This stakeholder 
group was responsible for consultation and the monitoring and evaluation of the 
operational task groups for each priority of the community safety partnership. 
From 1998-2002 these priority task groups were: recorded crime, burglary, auto 
crime, race hate crime, homophobic hate crime and domestic violence. In the 
period of 2002-2005 these task group priorities had changed to anti social 
behaviour, violent crime and hate crime, drugs, burglary, and auto crime. An 
examination of these priorities is returned to in Chapter 5, when I assess the 
governing agenda in Cardiff. While the 2002-2005 strategy document contains 
little detail about the schemes of cooperation within this period, it does outline 
who the core governing actors involved in community safety are. It also 
demonstrates the leadership role of the local authority and the police, in keeping 
with the requirements set out in the CDA.  
The 2005-2008 strategy illustrates the continuation of the structures described in 
the 2002-2005 strategy. Again, there was a clear delineation between the 
strategic arrangements for community safety and the operational task groups. 
Notable, however, was the addition of the Statutory Partners Executive group. 
This group comprised a more concentrated membership of local partners, 
consisting of senior officers from Cardiff Council, South Wales Police and 
Cardiff and Vale University Health Board. The emergence of this group is 
significant as it sheds light on the dispersal of power within the governing 
arrangements and the greater power afforded to the local authority, police and 
local health board. In addition to the introduction of the Statutory Partners 
Executive group, the Statutory Partners Leadership group had also expanded to 
encompass a larger membership of partners as required by the Police Reform Act 
(Home Office, 2002). This expanded membership of the Statutory Partners 
Leadership group is shown below in Table 1.     
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Organisation Representatives 
South Wales Fire and Rescue 
Service 
Divisional Commander 
Cardiff Council  The Corporate Director; Deputy Leader, 
Community Safety Manager, Local Substance 
Misuse Action Team Manager, Cardiff YOT 
Manager and Substance Misuse Lead Officer 
South Wales Police BCU Commander 
South Wales Police Authority Executive Member 
South Wales Area Probation 
Service 
Assistant Chief Officer 
British Transport Police Area Commander Cardiff 
Local Health Board Chief Executive 
Cardiff & Vale NHS Trust Director of Development 
South Wales Fire Authority Executive Member 
Local Criminal Justice Board Performance Manager 
TABLE 1: MEMBERSHIP OF THE STATUTORY PARTNERS LEADERSHIP GROUP, SOURCE: CARDIFF 
COMMUNITY SAFETY PARTNERSHIP, 2005: 41 
The structures outlined thus far have largely concerned the strategic 
arrangements for community safety practice in Cardiff, and have provided little 
insight into the practice of community safety through the operational task groups 
and the work of the community safety team. This delineation between the 
strategic partnership groups and the operational task groups is mapped out below 
in Figure 1, which is taken from the Cardiff Community Safety Strategy, a 
document produced by the Cardiff Community Safety Partnership (2005). These 
task groups were organised around particular priority issues and were led by task 
group chairs who were chosen from a range of partner organisations according to 
their expertise and skills. As part of the management and monitoring of the work 
undertaken in these task groups, each group was responsible for developing 
annual action plans. While the 2002-2005 strategy was unclear as to how these 
task groups were governed and managed, the 2005-2008 strategy is more explicit 
in this regard and provides an insight into the governing resources afforded to 
community safety as a key policy agenda during this period.  
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FIGURE 1: THE CARDIFF COMMUNITY SAFETY PARTNERSHIP, SOURCE: CARDIFF COMMUNITY 
SAFETY PARTNERSHIP, 2005: 6 
Like many large local authorities, a significant component of local community 
safety arrangements under New Labour, was the presence of a dedicated 
community safety team, an example of what Gilling et al. termed ‘extensive 
bureau-professional multi-agency teams’ (2013: 329).  The community safety 
team served an intermediary function between the individual task groups and the 
strategic level community safety groups, and ‘played a key role in coordinating 
the work of the statutory and responsible public authorities’ (Gilling et al., 2013: 
329). As seen in Table 2, below, the community safety team comprised a number 
of dedicated support officers tasked with facilitating the partnership response to 
crime and disorder in the city. Furthermore, the team served as the site for the 
development and accumulation of community safety expertise and knowledge 
(Hughes and Gilling, 2004). The roles of the officers within the community 
safety team ranged from dedicated administrative and financial staff to 
operational support through researchers, data analysts, anti-social behaviour case 
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workers and substance misuse workers. These practitioners provided 
informational and organisational governing resources to facilitate partnership 
work in the city for purposes of crime and disorder prevention and reduction. The 
size of the community safety team reflected the sizable commitment of financial 
resources to community safety during this period. An overview of the team is 
included below, in Table 2. Within this team, the role of the community safety 
coordinator was particularly important due to their responsibility for ensuring 
that the task groups were ‘operating smoothly and effectively’ and ‘within their 
defined “terms of reference”’ (Cardiff Community Safety Partnership, 2005: 34). 
Alongside the community safety manager, these two posts provided an important 
function in the coordination and strategic management of the disparate elements 
of community safety work.  
Position  Details  
Community Safety Manager  
Responsible for managing the Community Safety 
Team and for community safety issues within 
Cardiff Council.  
Anti-Social Behaviour Order 
(ASBO) Coordinator  
Responsible for the coordination and 
implementation of a Council wide ASBO policy  
ASBO Caseworker (x2)  Provides casework and takes victim statements in the preparation of ASBOs  
CCSP Coordinator  
Coordinates the activities of the CCSP. Also 
organises the CCSP task groups and monitors their 
activities.  
Administrative Officer  Provides administrative support to the CCSP and the Council team.  
Research Officer  Provides specialist research and policy skills to inform the Partnership.  
Design Officer  Provides specialist skills in Designing Out Crime.  
Finance Officer  Employed on a part-time basis to provide specialist financial advice to Partnership  
Substance Misuse 
Coordinator  
Coordinates a city wide response to Substance 
Misuse  
Development Officer  
The contact for council based initiatives and 
responsible for performance monitoring CCSP 
interventions.  
Communications Officer  Responsible for developing and implementing a Communications Strategy for the CCSP.  
Data Analyst  Provides specialist analytical skills to inform the CCSP.  
Night Time Economy 
Coordinator  
Coordinates city center response to alcohol related 
issues.  
TABLE 2: CARDIFF COMMUNITY SAFETY TEAM, SOURCE: CARDIFF COMMUNITY SAFETY 
PARTNERSHIP, 2005: 38 
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In understanding the importance of this community safety infrastructure during 
this national mandatory period of community safety, it is helpful to refer to the 
work of Edwards et al. (2007) and their distinction between ‘minimal’ and 
‘maximal’ models of community safety within Wales. The community safety 
infrastructure described here in Cardiff is reflective of Edwards et al.’s (2007) 
categorisation of a maximal model. For Edwards et al., these maximal models 
are typified by well-resourced community safety teams that ‘envisage a strategic 
leadership role for the head/manager of community safety’ (2007:18). For 
Edwards et al., the seniority of these senior community safety managers was 
integral in equipping ‘them with the capacity to make firm commitments about 
local authority’s contribution to CSP and, in return, secure commitments on 
action from other responsible authorities’ (2007: 20). These discussions highlight 
the importance of the role the community safety manager played in negotiating 
with senior officials in other partner organisations to facilitate partnership work 
around community safety.  As Edwards et al. note the power available to the 
community safety manager to do this was contingent upon the size of the 
community safety infrastructure as the greater size and resources provided 
greater leverage in encouraging cooperation.  Accordingly, those smaller local 
authorities with ‘minimal’ models of community safety ‘struggled to commit 
resources from key services within the local authority’ (Edwards et al., 2007: 
20). 
The resources afforded to community safety and, in turn, the size of the 
community safety infrastructure in Cardiff therefore marks it as a relatively 
fortunate local authority. Linking back to the conceptual framework of this 
research, this maximal model of community safety in Cardiff helps explain how 
cooperation for community safety was mobilised in this national mandatory 
period. The size and scale of the community safety infrastructure can be seen to 
have performed a vital function in leveraging and encouraging cooperation from 
other stakeholders. The strategic functions of the community safety manager and 
the community safety coordinator was likely to have played a key part in 
promoting engagement from other actors and providing strategic oversight of 
community safety practice. The community safety team can also be seen to have 
provided significant informational and organisational resources for the 
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facilitation of partnership activity. Therefore the community safety infrastructure, 
and its role in facilitating partnership work is important considering the changes 
to the community safety infrastructure that have taken place in recent years. 
These changes will now be examined. 
4.3 THE BEGINNINGS OF CHANGE 
4.3.1 THE NEED FOR SCRUTINY, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 
‘NEIGHBOURHOOD’ 
During the national mandatory period under the Labour Governments of 1997-
2010, the Cardiff Community Safety Partnership became recognised as a site of 
good practice in terms of partnership working and information sharing. Work 
around tackling alcohol related violence in the city through improvements to 
information sharing protocols were increasingly recognised as being effective 
and worth emulating (Caerphilly County Borough Council, 2005; Accounts 
Commission, 2000). Likewise, Cardiff’s response to domestic violence was held 
up ‘as an example of best practice’ both in national media (BBC, 2005: para 1) 
and in academic work (Maguire and Brookman, 2011; Robinson, 2006). 
Similarly, examples of effective partnership working around the night-time 
economy, highlighted by respondents during this research, were developed 
during this period. Despite these perceived successes and the financial resources 
afforded to community safety work in Cardiff, there remained indications that 
improvements were needed.  
The distribution of power and the dominance of council officers in the 
community safety arrangements at the time echoes Edwards et al.’s comments 
regarding the ‘officer-driven’ nature of community safety work in Wales (2007). 
In an attempt to redress this balance and encourage greater participation by 
elected members - as well as addressing broader concerns that community safety 
arrangements were becoming ‘talking shops’ rather than effective partnership 
arrangements - a number of changes were introduced. Cardiff, in line with the 
legislative changes of the Police and Justice Act 2006, introduced annual 
community safety reviews as well as mechanisms for the scrutiny of community 
safety practice by local authorities. This scrutiny was conducted through Cardiff 
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Council’s Community and Adult Services Scrutiny Committee (CASSC) that 
met on a monthly basis. More significantly, this legislation led to the emergence 
of a substantial change in local governing arrangements in Cardiff in response to 
perceived barriers to the realisation of section 17 of the CDA and the 
mainstreaming of community safety in the city. Reports produced by the CASSC 
exemplify this concern. The following extract is taken from a progress report of 
an inquiry carried out by the Scrutiny Research Team into the structure for the 
delivery of community safety, in particular, into the compliance of Cardiff 
Council with section 17 of the CDA. 
The Inquiry members were concerned at the lack of 
mainstreaming of community safety into all service 
provision. Community Safety is not extensively integrated 
into service area business planning processes or considered 
in the formulation of new policies and services. 
The Inquiry received evidence of a number of key barriers 
to effective mainstreaming, including: low organisational 
awareness of Section 17 duty; lack of available information 
and training on Section 17 duty; lack of recording of cost of 
crime to council services and assets; inconsistent recording 
of incidents of crime across service areas; and community 
safety information not shared extensively between service 
areas. 
CASSC, 2008: 3 
A key point of consideration for the improvement of partnership working 
involved examining the organisational levels at which partnership commitments 
were negotiated and organised. While the community safety manager was able to 
secure commitments at a senior level within council directorates and other 
partner organisations, the scrutiny committee report suggested that these 
commitments were not being realised further down the hierarchy. In response to 
these challenges a neighbourhood transformation programme was proposed 
which placed greater emphasis upon locally based partnerships to facilitate local 
cooperation.  By encouraging greater communication and organisation of 
partnership practices between local practitioners, it was argued that the 
programme would lead to more sustainable cooperation in addition to 
encouraging greater community engagement as alluded to in the following 
extract: 
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The aim of the Neighbourhood Transformation programme is 
to ‘design, develop and implement a sustainable model for 
citizen-focused, intelligence-led, problem-oriented multi-
agency neighbourhood management across Cardiff’  
CASSC, 2009: para 13 
This neighbourhood transformation programme emerged in 2007 following 
broader reviews of public service delivery in Wales, including the Welsh 
Government review ‘Making Connections’ (Welsh Government, 2006). 
Alongside this, national changes, in particular the implementation of 
neighbourhood policing, were placing greater emphasis on the importance of 
local neighbourhoods as the site for effective governance. In 2009, the 
neighbourhood transformation programme developed into the Cardiff 
neighbourhood management programme, which, building upon existing 
neighbourhood policing team boundaries, consisted of six areas covering the 29 
electoral divisions of Cardiff. These neighbourhood management areas consisted 
of a local partnership structure chaired by a senior council manager and were 
designed to promote local level engagement between local partners. Typically 
these partners included local council officers, the existing neighbourhood 
policing teams, fire station commanders, local schools, health clinics, doctors’ 
surgeries and elements of the voluntary sector. The absence of representation 
from the community fits with the broader narratives around these sorts of 
arrangements, which tend to ‘manage’ communities, rather than actively working 
with them (Foster, 2002; Taylor, 2003). These partnership teams were tasked 
with the following core objectives: 
• To understand neighbourhoods; 
• Develop partnership working; 
• Improve service delivery; 
• Communicate improvements and changes; and 
• Promote community cohesion and community engagement. 
 
Welsh Government, 2010: 2 
 
To achieve these goals each neighbourhood management area was allocated a 
budget of £10,000, as well as access to a £400,000 neighbourhood management 
budget upon submission of a ‘business case’ to the transforming neighbourhoods 
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tasking group. This tasking group consisted of high level individuals from the 
council, the police, health and fire services, and the six neighbourhood 
management chairs, and was responsible for providing ‘strategic support’ and 
‘strategically coordinating activities and allocating resources’ (Welsh 
Government, 2010: 2).  Both Cardiff Council and Welsh Government regarded 
the first year of the neighbourhood management programme positively. It was 
claimed that there had  ‘been a notable reduction in crime and anti-social 
behaviour…including 5,192 fewer victims of crime over the 12 months to June 
2010’ (Welsh Government, 2010: 1). The perceived successes of the 
neighbourhood management approach to governing crime and disorder in Cardiff 
were further recognised at a national level following the receipt of a Tilley 
award2 in 2010 for integrating partnership and problem solving approaches into 
their work.  
4.3.2 THE BLURRING OF BOUNDARIES AND THE NEED FOR INTEGRATION 
Alongside neighbourhood based innovations, broader changes to public service 
delivery were also taking place following the 2006 Beecham report into public 
service delivery in Wales. The Beecham report highlighted a divergence between 
Wales and England in the development of public services. Whereas public 
service delivery in England was developing in line with a consumer model - 
where public services were to be improved through increased choice and 
increased competition - in Wales it was argued that public services should be 
developed according to the ‘citizen model’ of service delivery: 
In the citizen model, exit is not the driver of improvement. 
The model relies on voice to drive improvement, together 
with system design, effective management and regulation, 
all operating in the interests of the citizen 
Beecham, 2006: para 2.14 
To achieve this, the Beecham report recommended substantial changes to public 
service delivery in Wales as ‘the citizen model cuts across the culture and 
                                                
2 The Tilley award encourages the recognition of good practice in implementing innovative 
approaches to crime and disorder reduction (Williams, 2007)  
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working practices of traditional public service delivery organisations’ and 
required a ‘weakening of organisational boundaries’ (Beecham, 2006: para 2.17). 
Under the citizen model, the effective governance of social problems required far 
greater coordination and integration of public services at a local level and greater 
strategic thinking. The report noted three main barriers to the realisation of the 
citizen model: culture, capacity and complexity. The third of these, complexity, 
is worth briefly highlighting, as it is something that is returned to later in this 
chapter. The Beecham report argued that ‘there is a widely held view that there 
are far too many partnerships and that they are not sufficiently effective in 
improving delivery’ (Beecham, 2006: para 3.51).  It went on to state that the 
‘Police Service in Wales expressed frustration at the limited impact of the 
Community Safety Partnerships, in tackling substance misuse and its impact on 
health, employment and community safety’ (Beecham, 2006: para 3.55). This is 
an important point as it relates to the fundamental frictions around leadership for 
community safety and the compromise of joint leadership between the police and 
local authorities implemented under the Crime and Disorder Act. The police’s 
frustration in regards to the ineffective partnership practices around substance 
misuse points to the challenges of mobilising cooperation for certain partner 
organisations around particular community safety objectives. These problems of 
incentivising cooperation can be linked to the limitations of joint leadership 
arrangements for community safety, which inhibit the mobilisation of other 
partners to engage around community safety objectives. This issue of leadership 
is important when considering the subsequent changes to the governing 
arrangements and agendas for community safety in 2010, and will be returned to 
later in this chapter and in Chapter 5. 
The Welsh Government set out its response to the Beecham report in the 
document Making Connections – Delivering Beyond Boundaries: transforming 
public services in Wales (2006). Building upon the recommendations of the 
Beecham report, the Welsh Government sought to introduce Local Service 
Boards (LSBs) to ‘bring together the key contributors to local service delivery’ 
(Welsh Government, 2006: 3) and to break down organisational boundaries and 
facilitate more ‘joined up’ public services. These recommendations made within 
the Making Connections paper are important when considering the power 
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relations of local governance as they sought a fundamental redistribution of 
power within local governing arrangements in Wales. This talk concerning the 
breaking down of organisational boundaries and more joined up delivery, is a 
managerialist discourse employed by the Welsh Government, that disguised a 
repositioning of the local authority as the ‘lead’ actor in local governing 
arrangements given that it also stated ‘local authorities will provide the enabling 
locus for Local Service Boards’ (Welsh Government, 2006: 9). The repositioning 
of the local authority as the lead actor in the governing arrangements is 
significant for this research and wider discussions of community safety given the 
historical contest of power between the police and local authorities. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, the Morgan Report advocated for a clear leadership role of local 
authorities in local community safety arrangements, which was eschewed in 
favour of dual leadership alongside the police, when introduced as part of the 
Crime and Disorder Act.  
 In progressing the Welsh Government agenda around LSBs, Cardiff was chosen 
as a pilot area, and in 2007 the Cardiff LSB was established. Its membership 
comprised of chief executives from Cardiff Council, Cardiff and Vale University 
Health Board, South Wales Fire and Rescue Service, South Wales Police 
(Cardiff BCU), Cardiff Third Sector Council and the Welsh Government’s 
Director General for Local Government and Communities. In line with the 
rhetoric of the Beecham inquiry, the LSB was envisioned as a lead partnership, 
responsible for the overall strategic direction of public services in Cardiff, 
driving forward partnership working in all areas of service delivery and to 
facilitate the strategic governance of social problems in the city. Discussions 
regarding the LSB and broader issues of public service delivery in Wales 
outlined here are important for considering the changes that were made to the 
governing arrangements around community safety in Cardiff and will be returned 
to shortly. However, before doing so, it is worth examining the extent of the 
financial challenge in Cardiff following the 2010 election of the Coalition 
Government and the commencement of austerity measures.  
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4.4 THE FINANCIAL CHALLENGE IN CARDIFF 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the significance of the election of the Coalition 
Government for community safety results from the decentralisation of power and 
the responsibilisation of local authorities, the introduction of regional PCCs and 
the extensive reduction of financial resources to the public sector, and local 
government in particular (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: Taylor-Gooby, 2012). 
Since the commencement of the austerity agenda, the amount of financial 
resources available to Cardiff Council has decreased as a result of both shrinking 
budgets and increasing demand for services, a situation echoed across all local 
authorities in Wales (WLGA, 2015).  In 2010-2011 Cardiff Council was required 
to make budgetary savings of £14 million, followed by £22 million in 2011-
2012, £14.4 million in 2012-2013 and £19.2 million in 2013-2014. Therefore, in 
the four years preceding this research, Cardiff Council had experienced budget 
reductions totalling £69.6 million.  The year on year cuts experienced in the four 
years prior to 2014-15, although significant, were notably less than the financial 
challenges posed in 2014-15.  
 
Welsh Government funding had largely protected Welsh local authorities from 
the scale of cuts experienced in England from 2010-2014. This protection was 
not sustainable and, facing a continued commitment to austerity in Westminster, 
Welsh Government reduced the amount of funding allocated to Cardiff Council 
from £463.6 million to £450.2 million. This reduction in funding from Welsh 
Government, which had previously been increasing year on year (from £400 
million in 2010-2011), coincided with increasing budgetary pressures. Thus in 
2014-15 the amount of financial savings required to be made by Cardiff Council 
totalled £52 million. £4 million of this was to be funded through increases in 
council tax, and the remaining £48 million was to be achieved through cost and 
efficiency savings. Given the extent of the cuts in the preceding four years, 
amounting to close to £70 million, and the unprecedented levels of savings to be 
achieved in 2014-2015, this represented a substantial challenges to the governing 
capacity of Cardiff Council. The extent of these pressures can be seen below in 
Table 3, which outlines the budget savings required in each financial year since 
2009/10. 
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Budget Shortfalls 2009 -2015 
Year Million (£) 
2009/10 8.7 
2010/11 14.0 
2011/12 22.0 
2012/13 14.4 
2013/14 19.2 
2014/15 52.4 
TABLE 3: BUDGET SHORTFALLS 2009-2015 
South Wales Police have also been subject to significant financial pressure. 
According to the 2014-2018 medium term financial budget and the Police and 
Crime plan 2014-17, (both produced by the PCCs Office) South Wales Police 
have faced a budget gap of £38 million from 2010 to 2014, with a further £10 
million budget gap in 2014-15. This was estimated to account for roughly 20% of 
the force’s budget. Much of this budget gap has been addressed through 
efficiency savings and staff losses.  
The Police and Crime Plan states, that in the last four years, the number of police 
officers employed in South Wales has fallen from 3400 to little over 2800. As 
with local authorities in Wales, the Welsh Government has attempted to mitigate 
the impact of these budget cuts through the funding of Police Community Support 
Officers (PCSOs). In 2011-12 325 fulltime PCSO positions in South Wales Police 
were funded by the Home Office and zero by Welsh Government. By 2014, the 
number of PCSOs funded by the Home Office had reduced to 200, however this 
reduction was mitigated by the funding of 206 PCSOs by Welsh Government. 
The financial challenge outlined here in relation to Cardiff Council and South 
Wales Police was also compounded by budget reductions targeted at Cardiff and 
Vale University Health Board and the local voluntary sector, therefore presenting 
a significant reduction in the governing capacity of public services in Cardiff. 
More specifically to community safety, as part of the Coalition Government’s 
austerity strategy, there had been a significant disinvestment in the community 
safety agenda in England and Wales. This was evidenced in Cardiff with the 
reduction of the community safety fund from £369,000 in 2010/11 to £149,000 
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in 2012/13 (Home Office, 2011a). Further problematising the allocation of 
resources for community safety was the regionalisation of the community safety 
fund. Previously, the fund was granted to the local authority but, as of 2014-15, 
responsibility for the fund has been afforded to the PCC. This reallocation of the 
community safety fund from the local to the regional level created power 
dependencies between the local Cardiff regime and the regional PCC office. 
Moreover, the regionalisation of community safety funding and its positioning 
with the PCC present a possible tension with the Welsh Government’s vision for 
the local authority as the leader in local partnership arrangements.  
Due to the salience of this issue and the potential impact of the PCCs upon local 
partnership arrangements (Gilling et al., 2013) it is worth noting how the PCC 
has been received in Cardiff. The PCC for South Wales Police (and therefore 
Cardiff) is a Labour candidate who was involved in the creation of the Crime and 
Disorder Act. The reception of the PCC amongst practitioners encountered 
during this research was mixed. Some spoke positively of the PCC and their 
involvement with the Crime and Disorder Act, regarding Cardiff as relatively 
fortunate given the strong ties of the PCC to the community safety and crime 
prevention agenda. This view was apparent in an interview with a senior 
practitioner involved with the youth offending team:  
[…] he [the PCC] takes a great interest in what we do 
because he, to be fair to him, does understand the argument, 
you grab ’em young and you divert where you can and then 
chances are they are far less likely to become adult 
offenders and be in and out of prison for the rest of their 
days basically. 
Youth Offending Service Practitioner 
In contrast to this more positive outlook, some members of the partnership team 
were more critical of the PCC. During a conversation with one practitioner in the 
partnership team, they commented upon the PCC’s lack of cooperation around 
the governing arrangements in Cardiff, in particular the neighbourhood 
management model. This was noted during one quarterly meeting of the safer 
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and cohesive communities programme board3, the first of which, I was informed, 
the PCC had attended. As the meeting progressed, attention turned to the 
potential expansion of neighbourhood watch schemes leading to a discussion of 
the role of neighbourhood management in facilitating this. This culminated in an 
exchange around the utility of the neighbourhood management teams, as the 
following extract from fieldnotes shows:  
While the PCC recognised the function of the 
neighbourhood partnerships he was resistant to their role in 
facilitating engagement with the neighbourhood watch. This 
was met by immediate frustration by some around the table 
who retorted that all of the organisations have agreed to 
work to these boundaries and that it is important that these 
arrangements should be used. To lend credence to their 
point they invited one of the neighbourhood partnership 
chairs to share their opinion on the subject, after which the 
PCC conceded the point but without committing to any 
decision. 
Fieldnotes 25/07/14 
This extract points towards tension between the agendas of the Cardiff regime 
and the regional power of the PCC. This contest of wills around the community 
safety agenda and how local governance is best achieved within Cardiff places 
strain on the governing capacity of the Cardiff regime in realising its agenda. 
This point is explored further in Chapter 5, when I consider the differences 
between the strategic agendas of the PCCs Office and the Cardiff Partnership 
Board.  
In terms of governing arrangements, there was evidence of an emerging regional 
infrastructure for community safety work developing under the PCC in which 
some partnership activity, formerly under the remit of the Cardiff community 
safety partnership, had migrated towards. This was seen in the relocation of the 
violence reduction partnership. Formerly a task group of the Cardiff community 
safety partnership, following the organisational restructure within Cardiff, there 
                                                
3 The safer and cohesive communities programme board was a meeting of the senior practitioners 
involved in the delivery of community safety work with a senior official within the governing 
arrangements.  
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has been a breakdown of local arrangements for the pursuit of this work as 
recounted by one member of the partnership team:  
[…] the violent crime task group when I spoke to **** 
who is the chair of that violent crime task group, he’s 
never been contacted since the community safety 
partnership has been dissolved, he’s never been contacted 
by anyone from community safety 
Partnership Officer 
In the absence of local support provided under the new governing arrangements 
in Cardiff, the work of this group had been picked up and supported by the PCC 
at a regional level. Alongside this, conversations with local practitioners 
indicated an emerging body of community safety expertise being developed at 
the PCC’s Office. While evidence of any impact of this emerging regional 
infrastructure was not yet apparent during my research, these points nevertheless 
raise questions for future research into how this regional and local relationship 
between the PCC and local authority actors develops. What is clear however, is 
that the combination of austerity and the introduction of the PCCs presents a 
significant challenge to the capacity of local governing regimes to take advantage 
of the greater autonomy presented by localism. 
The chapter now considers how local actors in Cardiff have sought to respond to 
these challenges by adapting the governing arrangements for partnership work. 
This consideration examines two competing narratives behind these changes. The 
following section, examines how changes to the governing arrangements have 
been positioned as a positive progression of local governance. The subsequent 
section, section 4.6, demonstrates how the changes can be viewed as a regression 
of the partnership infrastructure necessitated by austerity, which has resulted in a 
degradation of governing capacity for community safety. 
4.5 LOCALISED AND DEVOLVED ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMMUNITY 
SAFETY: PROGRESSIVE OPPORTUNITY?  
4.5.1 REDUCING COMPLEXITY 
As identified in the literature review, despite the reduction in the community 
safety fund, and the impact of PCCs, some commentators have highlighted the 
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opportunities presented by localism and the loosening of central government 
control (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012).  Similarly, others have speculated that 
austerity may encourage changes that might be perceived as beneficial but 
‘politically difficult in more favourable economic circumstances’ (Faulkner, 
2012: 22). These arguments are prevalent in the discourse of senior policy 
officials and senior managers and are persistent throughout the strategic 
documentation, which outlines the changes to the governing arrangements in 
Cardiff.  
 
The origins of the changes to the governing arrangements can be traced back to 
the introduction of the Local Service Board in Cardiff in 2007 and the 
recommendations made by the Beecham inquiry (2006) and the Welsh 
government paper, Building Connections (2006) discussed earlier. Tied up within 
these documents was the assessment that partnership arrangements in Wales had 
become increasingly complex. Senior policy officers within Cardiff adopted this 
argument of complexity when referring to the partnership arrangements in 
Cardiff before 2010 as  ‘partnership complexity’ in conversation. For reference 
this complexity is illustrated in Figure 2, overleaf.  
 
Figure 2, taken from a policy document, outlines the different partnership 
structures that had evolved over the years of successive Labour Governments. In 
the diagram, these structures are denoted by four colours, with the community 
safety infrastructure mapped in green. The interconnections between these 
structures are shown by the red lines and demonstrate the shared interests of the 
different partnership structures. This diagram provides a helpful portrayal of the 
arguments presented within the policy discourse, and the advocacy for the 
reduction of complexity through the rationalisation of ‘existing arrangements to 
reduce duplication and increase effectiveness’ (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2012a: 
6).  
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4.5.2 THE CREATION OF THE CARDIFF PARTNERSHIP BOARD 
This process of rationalisation commenced in 2009 when the Local Service 
Board began taking a more pivotal role in the strategic governance of the city; 
beginning with the initial integration of the four statutory partnership plans4 into 
a single Integrated Partnership Strategy. This integrated partnership strategy was 
designed to set out a ‘shared agenda’ for every partner agency within the Local 
Service Board with the aim of facilitating a more strategic approach to local 
governance. This integrated plan would go on to form the Cardiff ‘What Matters’ 
strategy, which sets out the strategic governing agenda within Cardiff and forms 
the focus of Chapter 5. In 2010 this process of integration was taken further, with 
the integration of the various partnership structures into the Local Service Board, 
which had been rebranded as the Cardiff Partnership Board. The integration of 
these partnership structures into the Cardiff Partnership Board represents a 
substantial reformulation of the governing arrangements in Cardiff, and of 
importance for this thesis, had significant implications for community safety 
work in the city. Before exploring the effect of this integration of partnership 
structures on community safety work, it is worth examining the Cardiff 
Partnership Board and the new governing arrangements it entailed in more detail. 
 
The Cardiff Partnership Board represented the centre of the new governing 
arrangements and was responsible for the strategic management and direction of 
partnership work in the city. This included community safety given the 
integration of the community safety partnership. Recognising this, it stated that 
the Cardiff Partnership is responsible for ‘overseeing the operational delivery of 
‘What Matters’, the governing agenda in Cardiff’ (Cardiff Partnership Board, 
2012a: 16). As discussed in Chapter 3, due to this strategic management role, it is 
argued that the Cardiff Partnership Board, and the core members that constituted 
it, represented the governing regime in Cardiff during this research. Building 
upon the arrangements of the existing Local Service Board the Cardiff 
Partnership Board consisted of a core membership of chief executives, or persons 
of equivalent position, from seven partner organisations:  
                                                
4 These four plans were the Health Social Care and Well Being Strategy, the Community Safety 
Action Plan, the Children and Young People’s Plan and the Community Strategy.  
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• Cardiff Council 
• Cardiff and Vale University Health Board 
• Cardiff Third Sector Council 
• South Wales Fire and Rescue Service 
• South Wales Police, specifically the Cardiff Basic Command Unit 
• Director General, Local Government and communities, Welsh 
Government 
• The Assistant chief probation officer 
 
The addition of a representative from the probation service resulted from the 
integration of the community safety partnership and the statutory obligations that 
go with it in terms of partner engagement. These seven officials formed the 
permanent members of the Cardiff Partnership Board and therefore represented 
the core actors of the governing regime in Cardiff. In terms of the powers of this 
board, its terms of reference state that ‘the Board is not a formal decision-making 
body with executive powers’ and that decisions will be ‘agreed by consensus 
among the full members’ (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2016a: para 7). This idea of 
agreed consensus is relevant to the analytical framework underpinning this 
research, which seeks an understanding of how this ‘consensus’ is actually 
reached and the importance of local power dynamics in influencing this. 
Crucially, the terms of reference, and other policy documentation, are relatively 
silent on the issues of leadership within the Cardiff Partnership Board and the 
language of consensus is suggestive of a partnership of equals. However, as 
discussed previously guidance produced by the Welsh Government relating to 
integrated partnership boards does offer some indication that all is not equal 
within these partnership arrangements, due to its recommendation that local 
authorities should take the lead in these arrangements (Welsh Government, 
2012).  
 
This was somewhat played out in this research. My examination of meeting 
minutes of the Cardiff Partnership Board indicated a consistent greater presence 
of local authority officials at these meetings. Moreover, the perception of local 
authority dominance was also noted in a report put forward to the Cardiff 
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Partnership Board which stated that there was not ‘enough clarity over different 
partners’ roles and responsibilities’ and that ‘there was also a view that 
partnership working is Council led’  (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2014a: 5). This 
dominance of the local authority in the new governing arrangements was also 
noted by a senior practitioner during an: 
I’ve heard of people in the third sector who have 
complained that it’s all very well these partnership 
arrangements but the local authority is in charge, and they 
resent that. Unfortunately the programme boards I think 
every single one of them is chaired by a local authority 
senior manager. Well you are not finding much favour with 
small third sector organisations because y’know the local 
authority is the big elephant in the room they’re bloody 
everywhere and in charge of everything 
Local Practitioner 
While definitive evidence of these power relations in action was difficult to 
acquire given the backstage nature of such interactions, the dominance of Cardiff 
Council within the governing arrangements was clearly apparent and not 
altogether unsurprising given the size and breadth of its responsibilities. The 
greater influence afforded to Cardiff Council within the governing regime had a 
significant impact upon the development of the strategic agenda through the 
production of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. This is discussed in more detail 
shortly when considering some of the arguments made in favour of the new 
governing arrangements for community safety that allude to a lessening influence 
of the police and the potential for more progressive agendas. Before this, 
however, it is worth elaborating on a discussion of the governing arrangements in 
Cardiff, and the mechanisms for community safety delivery that are managed by 
the Cardiff Partnership Board.  
 
Sitting underneath the Cardiff Partnership Board and building upon the 
innovations provided by the emergence of neighbourhood management, the 
operational delivery of the strategic partnership agenda was organised through 
two primary mechanisms. Firstly, through one of eight thematic programme 
boards that addressed issues that were perceived to exist at a city-wide level. The 
second mechanism was the neighbourhood management structure, which aimed 
to address local issues specific to certain geographic localities and required more 
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localised partnership responses. This rationalised structure is illustrated below in 
Figure 3, which is taken from documentation produced by the Cardiff Partnership 
Board. Where Figure 2 (page 101) was presented as statutory partnership 
complexity, Figure 3, overleaf, presents a visualisation of the integrated 
partnership structure and the bifurcated modes of delivery through the 
neighbourhood management model on the left and the eight thematic programme 
boards on the right. This bifurcated delivery model is important for discussions 
of community safety and is worth examining.  
 
Beginning with the eight thematic programme boards, these are strategic boards 
that meet on a quarterly basis and are responsible for determining practice around 
one of eight broad policy agendas. Membership of these boards varies according 
to the policy focus, but typically comprise a range of actors from partner 
organisations both within and outside of the public sector. As seen in Figure 3, 
these policy agendas are organised around eight thematic areas:   
• Family and Young People 
• Education Development 
• Safer and Cohesive Communities  
• Older People  
• Emotional, Mental Health and Wellbeing 
• Healthy Living 
• Thriving and Prosperous Economy 
• Urban Environment 
 
The feel good language deployed in these broad thematic areas is itself worthy 
of a passing mention, as how could anyone disagree with the priorities ‘healthy 
living’, ‘thriving and prosperous economy’, or noteworthy for this thesis ‘safer 
and cohesive communities’? The framing of these thematic areas in such broad, 
and inclusive terms can be understood in relation to earlier discussions of the 
Beecham inquiry. These eight thematic areas, covered by the programme 
boards, have been designed to cross organisational boundaries so that 
responsibility for these groups cannot be left to any singular agency or group in 
an attempt to promote partnership working.  
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The restructuring of the governing arrangements through the integration of the 
partnership structures and the introduction of the programme boards can be seen 
as a continuation of the trends of local governance that emerged following the 
Beecham report. In this sense, the narrative presented by the Cardiff Partnership 
Board suggests that the reorganisation of governing arrangements in Cardiff was 
not a reaction to austerity but, rather, a continuation of the path set in motion in 
the latter years of the New Labour Government. This is supported by the Welsh 
Government who refer to the Cardiff Partnership Board as an example of good 
practice and recommend ‘that a single integrated plan should replace at least four 
of the existing statutory plans and strategies…thereby reducing complexity and 
duplication, and freeing up resources’ (Welsh Government, 2012: 1-2). Given the 
extent of austerity outlined previously, this narrative is perhaps a little surprising, 
and as will be explored over the course of the next three chapters, there is 
substantial reason to question these claims.  Yet, for the moment, it is worth 
continuing this line of enquiry before exploring some of the more contested 
aspects of this narrative.  
 
4.5.2 THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE PROGRESSIVE AGENDAS 
The Welsh Government support of the organisational restructuring is largely in 
relation to the benefits it poses in a managerial sense as it contributes towards 
more efficient and less complex local governance structures. These benefits of 
reducing organisational complexity and facilitating more effective and joined up 
public services are argued to lead to more effective and progressive community 
safety agendas in the city. Related to this, the organisational restructuring and 
integration of community safety into the Cardiff Partnership Board is presented 
within the policy discourse as a way of challenging the dominance of the police 
in agenda setting. This is particularly important given the legacy of community 
safety and the role of the police in influencing the agenda in favour of more 
narrow conceptions of crime and disorder prevention (Crawford and Evans, 
2012). This argument that the changes to the governing arrangements had 
facilitated a reduced influence of the police on the community safety agenda was 
remarked upon during discussions with policy officers, as evidenced in the 
following interview extract:  
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[…] now the community safety sort of element of the 
partnership, as its not its own partnership is more 
inclusive, its broader, it looks at wider issues than just the 
sort of the police focus and its less driven by the crime 
stats which was the old community safety partnership used 
to be very driven by that. 
Policy Officer 
This argument builds upon the points made earlier regarding the problems of not 
adequately mainstreaming community safety as a policy agenda within Cardiff. 
This was argued to result in a lack of concern for issues of community safety 
across the different directorates of the council and amongst other partners. 
Instead, concerns of community safety were argued to have been confined to 
those directly involved in the community safety partnership, in particular the 
police, which therefore inhibited attempts to provide a more holistic approach to 
problems of crime and disorder.  Through the integration of the community 
safety partnership into the Cardiff Partnership Board it was argued by senior 
officials that community safety would be more effectively mainstreamed as a 
policy agenda.  During an interview with a senior director within Cardiff Council 
who was responsible for community safety, it was outlined that this diffusion of 
responsibility for community safety work had facilitated a wider engagement of 
partners and allowed the community safety agenda to move in a more 
progressive direction: 
When I asked [the senior director] about the progression 
of community safety in Cardiff they suggested that the old 
Community Safety Partnership structure did have some 
very positive aspects and was well regarded, but 
ultimately there were substantial problems. These 
problems were described as lack of connection of the 
community safety partnership with other council agencies, 
the dominance of the police in agenda setting and the lack 
of engagement from other organisations like health, 
education and social services. Following mainstreaming of 
community safety through the integration of the 
community safety team and the introduction of the Cardiff 
Partnership Board, these problems were argued to have 
improved. The police were argued to hold less power in 
determining community safety agendas and engagement 
from other council directorates and partner agencies was 
far more common.   
Fieldnotes 06/08/14 
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What is apparent in this extract and the interview extract previously, is that the 
new governing arrangements have been argued to alter the local dynamics of 
power for community safety away from the police in favour of the local authority 
and other partner organisations.  This is consistent with the earlier discussions 
relating to the increased dominance of Cardiff Council in the new arrangements. 
These changes have been argued to facilitate more progressive and 
transformative agendas for community safety5 . Within the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy, and echoed by individuals involved at a strategic level within the 
governing arrangements, it is evident that the changes to the governing 
arrangements are not being presented as negative, or as reaction to austerity, but 
rather as a move towards more effective public services and allowing more 
progressive and transformative agendas for community safety. Yet, for all the 
talk of mainstreaming and diffusion of responsibility for community safety, 
partnership work around ideas of community safety is still principally delivered 
through the two mechanisms outlined earlier, either through one of the eight 
thematic programme boards or as part of the neighbourhood management teams.  
 
4.5.3 LOCATING COMMUNITY SAFETY  
The primary programme board for community safety work was the safer and 
cohesive communities programme board. Participants within this research 
frequently referred to the safer and cohesive communities programme board as 
the de-facto replacement infrastructure for the community safety partnership. 
This is unsurprising given the similarities between the safer and cohesive 
communities programme board and the prior infrastructure of the community 
safety partnership. The programme board is chaired by a senior director in 
Cardiff Council who holds responsibility for the strategic oversight of 
workstream activities undertaken as part of the programme board. These 
workstream activities are directly comparable to the ‘task groups’ of the 
community safety partnership in that they represent the priorities of the safer and 
cohesive communities programme board and comprise issues such as domestic 
violence and the night-time economy. Similar to the task groups of the 
                                                
5 The extent to which this is realised in the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy is 
discussed in Chapter 5 
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community safety partnership, these workstream activities are coordinated by 
lead officers who are responsible for driving forward partnership activity in these 
areas. The operational practices of these workstream activities are discussed in 
Chapter 6.  
 
While there are similarities between the programme board and the community 
safety partnership, to equate the two would ignore some fundamental differences. 
Where the community safety partnership constituted a substantial infrastructure 
of dedicated officers for the pursuit and support of community safety work, the 
safer and cohesive communities programme board is a quarterly board meeting 
of key individuals. Attending these meetings would typically be the lead 
practitioner for each priority workstream, local authority employed policy 
officers, representatives from the police, probation service, the third sector and 
representatives from local universities. These meetings were designed to give 
opportunities to the workstream leads to report on progress and identify any 
barriers to progression rather than providing direct support and coordination to 
the delivery of these activities.  Even then, the support provided to the 
workstream leads in these meetings was limited, as observed in a programme 
board meeting that I attended, in which little attention was paid to the actual 
operational practices of the workstream:  
During the meeting little time was afforded to discussions 
of the actual delivery and partnership practices of the 
workstream activities. Much of the meeting was taken up 
by a presentation given by the PCC, and while there was 
some discussion of the progress of some of the 
workstreams, actual discussions of problem solving and 
coordination of partnership activity was absent. 
 
Fieldnotes 25/07/14 
 
These observations of the programme board meeting question the role and 
capacity of the programme board to provide any degree of support and 
coordination to the workstreams. This was an issue raised in an interview with 
one practitioner who attended these meetings on a regular basis and was 
concerned that it had ‘started to become a bit of a talking shop, it has started to 
become a place where people have come to do presentations’. Therefore in 
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contrast to the support provided by the previous community safety infrastructure, 
the new arrangement through the safer and cohesive communities programme 
board is more limited in the support that it provides to the operational practices 
of community safety. Furthermore, where the community safety partnership had 
dedicated community safety officers, under the new arrangements such provision 
has been integrated into a non-specialised partnership team who offer support for 
all partnership activity in the city, of which community safety forms a small part.  
These differences cannot be ignored, and are returned to shortly when 
considering the implications of the changes to the governing arrangements and 
how they contrast with the progressive narrative of the Cardiff Partnership 
Board.  
 
The other mechanism through which community safety work is delivered is 
through the neighbourhood management teams. As with the other governing 
arrangements in the city, the neighbourhood management structure did not 
escape the restructure of the governing arrangements. The biggest change to the 
neighbourhood management structure stemmed from the mainstreaming of 
community safety within the Cardiff Partnership Board. When first introduced, 
the neighbourhood management teams were exclusively tasked with addressing 
issues of crime and disorder as part of the Cardiff community safety partnership. 
As a result of mainstreaming through the integration of community safety into 
the Cardiff Partnership Board the scope of the neighbourhood management teams 
was extended to include issues regarding health, education and any other 
problem perceived to affect particular neighbourhoods.  As will be seen in 
Chapter 6, while this broadening of the agenda of the neighbourhood 
management teams has been argued to facilitate more progressive and holistic 
responses to the problems facing particular neighbourhoods, there are also 
concerns that the community safety agenda is being marginalised as a result of 
competition with alternative policy agendas at a local level.  
 
Alongside the change to their remit, the structure of the neighbourhood 
management teams had also been subject to change. When first introduced, each 
neighbourhood management area was led by one neighbourhood management 
chair from Cardiff Council. Under the new arrangements, each neighbourhood 
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management area had seen the addition of a second neighbourhood chair, a 
position occupied by individuals from a partner organisation outside of the 
council. During this research, practitioners from the local health board, the 
police, Communities First, and a private housing association provider occupied 
these positions. The justification for this was that it would facilitate a greater 
sense of shared ownership of neighbourhood management amongst partner 
agencies. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the addition of these new chairs 
altered the dynamics of power within these teams and the prioritisation of 
community safety within the neighbourhood management areas.  
 
Neighbourhood management saw further change in 2014, following a Cardiff 
Council white paper that recommended a rebranding from ‘neighbourhood 
management’ to ‘neighbourhood partnership’. The white paper recommended 
that greater input from local councillors was required. This was achieved through 
the introduction of a new position in each area, which was occupied by a local 
elected member who was tasked with acting as a conduit for local councillors to 
interact with the neighbourhood management teams. This rebranding and attempt 
to involve elected members in the neighbourhood management structure 
represented a desire to address the common problem of community-based 
governance, in that they often fall victim to top-down officer driven management 
of local areas (Hughes, 2007) rather than bottom-up community-led practice. 
These points regarding the neighbourhood management structure are explored 
further in Chapter 6. The purpose of these discussions have been to demonstrate 
how the changes to the governing arrangements have been presented by the 
Cardiff Partnership Board as a progressive change enabling more joined up and 
strategic governance of partnership activity in Cardiff. Yet, despite the optimistic 
narrative presented by the Cardiff Partnership Board, the impact of austerity and 
the realities of substantially reducing financial resources are clearly having an 
affect on the governing capacity within the Cardiff Partnership Board. 
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4.6 LOCALISED AND DEVOLVED ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMMUNITY 
SAFETY: NECESSARY REGRESSION 
4.6.1 DIMINISHING RESOURCES AND REDUCED GOVERNING CAPACITY 
Considering the discussions of section 4.2, which highlighted the role of the 
community safety team in facilitating partnership work the need for such radical 
change to the governing arrangements are questionable. While the integration of 
community safety into the Cardiff Partnership Board has been justified under the 
guise of reducing complexity, these changes have involved significant reductions 
in staff. As seen in previous discussion, these reductions in staff numbers have 
been explained away as merely a reduction in duplication and complexity, 
however this loss of staff has entailed a degradation of resources available to 
community safety. These competing narratives of change, on the one hand 
reducing complexity and promoting progressive change and, on the other hand, 
responding to austerity and reducing resources through mergers and staff losses, 
emerged in one conversation with a senior policy officer when discussing the 
changes as documented in fieldnotes: 
At first their description of the changes was consistent 
with the reasons for change outlined in the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy, stating the complexity of partnership 
arrangements often working on the same issues and the 
subsequent amount of duplication of work. This, they 
argued was solved by establishing the Cardiff Partnership 
board and merging the different partnerships together into 
this one centrally located team. Having said this, they then 
went on to describe what this entailed in practice and 
when actually talking about the realities of this rather than 
the policy they began to deviate from the official line and 
discussed how the reality was that a significant reason for 
change was the necessity to make savings.  Ultimately the 
driving force for the merging of the partnerships was 
largely austerity and the need to achieve a massive 
reduction in the number of staff and therefore costs. 
Fieldnotes 17/04/14 
This exchange was significant in revealing the problems of the progressive 
narrative offered by the Cardiff Partnership Board. While the changes to the 
governing arrangements and the loss of staff in Cardiff have been justified 
through the argument of reducing duplication and improved service delivery, 
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such claims are problematic given the evidence that will be outlined in the 
remainder of this chapter, and the following two chapters. The previous extract 
mentions the merging of the four partnership structures and the co-location of 
partnership activity within one office. In practice, this has resulted in the 
dismantling of the various dedicated partnership support infrastructures including 
the community safety team, and the creation of a non-specialised, generalist 
partnership support team. The assimilation of the community safety team into the 
generalised partnership team resulted in a relocation of the council employed 
partnership officers from the police headquarters to council offices and ended the 
co-location of police and council staff as discussed by a senior police officer 
involved in partnership activity:  
 […] the office you just walked through there, that was my 
community safety department, and they’ve been slimmed 
down from what they used to be, so there’s less numbers 
in there, as there is in the rest of the service, we’ve lost 
around 700 officers due to austerity measures, the funding 
due to austerity and also in that office used to be the 
council’s neighbourhood, the council’s community safety 
team, so we were co-located, but about 2 and a half years 
back, just as I was coming here they were taken back to 
county hall to work. So in my view a backward step, I can 
see that the council is under the same pressures as us, 
they’ve got money to find, not easy in this time and they 
found it was cheaper to work in at county hall maybe 
multi-hatting with jobs outside of that, but purely from a 
community safety aspect if we needed to discuss 
something around housing, for example problem tenants 
and anti social behaviour, may not be a council tenant but 
the council officers here would have access to the housing 
manager and the social landlords so all of that was a built 
in across the desk as opposed to a phone call or booking 
appointments, so that is a backward step in my view 
driven by finance. 
Police Inspector 
The co-location of practitioners from different organisations in one office is 
regarded as a key component in promoting partnership working as discussed by 
Berry et al. (2011). Co-location is argued to assist in developing informal 
working relationships, encouraging better information sharing and facilitating 
cooperation, as noted in the above extract. Therefore the ending of co-location, 
as a result of the changes to the governing arrangements, represented a stepping 
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back of partnership activity in relation to community safety as a consequence of 
the financial pressures facing the council. Moreover, the quote above refers to the 
disappearance of the community safety team and the creation of the non-
specialised partnership team in terms of the multi-hatting of council employed 
partnership staff. Rather than representing a shift to improved service delivery, 
what is discussed here is cost efficiencies achieved by dismissing staff and an 
amalgamation of roles achieved through fewer staff taking on more 
responsibilities.  
 
4.6.2 COORDINATING COMMUNITY SAFETY  
As discussed earlier, the community safety team in Cardiff played a key role in 
co-coordinating partnership activity and provided financial, operational and 
organisational support for community safety practice in the city.  Therefore, the 
reformulation of the governing arrangements in Cardiff and the subsequent 
dismantling of the community safety infrastructure had a detrimental impact on 
the governing resources available for community safety work. This has, in turn, 
affected the operational oversight of community safety activity in the city. 
Following the dismantling of the community safety infrastructure posts such as 
the community safety manager, community safety coordinator and many of the 
other supporting roles have been lost. These were posts that provided clear lines 
of responsibility and operational oversight of community safety within the city 
and, as noted by Edwards et al. (2007), performed a key role in facilitating 
cooperation and engagement from other partner organisations.  
 
The loss of the coordinating and supporting function of the community safety 
team formed a persistent concern during this research. This was apparent in my 
own experiences of fieldwork within the partnership team. While not easily 
captured in any singular event or moment, as the fieldwork progressed I realised 
that building a complete picture of what was happening in regards to partnership 
working around community safety was a complex task due to its diffuse nature 
and lack of clear lines of responsibility and accountability. Far from reducing 
complexity, the changes to the governing arrangements have compromised the 
coordination and oversight of the disparate elements of community safety in the 
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city. Such an assessment was revealed in a conversation with an officer from the 
National Crime Agency (NCA) following a workstream activity meeting:  
[The NCA officer] stated that changes made to CSPs 
under the guises of reducing duplication and reducing 
costs have made it increasingly difficult in coordinating 
NCA activity across local areas due to the absence of a 
direct point of contact for community safety who is 
responsible for coordinating multi-agency activity. Indeed, 
[the NCA officer] recount the complications that have 
taken place since 2010 in the local councils and police 
forces [the NCA officer] works with where there have 
been ‘restructures and then restructures of restructures’ 
and that this has made things increasingly complicated in 
terms of partnership working and getting in contact with 
the right people due to the ambiguity of who to contact.  
Fieldnotes 02/07/14 
Here the NCA officer recounts an experience whereby the changes to community 
safety governing arrangements have made it increasingly difficult to identify who 
to engage with and where responsibility lies for coordinating partnership activity. 
In this instance, such difficulties were complicating attempts by the NCA to 
coordinate multi-agency responses with local actors on the ground due to the 
absence of clear lines of responsibility for community safety work. One 
conversation with a senior policy officer highlighted that, although the changes 
to the governing arrangements have been politically favourable in terms of 
Welsh Government support, in practice, they have severely inhibited the 
coordination of partnership arrangements around community safety. They 
surmised that there should be someone suitably placed to provide the operational 
oversight that is needed to connect people together and identify where 
overlapping areas of interest were present and have sufficient seniority to 
facilitate the engagement of these actors around a shared agenda. This aligns 
with the role formerly provided by the community safety manager, whose 
seniority and position assisted in leveraging cooperation from other partner 
organisations  (Edwards et al., 2007). This issue was often brought up in regular 
conversation with one individual in the partnership team who lamented the 
absence of coordinated partnership practices in relation to crime and disorder as a 
result of the disappearance of the community safety team. In an interview they 
said: 
 117 
[…] see when you had that community safety department 
you had someone there who would bring everyone 
together so everybody, that’s the link that’s missing I feel, 
when you had that community safety department you had 
someone there bringing everyone together, arranging 
meetings, and all this type of thing and I thought that was 
an important role really because it was to bring that joined 
up working together. And although we’ve got the 
partnership group that’s at a higher level, you haven’t got 
that lower level coordination anymore and that’s what I 
feel is missing, that lower level coordination which is what 
you had as a community safety team. 
Partnership Officer 
These problems were further identified by another member of the team who 
discussed how the disappearance of the community safety partnership and the 
absence of operational responsibility and clear lines of accountability may lead to 
problems at a practical level: 
The one thing that I do think is missing from the current 
arrangements is that there is not one single person who has 
responsibility for community safety at an operational level. 
At a strategic level a lot of the sort of policies, if you take, 
lets just think of an example, if you look at domestic 
homicide reviews that’ll say that basically the responsibility 
lies with the chair of the community safety partnership but 
because we’ve got the integrated partnership that would be 
the chair of the CPB so the responsibility would ultimately 
lie with him. But then really at an operational level, if there 
was a domestic homicide in Cardiff probably that would 
come to us as a team to organise because there isn’t a 
designated community safety officer as such that could be 
the person who could coordinate the review so ultimately 
the strategic sort of responsibility lies with the chair of the 
Safer and Cohesive and the chair of the Partnership board 
but there isn’t that sort of operational, you know, this is 
where the coordination of community safety takes place all 
of the original functions still take place throughout the 
council and we still have those relationships in terms of 
having those relationships with the police and you know the 
other public sector bodies as and when you need them but 
there isn’t that one person with a real overarching 
operational view.  
Policy Officer 
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The preceding extract draws attention, again, to the lack of operational 
responsibility and accountability for partnership activities around issues of crime 
and disorder and how this problematises the statutory legal requirements set out 
from central government, in this case a domestic homicide review. This 
ambiguity regarding the responsibility for community safety under the new 
governing arrangements is problematic for its coordination. As described earlier, 
some individuals referred to the safer and cohesive communities programme 
board as a source of oversight for community safety work, but the consensus 
amongst practitioners was that this programme board was too strategic and was 
not suitably placed to provide sufficient oversight and coordination of the 
community safety practice.  This echoes with my own observations of the safer 
and cohesive communities partnership meetings and agendas, given that it only 
take place on a quarterly basis and acts more as a conduit for the workstream 
coordinators to voice any problems and report progress upon their workstream 
activities rather than a meaningful mechanism for the coordination of partnership 
activity.  
4.6.3 MARGINALISATION OF COMMUNITY SAFETY 
The dispersion of responsibility for community safety following the restructure of 
the governing arrangements further complicated statutory requirements to 
scrutinise community safety work as required by the Police and Justice Act 2006.  
By attending the monthly Community and Adult Services scrutiny committees, 
responsible for scrutinising community safety within Cardiff, between February 
2014 and March 2015 it became apparent that community safety rarely featured 
on the agenda. Instead, the agenda of these meetings were predominantly focused 
on issues of health and social care, both of which were also policy areas facing 
significant financial pressure. While quarterly reports of ‘community safety 
indicators’ were discussed briefly on occasion, scrutiny of actual community 
safety work was limited to only two examples throughout the year. Reinforcing 
this impression of the marginalisation of community safety within the governing 
arrangements were comments heard from a senior council official within the 
partnership team when speaking to a policy officer and senior practitioner within 
the team: 
 119 
From what I could hear it seemed that [the senior manager] 
is not happy with what is going on in the council and was 
critical of the work pressures being placed upon a shrinking 
team and of the proposed structural changes, commenting 
that ‘it’s not just about cuts though is it?’ A key point of this 
criticism was that more senior officials within the council 
had been focusing upon issues of health and well-being and 
social care at the expense of partnership working.  
Fieldnotes 24/04/14 
In seeking to explain the marginalisation of community safety as an agenda item 
it can be argued that the lack of clear responsibility and accountability for 
community safety under the new governing arrangements has made scrutinising 
community safety work more problematic. Adding credibility to this argument are 
the claims of one member of the scrutiny committee who, during an interview, 
discussed how the current scrutiny arrangements around issues of community 
were ‘muddled’:  
[…] so we have the scrutiny committee, which is probably 
fair to say, though I don’t know in percentage terms, it 
tends to be the housing, communities areas, not 
community safety, health and social care, and oh by the 
way you’ve got this other bit, I don’t mean the scrutiny 
process, and certainly our scrutiny officer its not her 
intention, but its all of that other bit that we say ‘well we 
are meant to be the scrutiny committee that looks at 
community safety’ 
Scrutiny Committee Member 
Furthermore, when connecting this low prioritisation of community safety on the 
agenda to the governing arrangements within the Cardiff Partnership Board, 
attention was again drawn to the lack of clear lines of responsibility for 
community safety. While the mainstreaming of community safety was 
consistently claimed as a way of improving ‘buy-in’ across the council by the 
Cardiff Partnership Board, there were concerns that, in practice, the dispersal of 
responsibility has actually resulted in an complete absence of responsibility as:  
[…] by having one person together, one person who 
collectively brings it all together and then goes back out to 
the various directorates is the best way to go, and I think 
the partnership board ought to do the same, whilst there 
are issues in education, health, wherever, there has to be 
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one place where all of that is collectively bought together, 
and the administration via the cabinet member is held to 
account for doing that, if he rolls out to his education 
cabinet member, so if [the chair of the scrutiny committee] 
talks to [scrutiny officer] and says there is a problem here, 
that’s to implement improvement because if you melt 
down the responsibilities, if you dilute them down not 
melt them down, dilute them down they become 
everybody’s responsibilities but nobodies and that’s why I 
said its muddled 
Scrutiny Committee Member 
Consistent across all of these responses, my observations, and conversations with 
practitioners encountered during fieldwork observation, was that, despite claims 
of the reduced complexity and improved delivery, the coordination of partnership 
activity has been negatively affected by the changes to the governing 
arrangements in the city. So what can be made of the policy narrative regarding 
progression and reducing complexity outlined in section 4.5? Certainly, the 
Beecham inquiry and the Welsh Government Making Connections paper is 
important in considering the changes to the governing arrangements in Cardiff, 
through the introduction of the Local Service Board with the ambition of 
promoting more joined up strategic planning of local services. Up until 2010, this 
integration had largely taken place at a strategic level. This chapter has shown 
how following the commencement of austerity, a more radical reorganisation of 
the governing arrangements took place through the wholesale integration of the 
various partnership arrangements into the Cardiff Partnership Board. Therefore it 
is likely that the more radical changes to the governing arrangements around 
community safety are a direct consequence of austerity measures, which 
necessitated significant cost savings within the local authority and other partner 
agencies. By taking advantage of the recommendations of the Beecham enquiry, 
the Cardiff Partnership Board sought to use this narrative of reducing complexity 
and increasing efficiency to make a virtue from necessity and in an attempt to 
frame these changes in a positive light rather than as a regressive response to 
austerity. Therefore, despite the positive pronouncements presented by the 
Cardiff Partnership Board regarding the mainstreaming of community safety, a 
clear discrepancy can be seen between the official rhetoric of the Cardiff 
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Partnership Board and the realities of these changes for the responsibility and 
management of community safety work in the city.  
4.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated the significant changes to the governing 
arrangements for community safety in Cardiff. During the statutory period of 
community safety, Cardiff and its well-resourced community safety team 
became a site of good practice and innovation in relation to the local governance 
of crime and disorder. However, as austerity took hold in 2010, and in the 
following years, the community safety infrastructure in Cardiff was dismantled 
and responsibility for community safety work was dispersed under the guise of 
mainstreaming. The Cardiff Partnership Board has presented this change as part 
of a narrative of progression and improvement for public service delivery that 
facilitate greater strategic thinking and the pursuit of a shared governing agenda. 
However, the latter part of this chapter began to question this narrative of 
progression. Using data collecting during the fieldwork, the chapter has begun to 
explore the impact of these changes for community safety work, through the 
identification of three key implications. Firstly, the changes have resulted in the 
dismantling of the community safety partnership team. This has led to the ending 
of the co-location arrangements between the police and council officers, and 
replacement of dedicated community safety practitioners with generalist 
partnership support staff. Secondly, these changes have compromised the 
coordination and oversight of community safety work, which was previously 
facilitated by the community safety manager and community safety coordinator. 
Finally, there were signs that community safety work was being eclipsed by 
larger and more pressured areas of responsibility in the Council, such as health 
and social care, which may be attributed to the degrading governing capacity 
available to community safety work.  
The impact of these changes upon the delivery of community safety work is 
explored in Chapter 6, but before that, it is necessary to consider the governing 
agenda within Cardiff. A key argument of the Cardiff Partnership Board is that 
these changes have facilitated the creation of a shared agenda amongst partner 
agencies in the city. Furthermore, the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board, 
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and the integration of the community safety partnership, has affected the 
distribution of power within the governing for community safety in favour of 
Cardiff Council. This rebalancing of the dynamics of power is noteworthy to a 
consideration of the governing agenda in Cardiff. It is to the analysis of the 
governing agenda of the Cardiff Partnership Board that this thesis now turns.   
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5. AGENDAS FOR GOVERNING SAFER AND 
COHESIVE COMMUNITIES IN CARDIFF: TOWARDS 
A PROGRESSIVE REGIME? 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
A key rationale for the changing governing arrangements was the potential for a 
more strategic model of governance, which would see governing actors unite 
behind a shared agenda. Moreover the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board 
was argued to facilitate engagement from a broader range of actors allowing the 
pursuit of more progressive and socially just agendas for community safety in the 
city. These claims regarding the possibility of more progressive governing agendas 
are assessed through the course of this chapter by examining the official policy 
discourse of the Cardiff Partnership Board. Given this focus on the official policy 
discourse, rather than the operational practices of community safety (discussed in 
Chapter 6), much of this chapter will rely on policy documentation and insights 
gained from formal and informal discussions with individuals familiar with the 
policy context within Cardiff.  
The chapter begins with an examination of the developmental governing agenda 
for community safety during the Labour governments of 1998-2010. The chapter 
then examines the strategic governing agenda in Cardiff, the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy, in which a clear commitment to ideas of social and restorative justice is 
evidenced. This progressive and transformative agenda has resulted in a reframing 
of the community safety agenda around more encompassing ideas of safety rather 
than the narrow focus on crime and disorder. Despite this rhetorical commitment 
to a transformative agenda within the ‘What Matters’ strategy, the chapter 
provides evidence that the realisation of this strategic agenda is being constrained 
by the reductions to governing capacity caused by austerity measures. The chapter 
finishes by assessing how this strategic agenda is translating into the prioritisation 
of community safety work in the city, in which evidence is found of a diminishing 
agenda for community safety. 
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5.2 THE EVOLUTION OF AGENDAS IN CARDIFF  
As with the previous chapter, tracing the progression of the governing agendas for 
community safety in Cardiff is a difficult task due to the paucity of information 
and the reliance on policy documentation. As required by the Crime and Disorder 
Act, every local authority produced three-year crime reduction strategies that 
outline the governing agenda for community safety and the priorities for 
community safety work. While the use of such textual evidence must be treated 
cautiously, these documents provide a useful insight into how problems of 
community safety were conceptualised during this period. The first evidence 
illustrating the agenda for community safety can be seen in the Cardiff 
Community Safety Strategy 2002-2005, which provides a summary of the 
priorities of the Cardiff community safety partnership from 1999-2002. In 
recounting the work of the first three years of the Cardiff community safety 
partnership the strategy presents an agenda orientated principally around ideas of 
crime reduction, as seen in the priorities for the period:  
• To reduce recorded crime, 
• To reduce dwelling house burglary,  
• To reduce auto crime, 
• To increase reporting of racist incidents  
• To increase reporting of homophobic incidents  
• To increase reporting of domestic violence  
Cardiff Community Safety Partnership, 2002: 4 
Reflecting the infancy of the community safety agenda at the time, the document 
offers little detail into how these priorities were addressed. However the measures 
of success used to show the ‘achievements’ of the Cardiff community safety 
partnership during the years of 1999-2002 does shed some light on the 
conceptualisation of community safety during this time. The achievements 
recounted in the strategy are exclusively focussed on law enforcement practices 
and how the Cardiff community safety partnership has been able to assist the 
police in addressing these priorities, either through reducing the amount of 
recorded crime or increasing the amount of crimes that are reported to the police. 
This is supported in a report presented to Cardiff Councils Environmental Scrutiny 
Committee in which in describing the targets for the community safety partnership 
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it was stated that the ‘Council will work with partners to support South Wales 
Police in meeting their race hate targets for Cardiff in 2002/03’ and ‘The Council 
will support the police’s ongoing drive to meet crime reduction targets for 2002/03 
(Environmental Scrutiny Committee, 2003: 3). Although limited, these statements 
and the preponderance on police defined priorities of crime reduction are 
indicative of a maintenance agenda within Cardiff where community safety work 
was subordinated to supporting local policing through assisting in the detection 
and enforcement of crime (Edwards and Hughes, 2012).  
Alongside evidence of this maintenance agenda, these early community safety 
strategies and supporting documents also revealed an emerging tendency towards 
more developmental agendas organised around risk management. Within the 
report provided to the environmental scrutiny committee outlined previously, there 
was reference to  ‘innovative work’ around anti-social behaviour: 
The police and council reviewed how they had been 
collecting data on anti-social behaviour and created new 
data analysis systems. This enables them to target 
problems areas and perpetrators.  
Cardiff Council, 2003: 2 
This discourse around risk and the targeted delivery of services at those perceived 
to be at risk became more apparent as the strategy explored the strategic objectives 
for 2002-2005. The priorities identified for 2002-2005 were anti-social behaviour, 
violent crime, burglary, substance misuse and auto-crime. Moving beyond 
discourses of supporting the police, the 2002-2005 strategic objectives began 
speaking of plans to ‘develop and implement strategies aimed at young people 
who are perpetrators of crime and disorder, particularly anti-social behaviour and 
drug misuse’, or ‘to develop and implement strategies which combat drug-related 
crime, by stifling the availability of drugs on the street’ (Cardiff Community 
Safety Partnership, 2002: 7).  This prevalence of notions of risk is further apparent 
in the consideration of Drug Treatment and Testing Orders (DTTO’s) to reduce 
risks of drug related re-offending to the consideration of Prolific Offenders and the 
use of ‘intensive Probation and Police supervision to avoid the risk of re-
offending’ (Cardiff Community Safety Partnership, 2002: 8). 
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Further highlighting the prominence of a developmental agenda organised around 
risk was a discussion of the ‘HASCADE model’. This model, included below in 
Table 4, provided a framework to ‘inform strategic crime and disorder evaluation 
and action for continuing crime and disorder reduction’ (Cardiff Community 
Safety Partnership, 2002: 10). In this table ‘key strategic community safety 
approaches’ are described in relation to four different ‘priority geographical areas 
(PGAs)’. This matrix indicates the contrasting needs within geographical areas 
pertaining either to the prevalence of crime or the level of vulnerability within that 
area. In looking at this model the prevalence of approaches that advocate ‘recourse 
to the criminal justice system’ alongside ‘situational crime prevention’ techniques 
indicate a clear tendency towards a developmental agenda that seeks to 
supplement criminal justice policy with risk management approaches.  
 
TABLE 4: THE HASCADE MODEL, SOURCE: CARDIFF COMMUNITY SAFETY PARTNERSHIP, 2005: 10 
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The 2002-2005 community safety strategy, which recounts the agenda for both the 
1999-2002 and the 2002-2005 periods, indicates that these early years of the 
national mandatory period were characterised by maintenance and developmental 
agendas. The developmental agenda apparent in the 2002-2005 strategy extends 
into the 2005-2008 Cardiff community safety strategy.  Indeed the five main stated 
priorities for the period of 2005-2008 mirror those of 2002-2005 however there 
was notable addition of a second tier of priorities including:  
• Prolific and other priority offenders 
• Public transport 
• Arson  
• Hate Crime 
• Business and retail crime 
This expansion of the agenda in 2005-2008 through the provision of a second tier 
of priorities reflects the growing resources afforded to the community safety 
agenda over the successive New Labour Governments. In addressing these 
priorities, the 2005-2008 strategy presents a strong emphasis on situational crime 
prevention methods used alongside targeted prevention strategies for particular 
populations deemed to be at risk of offending. The prevalence of these situational 
preventative methods was highlighted with the presence of a full time appointment 
of a ‘community safety design officer, to help design out crime’ (Cardiff 
Community Safety Partnership, 2005: 17).  
These discussions demonstrate the pre-occupation with risk-based approaches to 
preventing crime in the community safety agendas from 1997 to 2008, 
synonymous with Edwards and Hughes’ description of a developmental agenda 
(2012). Moreover the priorities identified during this period, which were largely 
equated with crime reduction, are consistent with much of the academic literature 
pertaining to this period (Gilling et al. 2013; Gilling, 2007; Wiles and Pease, 
2000). This is significant, given the managerialist approach adopted by New 
Labour in dictating the delivery of public services, including community safety, 
which resulted in ‘a relatively narrow focus on recordable crime’ (Gilling et al., 
2013: 329). The presence of a developmental agenda in Cardiff, and its reflection 
of broader national agendas for community safety demonstrate the restricted 
nature of community safety work during this period. As Hughes and Gilling state: 
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‘since 1998, practitioners have been drawn into an environment which seems to be 
responding to changes rather than setting the agenda. The reference point is mainly 
what is happening from ‘above’ or from the ‘centre’…. Practitioners and local 
policy strategists have been given little opportunity to flex any professional 
muscle’ (2004: 135). In furtherance of this point, the 2005-2008 strategy indicates 
that the prioritisation of anti-social behaviour, substance misuse and burglary were 
responses to the requirements of centrally determined public service agreements 
(PSAs). Therefore the potential of local policy actors to pursue alternative agendas 
within this time were constrained by managerialist tendencies of New Labour.  
It is for these reasons that the election of the Coalition Government in 2010 and its 
promise of greater localism, and reduced central management of public services, 
provide opportunities for more expansive agendas. As has been seen in Chapter 4, 
despite the financial pressures facing the Cardiff Partnership Board it was argued 
that the new governing arrangements would facilitate more progressive and 
socially just agendas. This formed the basis of the Cardiff ‘What Matters’ strategy, 
which set out the unified vision for public services in Cardiff from 2010 to 2020. 
5.3 THE ‘WHAT MATTERS 2020 STRATEGY’ – TOWARDS A 
TRANSFORMATIVE AGENDA? 
5.3.1 APPEALS TO ‘BROAD PURPOSES’ 
A key argument made in favour of the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board 
and a single integrated partnership strategy was that it would lead to a common 
objective for all local partner organisations to unite behind and contribute. 
Therefore this unified agenda, the ‘What Matters’ strategy, is crucial in facilitating 
greater strategic thinking about local governance within the city. This was 
discussed during an interview with a senior individual within the governing 
arrangements as recorded in my fieldnotes:  
After highlighting the strains that budget cuts and cost 
saving targets were putting on core services and 
partnership commitments they pointed out that a key 
challenge for partnership working under these conditions 
has been the difficulty of evidencing and exhibiting the 
benefits of responding to social problems through a 
collaborative partnership approach and why there is a need 
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to tackle the problems facing local government together. 
In trying to achieve this they remarked how the rationale 
and process of developing the ‘What Matters’ strategy was 
about getting all of the relevant people together to identify 
a collaborative vision for the issues that need addressing to 
facilitate a greater sense of shared ownership of the 
strategic agenda 
Fieldnotes 06/08/14 
Therefore the ‘What Matters’ strategy does not just represent the governing 
agenda, but rather is an attempt of the Cardiff Partnership Board to appeal to, what 
Stone calls, ‘broad purposes’ in an attempt to mobilise cooperation from partner 
organisations. As Stone notes ‘the politics of investment – for example, of 
establishing governing arrangements- requires bringing together substantial 
resources, both tangible and intangible, from a variety of players. Broad purposes 
deemed to be socially worthy play a vital part’ (2005: 318-319).  For Stone, broad 
purposes are not about particular material incentives for cooperation, but rather 
highlight the mercurial ‘motivational force’ of appeals to broad civic purposes. 
The ‘What Matters’ strategy is a good example of a ‘large change agenda’ (Stone, 
2005), in that it seeks to frame the problems of local governance in the city not as 
a suite of separate disconnected problems, but rather as a shared social cause 
around which partner organisations should mobilise. These appeals to broad 
purposes within the ‘What Matters’ strategy are pervasive and are evident 
frequently in the framing of the problems facing local governance. Given the 
importance of the ‘What Matters’ strategy both in terms of its status as the 
governing agenda in the city, but also as a call to action for local partner 
organisations, how this agenda is framed is crucial for this discussion of local 
governance and community safety specifically.  
Pervasive through the ‘What Matters’ strategy is a framing of the problems of 
crime and disorder consistent with Edwards and Hughes’ description of a 
transformative agenda which ‘augment policies for the social and political 
inclusion of all citizens’ (2012: 448). From the outset of the strategy it is possible 
to observe how this transformative agenda was linked to the changes to the 
governing arrangements and the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board. As 
discussed in Chapter 4 a key factor in the changes to the governing arrangements 
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were the recommendations of the Beecham inquiry and the need to work across 
organisational boundaries to achieve the best outcome for citizens. This narrative 
was highlighted in the ‘What Matters’ strategy when discussing the social and 
structural causes of social problems in the city:  
Achieving our outcomes is not the responsibility of any 
individual organisation. In fact, it simply would not be 
possible for one organisation to achieve any of these 
outcomes alone. Whilst all individual service providers 
work to manage and deliver the best services they can, they 
also recognise that the big and complex problems, such 
as tackling the many forms of inequality, can only be 
solved by working together. This represents an 
acknowledgement that each organisation is only one of the 
many partners, but together we can address what really 
matters in the city 
 Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 5, emphasis in 
original 
This quote is notable due to its affinity with the discussions of the previous chapter 
whereby effective public service delivery is contingent upon governing actors 
working collaboratively, and that this style of work is necessary to realise the 
agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. Moreover it is further evidence of the 
attempts of the Cardiff Partnership Board to appeal to broad social purposes 
(Stone, 2005), in this case the problems of inequality, through the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy.  The language used, and the approach described in the extract, is not new 
and have been prevalent in narratives around community safety and partnership 
working for the last two decades as evident in the work of many commentators on 
the growth of community safety and partnership work (Hughes, 1998; Gilling, 
2007; Crawford, 1999).  
As Crawford and Evans (2012) state, and noted in Chapter 2, for many reasons, 
these progressive and transformative aspirations have often failed to be realised in 
practice. Accordingly the transformative narratives presented within the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy should be treated with a degree of caution. However within the 
‘What Matters’ strategy there are indications that the Cardiff Partnership Board has 
implemented changes to facilitate this aim. Supporting the approach displayed in 
the quote and reflecting the structural arrangements of the thematic programme 
boards discussed in Chapter 4, the ‘What Matters’ strategy has framed the 
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solutions to social problems in the city not around particular organisational 
priorities but rather through seven shared outcomes for all partner organisations:  
• People in Cardiff are healthy 
• People in Cardiff have a clean, attractive and sustainable environment 
• People in Cardiff are safe and feel safe 
• Cardiff has a thriving and prosperous economy 
• People in Cardiff achieve their full potential 
• Cardiff is a great place to live, work and play 
• Cardiff is a fair, just and inclusive society 
Like the thematic programme boards it is tempting to assume that each of these 
outcomes relate to specific service areas or issues, for instance that crime and 
disorder is limited to the third outcome of ‘people in Cardiff are safe and feel safe’.  
This assertion would result in the understandable question of what is progressive or 
innovative about these outcomes? At a basic level the framing of the issue away 
from explicit notions of crime and disorder to more encompassing ideas of safety is 
important and is discussed later in this chapter. The argument of the Cardiff 
Partnership Board is that these outcomes do not reflect particular service areas or 
organisational priorities.  Rather, each of these seven broad outcomes are the 
responsibility of every partner within the Cardiff Partnership Board, and that policy 
issues such as crime and disorder do not lie within any one programme board as 
reflected in the following interview extract with a member of the Cardiff 
Partnership Board: 
[…] they’re not really seen as separate issues at all, 
crime is integrated throughout all of the workstreams of 
the partnership board, so offenders who, young people 
who are not in education or employment, some of those 
people will also be offenders, not all of them but some of 
them will, some of the other health and well being issues 
to do with smoking cessation is a big issue for instance, 
well a lot of those people might be offenders as well, so 
offenders sit within them all so we don’t actually have a 
separate offender stream 
Cardiff Partnership Board Member 
This extract indicates the importance of the seven shared outcomes and the attempt 
to encourage holistic solutions to the problems of local governance. In this way 
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then the seven shared outcomes can be seen as a further example of the framing of 
the ‘What Matters’ strategy around  ‘broad purposes’ and social action (Stone, 
2005). The seven broad outcomes identified here are not structured around 
particular priorities but are kept purposefully broad. This is important for 
cooperation as they cannot be easily dismissed as someone else’s responsibility but 
also, as Stone states, the durability of such broad framings of social problems ‘that 
governing arrangements do not have to be reinvented issue by issue’ (2005: 318).   
5.3.2 THE SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL NATURE OF INEQUALITY 
Of further importance when considering the transformative agenda of the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy, and the appeals to broad purposes around the problems caused 
by social inequalities in the city, is the recognition of the spatial nature of these 
inequalities. In explaining the extent of social and structural inequalities the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy affords particular attention to the geographical differences that 
exist in the city in which a clear geographical divide is stated to exist as seen in the 
extract below: 
Although Cardiff can be described as a ‘quality of life’ 
capital, the benefits of this are not spread equally across the 
city. There are marked disparities in affluence between 
the north and south of Cardiff, with the majority of 
deprivation falling in the south… this is not to ignore the 
fact that pockets of inequality exists within even the most 
affluent areas and that certain socio-economic groups are 
more vulnerable to deprivation, but recognising the broad 
pattern of deprivation can help us to understand the causes 
and associated effects that characterise the city 
Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 11, emphasis in original 
The recognition of the spatial nature of inequalities within Cardiff demonstrates 
awareness to the uneven distribution of need within the city. Moreover recognising 
the connection between crime and deprivation (Trickett et al., 1992) the strategy 
notes that burglaries, thefts, drugs and violence are ‘all higher in the more 
economically deprived communities’ (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 11).  It is 
worth comparing this to the developmental agenda in London examined by 
Edwards et al. and the use of aggregated city wide data which ‘obscured crucially 
the diversity of community safety challenges across London and thus the need to 
tailor the allocation of resources accordingly’ (2015: 200).  The geographical 
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variance of inequality in the city was also seen to demonstrate the need for the 
neighbourhood management structure, which was able to respond to the particular 
conditions of local neighbourhoods. Of further interest in the extract above, is the 
acknowledgement that this pattern of deprivation can help explain the ‘causes and 
associated effects’ of more specific social problems in the city. This consideration 
of the antecedent conditions of social problems is explored in relation to the role of 
income levels within the city: 
[…] income, unemployment, education, health, housing and 
crime all form a clear north/south divide and more in-depth 
analysis reveals that low income is the key determinant of 
almost every from of deprivation. This is certainly noticeable 
in Cardiff since the most income deprived areas also suffer 
from the most pronounced social problems, such as poor 
health, child poverty, and some aspects of community safety. 
As a consequence income deprivation must be recognised 
as a key concern, to which other solutions are anchored. 
We need to address deprivation in its entirety. Recognising 
income as the central component, if we are to find 
sustainable long terms solutions to persistent problems 
Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 11-12, emphasis in original 
This quote demonstrates an important insight into the conceptualisation of social 
problems that affect communities such as poor health, lack of housing and crime 
and disorder. These problems are presented not as isolated issues but are instead 
symptomatic of wider structural and social challenges, in this case, the income 
inequalities that are argued to pervade the city. This transformative agenda of the 
‘What Matters’ strategy, which sought to address the social and structural causes of 
criminality, was corroborated in discussions with senior members of the Cardiff 
Partnership Board as seen in the following interview extract: 
It [The Cardiff Partnership Board] oversees the 
governance of integrated issues really to do with the 
health and well-being and safety of citizens of Cardiff, so 
included in that are people who we term ‘offenders’ but 
they are people who from time to time commit offences, 
so they are citizens of Cardiff as such so they’re people 
who tend to have, often have a difficulty in accessing 
universal services and their consequential thinking and 
their under-developed life skills and social skills mean 
that they need to have a voice within the agenda of the 
partnership board 
Cardiff Partnership Board Member 
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In addition to the spatial characteristics of these inequalities, the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy highlights the temporal and persistent nature of problems of inequalities, 
as ‘some areas of Cardiff are seeing recurrent worklessness and more and more 
children are growing up in poverty’ and ‘if the gap in educational attainment is not 
addressed then young people from the more deprived wards could be consigned to 
a future with fewer opportunities’ (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 12-13).  
The discussions contained within the ‘What Matters’ strategy regarding the spatial 
and temporal characteristics of inequality are consistent with Hughes’ distinction 
between ‘communities of choice’ and ‘communities of fate’ (2007: 13). 
Communities of choice represent the neighbourhoods of the northern arc of Cardiff 
that are typically more affluent, less transient and suffer from fewer social 
problems than their southern equivalents. Equally the ‘What Matters’ strategy 
description of the southern arc of the city fits well with Hughes’ depiction of 
communities of fate as ‘socially and spatially trapped’ (2007: 13). The narrative of 
the ‘What Matters’ strategy asserts that some communities in the south of the city 
are socially trapped as opportunities to elevate their social position through 
education and employment are scarce, and spatially trapped due to income 
deprivation and the inability to relocate to more prosperous areas. These are 
mutually reinforcing. In recognising the uneven distribution of inequalities in the 
city, the ‘What Matters’ strategy asserts the need for the targeting of limited 
resources to areas identified as those most in need of support and resources: 
Organisations must be agile enough to target intervention 
and geographically tailor responses to meet local need. 
Addressing inequality is dependent on partners being able 
to direct resources to the people and areas who need it 
most. Only by focusing our efforts on the areas of distinct 
disadvantage can we break the pattern that has come to 
characterise need in the city 
Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 13 
 However interviews with practitioners and councillors from the north of the city 
revealed a cautionary note about complacency with regards to the north of the city. 
This was raised in an interview with one councillor who highlighted that areas of 
high deprivation within the northern arc of the city were almost doubly 
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disadvantaged due to the increased targeting of resources in the south which was 
resulting in a reduction of services to the north of the city: 
[…] in a sense if you look at areas, I’m slightly envious 
of areas like Riverside, Grangetown, there’s loads of 
stuff going on, and there’s loads of issues knocking 
about and you know what you do have in those areas is, 
you have funding from various groups as well, what you 
do have is a lot of activity and a lot of groups as a result 
of that, I mean we don’t have that 
Local Elected Member 
The above extract points to some of the areas where the targeted provision of 
services in the south of the city may be having a negative impact upon the pockets 
of deprivation within the more affluent north of the city. This was seen in regards 
to the changes to the provisions of youth services in Cardiff. While Youth Activity 
Centres in the south of the city had continued to be provided and managed by the 
council, those in the north of the city had been closed and replaced by a ‘youth 
bus’ that provided a roaming provision of youth services to young people in these 
areas. The importance of this is discussed later in the chapter when highlighting the 
concerns of practitioners around the degradation of youth services in the city. 
Taken together these discussions demonstrate a clear foregrounding of inequalities, 
and their spatial and temporal nature, as the central problem within the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy. Of further importance is how the need to tackle inequality in the 
city is presented as joint effort. This is presented in the ‘What Matters’ through 
clear connections of how different policy agendas can all be seen to contribute to 
this ‘broad purpose’ of addressing inequality. Before examining how this has 
affected the framing of community safety in the city, it is worth providing some 
examples of how this holistic approach to local governance is evidenced within the 
‘What Matters’ strategy.  
5.3.3 RESPONSES TO INEQUALITY 
In tackling inequality the ‘What Matters’ strategy placed great emphasis on 
engaging communities in decision-making processes and actively involving them 
in partnership work. In this way the communities and residents of Cardiff were not 
framed as being incidental to these problems, but were rather seen to be crucial in 
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addressing the systemic problems within the city. The importance of mobilising 
community participation in partnership work is highlighted in the extract below:  
Working together does not just mean working with other 
organisations; it means working with individuals and 
communities, sharing responsibility and sharing success. 
We will move forward towards a new emphasis on 
individual and social responsibility and will be guided by 
the principles of fairness and sustainability. The challenges 
we face…will only be met if we can successfully work 
together to release the potential of our communities 
 Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 5 
It is worth noting that attempts to mobilise community participation have formed a 
common refrain in discussions of community safety. Furthermore as Hughes notes, 
such attempts to leverage community engagement participation have often failed to 
be actualised and ‘the people who live in high crime areas have generally been 
incidental rather than central to the practical enactment of ‘community’ crime 
prevention efforts’ (2007: 65).  In facilitating this aim the ‘What Matters’ strategy 
highlights the role of the neighbourhood management structure as a key 
mechanism in achieving the goals of localised delivery and community 
empowerment when addressing the persistent problems of inequalities and 
disadvantage across the city. The neighbourhood management teams were 
presented as facilitators of this community participation, and therefore were seen to 
play, what Hughes has termed, an ‘enabling, harnessing, even “manufacturing” 
role’ (Hughes, 2007: 16).  However as will be further explored in Chapter 6, there 
was evidence that the role of local communities in the neighbourhood management 
teams was limited as was noted by a local practitioner:  
It [the neighbourhood management programme] is still as 
far as I can tell only professionals who come together as 
opposed to really engaged local communities which had 
always been the intention that it would do 
Local Practitioner 
In addition to the role of communities, the ‘What Matters’ strategy further 
highlighted the role of private business within the local economy and its 
importance for reducing unemployment as a vehicle for addressing the inequality 
in the city. Accordingly, the ‘What Matters’ strategy emphasised the importance of 
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economic development in creating an environment that is conducive to investment 
from business and therefore job creation. This focus on the importance of 
economic development for tackling inequalities in the city is premised upon two 
assumptions. Firstly that a growing and vibrant economy should facilitate the 
growth of jobs in the city that would ‘generate wealth and prosperity that can be 
shared by all, thereby reducing the inequalities in Cardiff’ (Cardiff Partnership 
Board, 2011:43). Secondly, that the jobs created as part of the focus on economic 
development would assist in reducing unemployment and poverty, which would 
have long term benefits for people in Cardiff:  
[…] increasing adult employment and reducing workless 
families can perhaps have the greatest impact on child 
poverty. Because income can be seen as the anchor for all 
other forms of poverty, increasing the wealth of the family 
can improve the health, well-being and education 
attainment of children and young people. In this way we 
can break the cycle of poverty and encourage social 
mobility 
Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 45 
While framed in terms of its importance for job creation and the reduction of 
unemployment, the emphasis on economic development also posed challenges for 
the local governance of crime, disorder and safety.  A good example of this is the 
night-time economy, or as Stenson highlights ‘the alcohol retail industry upon 
which urban economics are increasingly reliant’ (2005: 278). While the night-time 
economy in Cardiff was a key source of revenue for Cardiff Council, and due to its 
size, a substantial provider of job opportunities in the city, it also accrued 
substantial costs for partner organisations involved in the control, policing and 
enforcement of problematic behaviour. Further examples of the challenges posed 
by the emphasis on economic development include Cardiff’s desire to attract high-
level investment from international business as well as the ambition to increase its 
presence on the world stage through hosting sporting and political events, 
including the hosting of some aspects of the NATO summit in 2015. Such 
attempts, while beneficial for economic development are problematic for the 
priorities of the CONTEST strategy, as will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
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Alongside the role of communities, and the private sector in addressing the 
problems of inequality, the ‘What Matters’ strategy positioned the many elements 
of the public sector as crucial in tackling inequality in the city. This was evident in 
the discussion of the role of housing in addressing spatial mobility, in that effective 
housing strategies play were important in disrupting the cycle of deprivation and 
the inequality that affect those communities in the southern arc of the city. The 
provision of affordable housing was argued to represent a key way of addressing 
the spatial disadvantages experienced by certain communities, and in doing so 
would have further benefit with regards to social mobility, as evidenced in the 
following extract:  
[…] the affordability of housing is a key determinant of 
quality of life…inequalities in housing have a particular 
impact on child poverty…housing wealth creates freedom, 
allowing those who have it to choose the area they live 
which may be determined by proximity to job 
opportunities, high performing schools, popular facilities or 
healthier physical environments. As a result access to 
housing in the short term and housing wealth in the long 
term can have a major impact on geographical and 
generational socio-economic disadvantage. This once again 
reinforces the fundamental importance of increasing the 
incomes of the most disadvantaged in our society 
Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 58 
Alongside concerns of poverty and income deprivation the ‘What Matters’ strategy 
also places great emphasis on the importance of inclusion in developing ‘active 
citizens’. The ‘What Matters’ strategy presented two notions of inclusion. First, it 
outlined ideas of inclusion around young people and ‘participation poverty’ where 
it asserted that some young people, typically those from deprived communities are 
being excluded from some activities and that this exclusion can lead to further 
‘social exclusion and stigma, as well as impacting on health, well being and 
development’ (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 59). The second aspect of 
inclusion discussed in the ‘What Matters’ strategy related to a more encompassing 
idea of civic inclusion in the local democratic process as seen in the extract below: 
Some members of society may face challenges that prevent 
them from fully engaging in the democratic process or in 
civil society; this reflects how inclusive a society is, as well 
as determining how a society is shaped. Engagement and 
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involvement is therefore crucial, an end in itself that 
recognises the rights of every individual, but also because 
the more people who are empowered to influence 
decisions, the more representative those decisions, and 
therefore the more representative society becomes 
Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 65 
The emphasis on ideas of inclusion is important for this thesis. Firstly it offers 
further credence to the arguments that the ‘What Matters’ strategy represents a 
transformative agenda, as citizen engagement and active citizenship is noted by 
Edwards and Hughes as a key component of a transformative community safety 
agenda (2012: 448).  Secondly, this emphasis on inclusion affects how traditional 
priorities of community safety, such as anti-social behaviour, are framed as 
problems. As Edwards et al. assert the history of community safety has tended 
towards the ‘social control of young people’ rather than more progressive or 
transformative framings of inclusion (2015: 198). Within the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy there is a clear recognition of the exclusionary potential of responses to 
anti-social behaviour and the need for more inclusive strategies to deal with young 
people: 
Children and young people often feel they are perceived 
negatively in relation to crime and antisocial behaviour by 
the media, service providers and even their own 
communities. Whilst it is a priority for many of the 
neighbourhood management areas to reduce the number of 
young people engaged in antisocial behaviour and criminal 
activity it is also recognised that young people’s sense of 
belonging must be improved and their participation in 
positive activities increased 
Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 38 
These discussions demonstrate how issues of inequality and inclusion have 
permeated the ‘What Matters’ strategy, and how the solutions to these problems 
are presented as requiring a holistic approach to local governance. This attempt to 
mobilise cooperation around a ‘broad purpose’ agenda of addressing inequality 
within Cardiff is significant for discussions of community safety.   The primacy of 
issues of inequality and social inclusion are reminiscent of Hughes’ (1998) 
identification of a more transformative model of community safety, that of ‘civic 
and inclusive safe cities’ (Hughes, 1998: 146). This model described by Hughes 
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privileges ideas of social democratic participation, inclusion and engagement and 
partnership between the police, local government and the communities they serve. 
So far the chapter has focussed on the broad framing of the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy, but of further importance is how community safety, in particular, is 
framed within the ‘What Matters’ strategy.   
5.3.4 CONCEPTUALISING SAFETY 
The outcome that is most explicitly linked to issues of crime and disorder in the 
city is the outcome ‘people are safer and feel safe’. While it may be easy to look 
past this title, doing so would miss an indication of the progressive and 
transformative conceptualisation of community safety in the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy. Titles are useful and worthy of attention as they provide clues as to what 
is considered important, and indicate how social problems are presented and 
therefore rendered governable. Earlier it was shown that community safety in 
Cardiff during the national mandatory period was characterised by a developmental 
agenda largely orientated around ideas of risk management and crime reduction.  
Reflecting this co-opting of community safety under a crime reduction agenda and 
illustrating the importance of titles, Hughes, writing during that time, asserts: 
It is telling to note that we have community safety in a 
Crime and Disorder Act rather than crime and disorder in 
a Community Safety Act 
 Hughes, 2002: 128  
It is significant then that within the ‘What Matters’ strategy issues of crime and 
disorder are encompassed within the outcome of ‘people are safer and feel safe’. 
What is presented is more akin to the latter half of Hughes’ statement where safety 
is not seen as a product of effective strategies to address crime and disorder, but 
rather crime and disorder is one aspect of a broader agenda around the governance 
of safety. This lends further credence to the argument that the strategic agenda of 
the ‘What Matters’ strategy is in contrast to the developmental agenda of the 
national mandatory period. This divergence is emphasised in the introductory 
statement highlighting the importance of safety: 
Being safe and feeling safe are fundamental aspects of 
citizen well-being, and these issues have consistently 
ranked as top priorities for residents and visitors alike. This 
 141 
means people from all sections of the community being 
free from harm, injury or risk and being secure in their 
surroundings. Feeling safe means feeling confident that 
none of these things will be compromised. Partners in 
Cardiff recognise how much these issues matter to people 
and are committed to creating a city that is safe in the 
broadest possible sense. This means protecting our citizens 
from harm and exploitation, particularly those who are 
most vulnerable, in every neighbourhood across the city 
Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 35 
The latter half of this quote is significant in its appeals to safety in its ‘broadest 
possible sense’ and the protection of those who are most vulnerable to harm and 
exploitation. This agenda of promoting safety in its broadest sense is divided into 
four thematic priorities concerning different elements of safety, only one of which 
specifically notes the concern of crime and its effects:  
• People are safe from harm, abuse and exploitation 
• Communities and neighbourhoods in Cardiff are cohesive  
• People are free from crime and the effects of crime 
• People are safe in their environment 
The breadth of these thematic priorities indicate an agenda that extends beyond the 
exclusive focus on crime reduction displayed in the developmental agendas of the 
national mandatory period (Gilling, 2007) where community safety was equated 
with a ‘narrow brief of certain types of crime reduction’ (Hughes, 2002: 128).  
Such a narrow scope for community safety was also noted by Croall (2009) and 
Tombs and Whyte (2006) in regards to the absence of corporate, white collar or 
economic offences in any community safety agenda. The inclusion of these four 
broad priorities provides more opportunities for progressive and socially just 
responses to the problems of crime, disorder and safety. This is evidenced in the 
consideration of broader harms and threats to safety that may exist in the city, such 
as road safety, but also more significantly, and arguably more encompassing, is the 
desire to protect vulnerable adults which is significant due to its potential to 
encourage a broader agenda around exploitation.  Moreover, the first of these 
priorities, ‘people are safe from harm, abuse and exploitation’, places particular 
emphasis on children. This emphasis on the abuse and exploitation of children 
firmly foregrounds the role of social workers and children’s services in relation to 
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the safety agenda in Cardiff, further demarcating it from previous arrangements in 
which social services were far removed from the concerns of community safety.  
Therefore the ‘What Matters’ strategy presents an agenda focussed on the issues of 
inequality in the city, from which other social problems, including crime and 
disorder, stem. In addressing the causes and consequences of this inequality, the 
Cardiff Partnership Board has sought to appeal to, what Stone terms, a social 
change agenda in attempt to mobilise cooperation and to draw attention to the need 
for a holistic approach. More specifically to community safety the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy demonstrates a repositioning of the relationship between ideas of safety 
and concerns of crime and disorder, whereby community safety is structured 
around a broader agenda of safety, of which issues of crime and disorder are 
subordinated to. In considering the framing of the ‘What Matters’ strategy it is 
important to recall the discussions of the previous chapter, and the repositioning of 
the local authority as the lead actor in the governing arrangements. This 
repositioning of the local authority as the lead actor within the governing 
arrangement has likely had an impact on how this agenda was created. Certainly it 
was apparent in the fieldwork that council officers within the policy and 
partnership team played a key role in the development of the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy and its annual revisions. The dominance of Cardiff Council within the 
governing arrangements and its responsibility in authoring the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy is important when considering the transformative agenda, as the effective 
realisation of this agenda is dependent upon the mobilisation and coordination of 
partnership activity around this agenda.  This is particularly relevant due to the 
appeals of broad purposes within the ‘What Matters’ strategy, for as Stone asserts:  
Purposes compete with one another, and individuals face 
an abundance of worthy claims, some of which concerns 
matters immediate in their everyday lives. Indeed, under 
the constraints of bounded rationality, human beings are 
focused on what is immediate 
2005: 319 
This is of paramount importance in this research. While the presence of a 
transformative agenda is itself significant, whether this appeal to broad purposes 
around inequalities and social justice is realised at an operational level and in the 
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face of more immediate priorities is an important question. These issues are 
tackled in Chapter 6, when considering how the strategic agenda of the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy is being reflected in operational practice. In assisting these 
discussions it is also worth briefly noting other policy agendas that may influence 
practice in Cardiff. It is therefore worth highlighting that the social justice 
orientation of the ‘What Matters’ Strategy and its focus on reducing poverty 
through employment opportunities corresponds to the Welsh Governments anti-
poverty agenda. Like the ‘What Matters’ strategy the anti poverty agenda 
explicitly states a commitment to ideals of social justice, and the importance of 
effective social policy to reduce poverty and its affects on society. Unlike the 
‘What Matters’ Strategy, the anti-poverty agenda does not directly connect issues 
of poverty to the onset of criminal behaviour but does draw connections between 
areas affected most afflicted by poverty and those most likely to experience the 
affects of crime and disorder.  
In contrast to the ‘What Matters’ strategy’s consistency with the Welsh 
Government anti poverty agenda, the agenda on display within the Police and 
Crime Plan for South Wales suggests potential for conflict. Where the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy can be described as transformative, the agenda of the Police and 
Crime Plan would better be described as a maintenance agenda with elements of 
progressive practice in regards to the restorative justice and diversionary practices. 
The Police and Crime Plan unsurprisingly put the police at the centre of the crime 
reduction agenda. Within the Police and Crime plan is the understanding that other 
agents of local governance should support the police in the enforcement and 
control of crime and disorder. This is observed through the prioritisation of issues 
within the Police and Crime plan that represent a narrower focus on crime and 
disorder and are reminiscent of agendas of the national mandatory period of 
community safety. So whereas the agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy has 
sought to shift focus away from an explicit crime and disorder remit, this is at odds 
with the agenda of the Police and Crime plan, which is more directly focused upon 
issues of crime and disorder. This friction between the progressive and 
transformative agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy and the Police and Crime 
plan is important when considering operational practices of community safety 
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work in the city and the differing agendas that are influencing local decision 
making and partnership work. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.  
5.4 A SUSTAINABLE AGENDA? REVISIONS OF THE ‘WHAT MATTERS’ 
STRATEGY 
As has been seen the ‘What Matters’ strategy presents a clear rhetorical 
commitment to a transformative and progressive agenda for local governance in 
Cardiff, however, highlighting the potential challenges caused by austerity such 
rhetoric is less pervasive in subsequent annual reviews of the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy. While the importance of poverty is still identified and the need to 
minimise it through various means of increasing education and employment are 
clearly illustrated, a clear recognition of how addressing these issues could have a 
preventative impact on other social problems including crime and disorder are 
absent. Within the original ‘What Matters’ strategy document there was a 
recognition of how addressing broader structural issues such as poverty, inequality 
and social mobility can impact upon other social problems. However in the annual 
revisions of the ‘What Matters’ strategy these priorities of addressing poverty, 
addressing income inequalities and improving education and social mobility are 
seen to be ends in themselves rather than part of a broader preventative strategy 
orientated around ideas of social justice. This disconnect between wider structural 
problems and more specific policy issues is reinforced in the revisions to the 
conceptualisation of community safety within the outcome of ‘people in Cardiff 
are safe and feel safe’. In the revisions the conceptualisation of community safety 
had reverted to a narrower focus on problems of crime and disorder and eschewed 
the wider issues of safety that were apparent in the original strategy. This is seen 
in the focus on the priorities of anti-social behaviour, violent crime, domestic 
abuse, first time entrants into the criminal justice system and perceptions of crime. 
These priorities, which are the same throughout the revisions, are more akin to the 
priorities in the national mandatory period.  
Whereas the more transformative elements of the original ‘What Matters’ strategy 
were obfuscated in the annual revisions of the strategy, the more progressive 
elements around ideas of restorative justice have persisted. This commitment to 
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restorative approaches can be traced throughout the various annual reviews of the 
strategy, and the value placed upon diverting people away from the criminal justice 
system. In the 2012 revision there is a stated aspiration to become a ‘restorative 
city’ (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2012b: 54) and these restorative ideals are seen in 
relation to crime and disorder but also other areas such as problematic behaviour in 
schools to prevent transition into criminal or disorderly behaviour. This 
commitment to restorative justice was evident in the 2013 review and the piloting 
of neighbourhood resolution panels in neighbourhood management areas  (Cardiff 
Partnership Board, 2013).  This aim was strengthened in 2014 with the roll out of 
restorative approaches in response to low-level crime and disorder in accordance 
with the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Cardiff 
Partnership Board, 2014b). The discrepancies between the original ‘What Matters’ 
strategy and its annual visions indicate a lack of continuity in the transformative 
elements of the agenda but an apparent continuation of commitment to the 
restorative elements of the progressive agenda.  The question this raises, is whether 
these discrepancies represent changes in practice, or whether they indicate 
something about the policy process in Cardiff.  
There is evidence that these differences reflect the ways in which these policy 
documents are written and subsequently highlight some of the fundamental 
limitations of looking at policy ‘talk’. As the governing agenda outlining the 
vision for local governance for a ten-year period, the original flagship ‘What 
Matters’ strategy was subject to substantial strategic direction and input from 
various stakeholders.  In comparison, insights gained through discussions with 
members of the policy and partnership team revealed that the creation of the 
annual reviews of the ‘What Matters’ strategy was more heavily influenced by the 
individual officers within the team and received more minimal input from more 
senior actors in the Cardiff Partnership Board. To an extent this helps explain the 
lack of continuity between the original strategy and its subsequent revisions in that 
it may reflect variances in the authoring of the reviews rather than policy 
discontinuity.  However, given the extent of austerity it is plausible that the 
variance between the original ‘What Matters’ strategy and its annual revisions is 
indicative of the problems of sustaining a strategic agenda orientated around more 
transformative ideals. In seeking to further clarify the sustainability and feasibility 
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of this agenda in times of austerity this chapter now moves to identify how the 
‘What Matters’ agenda is translating into actual policy decisions, in terms of the 
allocation of funding and the prioritisation of certain issues within the safer and 
cohesive communities programme board.  
5.5 THE CHALLENGES OF AUSTERITY FOR ACHIEVING THIS 
PROGRESSIVE AGENDA 
The progressive and transformative agenda communicated in the rhetoric of the 
‘What Matters’ strategy is itself important as it represents a clear demarcation from 
the developmental discourses prevalent in the Cardiff community safety strategies 
during the national mandatory period. This indicates the greater autonomy afforded 
to local governing regimes in developing their own agendas following the 
decentralisation of power advocated by the Coalition Government. However, as 
noted in Chapter 2 this greater autonomy has come hand in hand with austerity and 
diminishing governing resources available to local actors. This raises questions of 
how governing regimes can mobilise cooperation around particular agendas given 
the challenges of austerity and the pressures on partnership working (Lowndes and 
Pratchett, 2012). This is critical for this research as the realisation of the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy is contingent upon the effective mobilisation of local partner 
organisations and directorates within the council around this agenda.  However 
there is evidence that more immediate concerns, such as reducing financial 
resources, are overshadowing the ‘What Matters’ strategy. Given their size and 
remit, Cardiff Council is crucial for the realisation of the ‘What Matters’ strategy, 
however the extent of austerity facing local authorities (Taylor-Gooby, 2012) posed 
a number of challenges to their commitment to the ideals espoused in the strategy. 
The following section explores how budgetary savings within the Council indicate 
how more immediate concerns of austerity superseded the broader purposes of the 
‘What Matters’ strategy. 
The most contentious budgetary savings encountered during the research concerned 
the extent of cuts to youth provision in the city, which faced budget reductions of 
£250,000. Savings on youth provision were a persistent issue during the fieldwork 
and there were significant concerns about the impact of these cuts on young people 
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in the city, as highlighted by numerous practitioners encountered during the 
research. One neighbourhood chair remarked upon the impact of the cuts to youth 
provision in their area and how it may lead to future problems in terms of crime, 
disorder and anti social behaviour:  
[…] my biggest worry is around some of the budget cuts 
that are coming about, you know most anti social behaviour 
I think comes out of boredom rather than intent as I don’t 
think people wake up in the morning and say I’m going to 
go out and really upset people, actually what happens is 
they just get bored and they start doing things, and things 
turn into anti social behaviour and my biggest concern is 
actually the improvements we’ve made through working 
with PCSOs, working with the youth service and things like 
that is actually, you know, there are significant cuts to the 
youth service in the council, there are significant cuts in 
policing and my concern is that we will withdraw some of 
that, what people see as nice to have, and we will go back to 
fighting ASB rather than actually preventing it which isn’t 
good use of resource but its much easier for people to argue 
‘oh I need this to stop this happening’ than to say ‘well 
actually we need this because that’s going to prevent this in 
the long-term’ so yeah I think you know what instigates it is 
around boredom and I do have concerns around the 
improvements that we’ve made 
Neighbourhood Chair 
This quote illustrates the dominant concerns around the significant cuts to the 
youth service, much of these focussed around counter-productive long-term 
impact of such savings.  The degradation of youth services have not been confined 
to Cardiff, but have been emulated elsewhere, as reported by Firmin (2013) for the 
Guardian, who argues that the disappearance of youth services nationally are 
reducing opportunities for social mobility and addressing child poverty.  However 
given the unequivocal commitment in the ‘What Matters’ strategy to the 
importance of early intervention and equality of access for all young people in the 
city, the degradation of youth services in the city is a significant problem for the 
realisation of the progressive and transformative agenda espoused by the Cardiff 
Partnership Board. In addition to reducing funds available for youth provision in 
the city, it was apparent that a range of support funds were being cut back as a 
result of the pressures of austerity as noted by one practitioner who was working 
within the safer and cohesive communities programme board:  
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[…] so the cuts are going to be brutal… they’re going to 
decimate youth services and outreach services around an 
agenda that we know politically is just massive at the moment 
so street outreach is crucial to get to these kids and if in the 
proposal its there that they’re going to cut the service, then 
there’s a massive risk, not to the programme, to children and 
young people, it’s not about the programme, its about what 
happens for the people on the ground, so massive risk, the 
other risk is the supporting people grants are going or being 
cut, so the money that supports the most vulnerable of women 
who are in hostels so that money is being axed, you know we 
are going to have a real crisis situation where people who have 
got complex needs, their money will be taken away and there 
will be nobody to care for them and there is a chance that we 
are heading back to Victorian, Dickensian days where there 
will be people begging on streets because there won’t be 
money to support them 
Local Practitioner 
Both extracts included above draw attention to a number of provisions under the 
remit of the council affected by austerity such as the provision of sports, leisure 
and culture, and grants aimed at supporting vulnerable people. The loss of these 
provisions are problematic for the philosophy of addressing the ‘inequalities of 
opportunities’ which emphasised that all people should have equal access to 
services regardless of their circumstances. Within the ‘What Matters’ strategy 
there was recognition of the long-term repercussions of these inequalities of 
access for wider social problems. Such long-term thinking and commitments are 
compromised by the placement of these cuts, which reinforce rather than reduce 
the inequalities of access. Cuts to sports provision, and more controversially in 
Cardiff, the cuts to library services have most impact upon the most vulnerable in 
Cardiff in that the people that it will affect the most are those who are in most 
need of public provision of these services.  The presence and extent of these cuts 
to the youth service and the provision of sport, leisure and culture facilities within 
the city are important given the explicit connection made between the importance 
of these services and the prevention of crime and disorder displayed in the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy. Therefore the cuts to these services indicate the challenges of 
realising the more progressive and transformative aspirations of the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy in times of reducing financial resources, in which the immediate 
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pressures of austerity have constrained the ability of Cardiff Council to effectively 
contribute to the commitments outlined within the ‘What Matters’ strategy.  
In addition to problematising the fulfilment of the ‘What Matters’ strategy these 
cuts necessitated by austerity have also affected the political legitimacy of Cardiff 
Council as seen in numerous protests across the city against the cuts to services. In 
an attempt to mitigate this Cardiff Council has engaged in an approach to gather 
political resource to defend future funding decisions. This engagement exercise, 
called the Cardiff Debate, was an on-going three-year public consultation exercise 
that commenced during the summer of 2014 and was designed to gather public 
input on the allocation of resources and the delivery of services in times of 
austerity. The Cardiff Debate was therefore presented as a way of facilitating 
public engagement and public participation in the prioritisation process and local 
decision-making. During my fieldwork this engagement exercise comprised a key 
element of the work undergone in the partnership office and was delivered 
through a series of workshops and engagement sessions in every ward area of the 
city, and through the use of social media. These engagement methods sought to 
inform the public of the financial challenges facing public services in the city and 
aimed to identify what residents thought were the most important services and 
what issues should be prioritised in these times of reduced public budgets.  This 
presentation of the Cardiff Debate is concordant with transformative agendas 
around ideas of social inclusion in decision-making processes, however 
observations gained through my fieldwork revealed an ancillary motive to this 
engagement. In discussions with research officers and policy officers it was 
apparent that they suspected that Cardiff Debate and the responses it was gaining 
would be used to justify future disinvestment decisions. This was mostly clearly 
evidenced when I attended a pilot of one of the Cardiff Debate sessions alongside 
members of the policy and partnership team:  
In talking to some of the research officers present it was 
apparent that one of the more significant aims of this 
session was to find out people’s view on which should be 
provided by the council, and which could be delivered by 
other sectors. They suspected that the senior decision 
makers in the council are hoping that respondents do not 
prioritise this as an issue so that the council can defend 
itself when services are contracted out to third parties. 
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This was confirmed later in the session when one of the 
policy officers commented that it will give the politicians 
ammunition in their defence in future as they can say  
‘well in the consultation you said it didn’t matter who 
delivered the services?’ 
Fieldnotes 22/07/14 
In this regard, the Cardiff Debate exercise represented an attempt by Cardiff 
Council to accumulate political resources that could be used to justify 
disinvestment decisions, and in particular justify the distribution of responsibility 
for service delivery to other sectors. Therefore while the Cardiff Debate has been 
framed around social democratic principals of inclusion it has also facilitated the 
accumulation of political resource to justify future disinvestment from service 
delivery and to act as a bulwark against public disapproval, in the wake of 
reducing financial resources and the necessity of cuts to public services in the city. 
These discussions are important considering the analytical framework 
underpinning this research. In Cardiff there is a governing agenda emerging 
around progressive and transformative ideas within the ‘What Matters’ strategy 
demonstrating the opportunities of the greater autonomy given to local governing 
regimes. However, the realisation of this agenda is dependent upon the effective 
mobilisation of governing resources around this agenda. In this last section it has 
been shown that Cardiff Council, as one of the leading players in the Cardiff 
Partnership Board, has been unable to deliver on the more aspirational claims of 
the ‘What Matters’ strategy due to the pressures of austerity, which are 
superseding the more aspirational aims of the ‘What Matters’ strategy.  
5.6 THE SAFER AND COHESIVE COMMUNITIES PROGRAMME BOARD   
It was evident that the immediate pressures caused by austerity were 
problematising commitments to the progressive and transformative aspirations of 
the ‘What Matters’ strategy at its broadest level. There were also signs that the 
agenda around community safety explored in the ‘people are safe and feel safe’ 
section of the ‘What Matters’ strategy was not translating into practice. This 
problem of translation can be seen in two ways. Firstly the prioritisation of 
particular issues within the safer and cohesive communities programme board 
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which represent the city wide priorities for issues of crime and disorder within the 
Cardiff Partnership Board. Secondly, the actual practice and agendas within each 
of the Safer and Cohesive Communities Workstream activities and the six 
neighbourhood management teams. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the 
first of these, how the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy aligns with 
the prioritisation of citywide workstream activities. Therefore the remainder of this 
chapter is purposefully restricted to the identification of what community safety 
priorities are identified at a citywide level. The operational practices and agendas 
of the workstream activities and the neighbourhood management teams are 
discussed in Chapter 6 in relation to the mobilisation of partnership working and 
cooperation at an operational level.  This discussion of the safer and cohesive 
communities programme board is divided into two sections corresponding to the 
two workstreams underneath the safer and cohesive communities programme 
board. Section 5.6.1 is concerned with the safety and safeguarding communities 
workstream and section 5.6.2 addresses the community cohesion workstream.  
5.6.1 THE SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDING COMMUNITIES WORKSTREAM 
The safety and safeguarding communities workstream was considered to be the 
replacement infrastructure to the community safety partnership by both policy 
officers and practitioners due to its explicit focus on citywide issues of crime and 
disorder in the city. However in looking at the priorities within the safer and 
cohesive communities programme board there is a clear difference between its 
priorities and the priorities identified during the national mandatory period 
outlined earlier. During the period in which this research was conducted the 
priorities were:  
• Reducing domestic and sexual violence  
• Improve offender management/Reduce first time entrants to the youth 
justice system 
• Develop a vibrant and safe night time economy 
• Addressing exploitation 
• Reduce anti-social behaviour 
The presence of only five priorities represents a significant reduction in the size of 
the agenda in contrast to the priorities prior to 2010. In comparison the 2005-2008 
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strategy contained five main priorities, in addition to a second tier of five further 
priorities.  For those few individuals who had experience of both the pre 2010 and 
post 2010 community safety arrangements, this reduction in the number of 
priorities was reflective of a diminishing role for community safety as remarked 
by a member of the research side of the Policy and Partnership team: 
[…] years ago there used to be a lot committees, such as, 
you had a criminal damage group, you had a violent 
crime group, you had serious inquisitive crime group, 
you had an anti social behaviour group, multi agency 
groups and I used to service all of those groups with 
reports but those groups don’t exist anymore 
Partnership Officer 
This was also alluded to by one of the Policy officers in the team: 
So I mean the differences, are I guess at the time at there 
was more of a focus on community safety but that’s 
understandable as it was part of the community safety 
partnership and there were a lot more focussed meetings 
to that end, there were a lot more focussed sort of I guess 
they were predominantly, sort of police heavy meetings 
about you know tackling violence and things like that 
Policy Officer 
These extracts, which point out the diminishing activity around community safety, 
also touch on another issue, the reduced focus on volume crimes. In keeping with 
the commentaries of Gilling (2007) and Gilling et al. (2013) the priorities for 
community safety in Cardiff during the national mandatory period were dominated 
by issues of law enforcement and volume crime as seen in the prioritisation of 
violent crime, burglary, auto crime substance misuse and anti-social behaviour.  In 
contrast the priorities of the safer and cohesive communities programme board are 
notable due to the absence of volume crimes. This absence is significant as it 
denotes a retrenchment of partnership work around these issues and suggests that 
volume crimes have been left to the police to address on their own, counter to the 
narrative of joint working and partnership appealed to in the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy. While it may be argued that these issues are being addressed through the 
neighbourhood management teams, during this research it was apparent that 
volume crimes, other than anti-social behaviour, were not addressed within the 
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neighbourhood management teams either. This omission of volume crimes in 
discussions of partnership activity was not only raised by interviewees but was 
clear when analysing and reviewing my fieldnotes of observations within the 
Policy and Partnership team. In this review process what was apparent, and what 
was always in the back of my mind during this research was the absence of 
discussions regarding volume crimes within this team.  
This raised an obvious question, was the central coordination and oversight of 
community safety happening elsewhere and was that somewhere where I should 
have been located?  Recognising this during the research I sought clarification 
from policy officers, research officers, operational practitioners and strategic 
actors, all of which affirmed the site of observation in which I was located. Nor 
could it be that I was located in the wrong part of the team, throughout my year 
observation I circulated around the office, from the research team, to the policy 
team and to the neighbourhood management team, and in each location 
discussions of criminal activity was sparse. What was evident then during this 
research was a definitive absence of considerations of volume crime within the 
policy and partnership team which was reflected in the lack of prioritisation of 
volume crimes within the safer and cohesive communities programme board. This 
relegation of volume crimes from the agenda indicates a degradation of the 
partnership resources afforded to addressing volume crimes in the city and 
represents a shrinking of the agenda for community safety.  
The reduction of the community safety agenda in the city was not just evidenced in 
relation to volume crimes but can be seen in further changes that have occurred 
following the organisational restructure in 2010. The priority of alcohol related 
violence has disappeared from the community safety agenda in Cardiff, and has 
migrated to the remit of the PCCs Office as revealed in conversation with members 
of the Policy and Partnership team: 
He [the lead for the violent crime group] tends to liaise 
with the police commissioners office now, because he’s 
been left out on his own, there’s no control over it so 
he’s doing what he likes out there basically, and the other 
problem is he’s got no one to go to with any issues, what 
he tends to do now is go straight to the police and crime 
commissioners office 
Partnership Officer 
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Alongside this substance misuse as a policy issue has also fallen off the community 
safety agenda, however unlike violent crime and volume crime substance misuse is 
still being addressed within the Cardiff Partnership Board. Substance misuse was a 
priority within the Cardiff community safety strategy in the national mandatory 
period, and following the changes that took place in 2010 was initially an agenda 
item within the safety and safeguarding communities workstream. However 
responsibility for substance misuse has since transferred to the ‘Healthy Living’ 
programme board and been reprofiled as a health issue rather than that of criminal 
justice. In some ways this reprofiling of substance misuse as a policy issue is 
consistent with the progressive leanings of the ‘What Matters’ strategy as it diverts 
people away from the criminal justice system and is indicative of a longer term 
preventative view of the problem as evidenced in the following extract taken from 
an interview with a police inspector involved in community safety work:   
[…] so if we can push them into health and they get 
treatment whether or not it be methadone as a substitute or 
if they’re taking off drugs altogether, great, yes you got to 
spend money in the first instance to get it but the end 
result is that it’s not just the police time you’re freeing up 
Police Inspector  
Furthermore this interview indicates how this approach is consistent with the 
emphasis on inclusion within the ‘What Matters’ strategy:  
[…] if you can get them onto an alternative drugs or want to 
come off drugs altogether, they might still be productive 
members of society, they might be functioning addicts but 
they need support because very, very few of them will do it 
on their own 
Police Inspector  
While these quotes demonstrate how the shift of responsibility for substance 
misuse towards health was consistent with the agenda of the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy the extent to which this change can be solely attributed to the Cardiff 
Partnership Board is questionable. This preventative health agenda around 
substance misuse is driven by the recently established Cardiff and Vale Area 
Planning Board (APB), a board that specifically advocates this health orientated 
approach to substance misuse. The introduction of Area Planning Boards were part 
of a broader Welsh Government agenda set out in the Substance Misuse Delivery 
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Plan 2008-18 (Welsh Government, 2008) which sought a more health orientated 
preventative approach by emphasising the value of support and the provision of 
health services.  
Moreover, in keeping with the argument that the capacity for community safety 
work has diminished as a result of austerity and the repositioning of community 
safety as a result of the changing governing arrangements it cannot be escaped that 
the transferral of responsibility for substance misuse represents a loss of funding to 
community safety work. The transferal of rehabilitation services for the 
community and alcohol drug team to the NHS away from Cardiff Council must be 
considered in relation to the disinvestment from community safety work in the city 
as it represent a shrinking of the community safety agenda and minimises the 
leverage available for community safety concerns on the substance misuse agenda. 
The repositioning of substance misuse as a policy concern was framed in the 
following way: 
A saving of £87,000 has been realised following the 
realignment of Community Safety within the directorate 
and the transfer of Substance Misuse to Health  
Cardiff Council, 2014: 24 
This framing of the ‘realignment’ of substance misuse as a health issue rather than 
that of a community safety as primarily a ‘saving’ rather than a functional attempt 
to improve practice is significant and points to the overriding concern of financial 
resources. More importantly there was evidence that as a result of this 
repositioning and the greater control afforded to health practitioners the substance 
misuse agenda had largely been appropriated under the guise of addressing the 
health problems of alcohol abuse. This was seen in one meeting regarding 
substance misuse attended by members of the Area Planning Board as recorded in 
my fieldnotes: 
As with many times during the weekend, members from 
the neighbourhood management team tried to steer the 
discussion towards the impact of heroin, cannabis and 
cocaine within these communities, but like the previous 
points those practitioners from the Area Planning Board 
continually put alcohol at the centre of the discussion at 
the expense of other substance misuse concerns.  
Fieldnotes 10/01/2014 
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This increased focus of the substance misuse agenda around the health issues of 
alcohol as opposed to broader issues associated with substance misuse problems 
indicates that the criminal justice concerns around substance misuse have become 
less prevalent as greater control over the agenda is handed to health practitioners. 
This was confirmed in an informal discussion with a fellow PhD researcher who 
had undertaken research related to substance misuse services within the city and 
the increasing status of alcohol as a public health issue for substance misuse 
workers. This suggests that while the change in responsibility for substance misuse 
may have the potential to lead to more progressive approaches, that this is not 
happening and that the community safety concerns are falling by the wayside in 
favour of a greater concern on the repercussions of alcohol misuse on peoples 
health rather than the broader social implications in terms of crime, disorder and 
community safety. This is also echoed within the APB strategy, which places 
significant emphasis on problems of alcohol misuse, and is further demonstrated in 
the Cardiff Partnership Board documentation where the two priorities listed under 
substance misuse are ‘reducing damaging alcohol consumption’ and ‘reduce 
smoking’.  Therefore while the hiving off of substance misuse has enabled a 
financial saving and fits with the rhetoric of shared delivery and holistic support 
what is happening is the health agenda around substance misuse is eclipsing 
broader community safety concerns and therefore stands in stark contrast to the 
ideals of mainstreaming community safety.  
The reduction in the scope of the community safety agenda within Cardiff was 
further evidenced in my fieldwork, emerging first as signs that anti-social 
behaviour was to be removed as a priority within the workstream as discussed in 
the following quote:  
I still think at some point that there is a case to have a look 
at what we’ve got as priorities and see if really, y’know 
one of the things we’ve got down there is anti social 
behaviour and that’s never going to go away and its never 
not going to be a priority broadly speaking but really in 
what we need to tackle for community safety and the 
partnership, this is personal opinion now, I think that 
could go to a watching brief, we’ve got an anti-social 
behaviour team, we’ve got thousands of PCSOs now, there 
are a lot of resources to tackle that as an issue  
Policy Officer 
 157 
The removal of anti-social behaviour as a priority from the safer and cohesive 
communities programme board was realised at the end of 2014. This is worthy of 
note given the 2014 anti-social behaviour legislation bringing in Public Space 
Protection Orders and imposing a greater emphasis on the role of local councils in 
reducing anti-social behaviour. However, as indicated in the above quote the 
removal of anti-social behaviour as a workstream was argued to reflect that the 
infrastructure and procedures put in place to deal with anti-social behaviour were 
developed enough that it no longer needed to be prioritised as an issue within the 
Cardiff Partnership Board. This is further indicated in minutes of a meeting of the 
Cardiff Partnership Board (2014c): ‘Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) workstream 
removed as agreed. Acknowledged that this would always be a priority, but 
Cardiff has a robust partnership process in place to deal with ASB and this no 
longer needs to be viewed as an intractable issue’. However as discussed in the 
next chapter, the robustness of the partnership practices around anti-social 
behaviour are more contested than the narrative displayed here suggests and point 
to a more fractious relationship between the police and the local authority. What is 
being demonstrated then is a further example of how the community safety agenda 
is constricting as a result of reducing financial resources.  
Taken together the disappearance of volume crime, alcohol related violent crime, 
substance misuse and anti-social behaviour represent a significant reduction in the 
scope of the community safety agenda and further point to a reduction in the 
governing capacity available to community safety work in the city. Far from being 
progressive or transformative, the community safety agenda is being constricted 
and constrained as a result of austerity and the mainstreaming of community safety 
resulting in certain agendas being hived off to other parties. This is in contrast to 
the agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy that posited an integrated and holistic 
approach to service delivery whereby responses to crime and disorder are to be 
situated with an integrated strategy of social and economic policy. Here however 
we have seen the pressures of austerity place these priorities back within particular 
functional service areas: substance misuse as a public health issue, and volume 
crimes as a police and criminal justice issue.  
 This diminishing scope of the community safety agenda is important when 
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considering the changes to the governing arrangements discussed in the previous 
chapter. It is not simply the case that austerity has caused a reduction in the scope 
of the community safety agenda, but rather in times of austerity there is a reduced 
amount of resources being afforded to the community safety agenda within the 
Cardiff Partnership Board. This is an important distinction as it draws attention to 
the allocation of governing resources, and the reasons why resources are not being 
afforded to the community safety agenda. An important point here relates to the 
dismantling of the community safety team and the loss of key roles such as the 
community safety manager and coordinator who played important roles in 
promoting the community safety agenda and facilitating engagement from partner 
organisations. The absence of these key actors championing community safety as 
an agenda at a strategic level and the lack of clear lines of responsibility for 
community is likely to have had an impact upon the prioritisation of community 
safety against competing policy agendas. Therefore it can be argued that the 
changes to the governing arrangements has degraded the community safety 
infrastructure in Cardiff and the institutional capacity to mobilise commitment and 
cooperation for community safety work resulting in the diminishing resources 
afforded to it. 
Reflecting this, the only example of an expansion of the community safety agenda 
did not arise from top-down strategic thinking but rather resulted from consistent 
pressure from the bottom-up involving a singular motivated practitioner. The 
priority in question, that of addressing human exploitation, emerged from 
approaches to tackle the problems of sex work in the city around 2010. While 
exploitation was identified as a key issue within the original ‘What Matters’ 
strategy it was not until 2013 that addressing exploitation became a priority for the 
safer and cohesive communities programme Board. The prioritisation of this work 
on the safer and cohesive communities programme board was considered 
important for cooperation around this agenda from other partners however the 
process of getting it recognised as shared priority did take a substantial 
commitment of time and personal resources. In the following extract a key figure 
involved with the human exploitation agenda described how political and 
organisational pressure was used to encourage the prioritisation of this issue as an 
agenda item:  
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I’ve been really consistently tenacious and vocal and 
championed and its taken me years… locally I’ve just 
beavered away with local councillors, and whoever the chair 
was, it was [Local Councillor] at the time, just really bent her 
ear about all of this, scrutiny enquiries came for sex work, and 
then they redid a human trafficking one, which then put the 
local authority in the spotlight in terms of what are the 
recommendations you have to be seen to be implementing the 
recommendations, so there’s some weight coming politically, 
in terms of the partnership board I’ve just made myself a 
regular feature, because I’ve thought this is important enough 
and they should hear about it so I have asked over the years for 
frequent spots when issues have come up, written briefing 
papers, put words into their mouths that this is a shared 
priority, and I’ve listed why, the risks for different 
organisations and why it is a shared priority, culminating in 
the establishment of a new workstream  
Local Practitioner  
This cultivation of political resources through the scrutiny committees and the 
recommendations that they make in terms of improving practice was verified 
through analysis of past scrutiny committee meetings where the evolution of the 
agenda can be seen. The second half of the quote demonstrates how in addition to 
political resources it was possible to achieve leverage through the cultivation of 
hierarchal resources by taking advantage of the programme board and using it as a 
way of garnering strategic buy in from other partners. That the origin of this 
prioritisation lied with the persistence of one individual rather than as a product of 
strategic direction is problematic for the claims of strategic governance and points 
to a lack of proactive agenda setting for community safety at a strategic level, 
which again can be linked to the diminished community safety infrastructure in the 
city. What appears to be happening in Cardiff is the degradation of formal 
institutional support for the facilitation and promotion of partnership work around 
community safety at a strategic level, which is compromising the prioritisation of 
community safety work. What the example of human exploitation demonstrates is 
that it is still possible to mobilise support around new agendas but at the expense of 
a significant personal investment of time and resources in negotiating support and 
cooperation from partner organisations. This greater emphasis on individuals in 
driving forward in partnership activity in the absence of the dedicated support of 
the community safety partnership is discussed further in the next chapter.   
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5.6.2 COMMUNITY COHESION WORKSTREAM 
The shrinking of the agenda was also observed within the community cohesion 
workstream, which formed the other half of the programme board. The community 
cohesion workstream focuses on three areas of work: i) Delivering the outcomes 
sought by the CONTEST strategy ii) mainstreaming, managing and promoting 
community cohesion and supporting inclusion iii) citizen involvement. Like the 
Safer and safeguarding communities workstream there was evidence that one of 
these priorities had disappeared. Firstly this was seen in the dominance of the 
CONTEST board as noted by one senior manager involved in the workstream:  
The part of the community cohesion workstream that I’m 
most intimately involved in and how I, I don’t see the 
workstream as anything separate to this, is through the 
coordination of the Counter terrorist work, the CONTEST 
work and the prevent work as part of that. So where... 
there are probably some other bits and pieces within the 
workstream that sit outside that but my focus is entirely on 
that work 
Senior Manager Cardiff Council  
While this individual’s work covered the three priorities within the community 
cohesion workstream it was apparent that their efforts were focussed solely on the 
CONTEST board and not on the other two activities. In explaining why this was 
the case they outlined that one of their other roles was specifically linked to the 
CONTEST board and as an attempt to reconcile the pressures of two roles they had 
conflated the two roles to manage the ‘pressure of work’ as they have ‘a set of core 
deliverables there and that’s where I’ve put my energies in’.  So while the 
community cohesion workstream has been focussed on the CONTEST board, the 
mainstreaming, managing and promoting community cohesion and supporting 
inclusion workstream and the citizen involvement workstream have been 
marginalised. Indicating the diminishing scope of the community cohesion 
workstream, there was evidence that the citizen involvement workstream activity 
has been removed, which was revealed in a informal conversation with the stated 
lead on citizen involvement who revealed that they had ceased working in that 
capacity years previously. This was clarified in the most recent iteration of the 
programme board where the agenda for the community cohesion workstream has 
been reduced to two activities, with the absence of community involvement. I was 
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unable to interview the third workstream activity lead within the community 
cohesion workstream due to a change of staff, but I was made aware of a dedicated 
community cohesion officer within the council who was responsible for driving 
forward the community cohesion agenda within Cardiff. Again, what is apparent is 
further evidence of a diminishing agenda within the safer and cohesive 
communities programme board, which is indicative of diminishing financial 
resources being afforded to community safety under the Cardiff regime.  
5.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter, like the previous, presents two competing narratives. On the one 
hand there is the narrative of the Cardiff Partnership Board, which through the 
‘What Matters’ strategy presents an agenda organised around principles of social 
and restorative justice. Within this strategy, there is an appeal to mobilise 
engagement around a ‘broad purpose’ of addressing the inequalities that exist in 
the city, from which other social problems, such as crime and disorder stem. The 
‘What Matters’ strategy places significant emphasis on the need for a holistic and 
joined up response to addressing the causes and consequences of inequality in the 
city. The agenda displayed is therefore consistent with the justifications for the 
changing governing arrangements offered in the previous chapter, whereby the 
creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board would enable a more joined up response 
to social problems, and facilitate the strategic governance of the city. 
Counterpoised to this narrative of progression, we have seen how the changes to 
the governing arrangements have resulted in significant repercussions for the 
community safety infrastructure in the city that has been stripped back under the 
guise of mainstreaming and integration. Similarly this chapter has demonstrated 
how the progressive and transformative rhetoric encountered within the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy is dependent upon the ability of the Cardiff regime to mobilise 
cooperation and resources around this agenda. This chapter has begun to illustrate 
some of the challenges of doing this, as more immediate financial pressures are 
taking precedent over the progressive and transformative aspirations of the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy.  This is seen within Cardiff Council where commitments made 
in the ‘What Matters’ strategy to reducing inequality and ensuring equality of 
access are being overshadowed by the necessity of reductions in financial 
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expenditure seen in the budget cuts to youth, sport and library provision in the 
city. Moreover, despite the claims that the changes to the governing arrangements 
would enable the pursuit of a more progressive and socially just community safety 
agenda, there are signs of a diminished community safety agenda, where previous 
partnership priorities have been hived off to particular functional service areas. 
The response to volume crimes have been left to the police, work around alcohol 
related violence has migrated towards the Police and Crime Commissioners Office 
and responsibility for substance misuse has been transferred to health. This 
shrinking agenda for community safety work in Cardiff is significant considering 
the dismantling of the community safety infrastructure in Cardiff.  
This discussion, however, has been limited to the broad prioritisation of 
community safety priorities and says little about the partnership practices on the 
ground, both in the workstream activities of the Safer and Cohesive and 
Communities Board and the neighbourhood management teams. Given the 
repercussions of austerity on the governing arrangements, the disintegration of the 
community safety infrastructure in the city, how cooperation is achieved and 
induced by practitioners without the institutional support of the community safety 
team is important. It is this which forms the focus of the final findings chapter, 
what schemes of cooperation are employed to achieve partnership working and 
how do these schemes of cooperation affect the pursuit of community safety work 
in the various workstream activities and neighbourhood management areas. 
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6. GOVERNING SAFER AND COHESIVE 
COMMUNITIES IN CARDIFF: REALISING THE 
‘WHAT MATTERS’ STRATEGY? 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
For the progressive and transformative agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy to 
be realised, cooperation at an operational level needs to be encouraged and 
facilitated. However the commencement of austerity and the degradation of the 
institutional infrastructure for community safety, as part of the mainstreaming 
and integration of community safety into the Cardiff Partnership Board, have 
made partnership arrangements increasingly precarious. The dissolution of the 
Cardiff community safety partnership ended the co-location of police and local 
authority staff, adding barriers to communication and the development of 
professional relationships. Yet, more problematic was the loss of expertise and 
support following the disappearance of the community safety team, which has 
resulted in a lack of coordination and oversight of the disparate practices of 
community safety work. In the absence of such coordination, the operational 
practices of community safety work have become increasingly isolated and 
disconnected, culminating in partnership arrangements that were largely driven 
by the locally situated operational leads of these activities. As a result of this, the 
operational practices of community safety in the city were fragmented, with 
divergent operational agendas, and varying levels of success in promoting 
cooperation from partner organisation. This variance is problematic for the 
realisation of the ‘What Matters’ strategy and the aspirations of strategic 
governance highlighted in Chapter 5.  
6.2 COOPERATION, COORDINATION AND THE  
COMMUNITY SAFETY PARTNERSHIP 
 
It is useful to begin this discussion with a brief account of the schemes of 
cooperation within the national mandatory period of community safety prior to 
the reorganisation of the governing arrangements in 2010. As seen in Chapter 4, 
the resources afforded to community safety during the Labour Governments of 
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1997-2010, had allowed the establishment of a sizable community safety 
infrastructure in Cardiff reflective of Edwards et al.’s (2007) maximal model of 
community safety. Chapter 5 demonstrated how this provision of resources was 
accompanied by central government targets and performance management 
(Gilling, 2007) that resulted in a developmental agenda in Cardiff.  The 
extensive provision of financial resources for community safety, and the 
centralised management of local community safety work, reflected the 
importance of the community safety agenda for the New Labour Government. 
The highly resourced nature of community safety work, and its primacy as a 
policy agenda under New Labour was important for local partnership practices 
and leveraging cooperation from other actors as will now be explored.  
Firstly, the highly centralised management of community safety work during this 
period, did not just incentivise partnership work, but actively made it a statutory 
duty following the requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act. As described in 
Chapter 4, this statutory duty dictated who should participate in partnership 
work and the nature of that cooperation. This centralised steering of local 
partnership arrangements was further seen in the Police Reform Act 2002, which 
stipulated an expanding membership of local partnership practices for 
community safety. Therefore at a strategic level of local partnership 
arrangements, these legislative acts were important in driving forward 
partnership activity, in dictating who should be involved and the nature of their 
involvement. Alongside this strategic influence, the central management of 
community safety also affected cooperation at an operational level through 
centrally determined public service agreements. This was evidenced in the 2005-
2008 Cardiff community safety strategy in reference to anti-social behaviour and 
substance misuse, both of which corresponded to centrally determined public 
service agreements (Cardiff Community Safety Partnership, 2005). These public 
service agreements not only set out specific targets for these priorities but also 
influenced who should be involved through Home Office issued action plans.  
Therefore, during this national mandatory period of community safety the 
agendas, the governing infrastructure and therefore the schemes of cooperation 
in place were significantly influenced by central government policy.  
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In addition to the influence of central government steering in this period, the 
provision of financial resources for community safety work enabled the 
development of extensive governing infrastructure for community safety in the 
form of multi-agency teams comprised of community safety practitioners. As 
seen in Chapter 4, in Cardiff this was seen in the sizable community safety 
infrastructure, which comprised of dedicated officers for situational prevention 
strategies, anti-social behaviour and substance misuse, as well as researchers, a 
community safety coordinator and a community safety manager. The 
practitioners played a key role in offering organisational support to the priority 
task groups, coordinating partnership work and facilitating cooperation in the 
city, in addition to ‘establishing new and distinct forms of community safety 
expertise’ (Edwards et al., 2015: 195).  This coordination role was evidenced 
within the Cardiff community safety strategy, which highlighted the role of the 
community safety team in ensuring that ‘the task groups are operating within the 
their defined ‘terms of reference’ and that they are successfully implementing 
the intervention that are detailed within the Action Plans’ (2005: 34).  
In addition to the coordination of operational activity, the community safety 
team also played a key role in the brokerage of partnership activity and 
mobilising strategic buy in for community safety work. In explaining this it is 
worth reflecting upon the discussions in Chapter 4, and the argument that the 
community safety infrastructure in Cardiff was indicative of a ‘maximal’ model 
of community safety (Edwards et al., 2007). Due to the size and well resourced 
nature of these large community safety teams, the community safety manager 
occupied a relatively senior position in local governing arrangements which 
granted greater leverage when co-opting engagement from other partner 
organisations (Edwards et al., 2007). Therefore the community safety 
infrastructure, and the governing resources it had access to, was integral in 
facilitating partnership work in the city. The community safety team enabled the 
coordination of operational activity, while the community safety manager was 
able to promote engagement at a strategic level. Therefore the importance of this 
infrastructure for the schemes of cooperation at both a strategic and operational 
level is clearly apparent.   
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This discussion is important, as this period can be regarded as the ‘high water 
mark of the ‘preventative turn’’ (Edwards et al., 2015: 191), as austerity 
measures and the introduction of PCCs have compromised the continued 
commitment of financial resources to community safety as seen in Chapter 5. 
The influence of legal constitutional resources for pursuing community safety 
arrangements have weakened as a result of the Coalitions Governments 
abandonment of public service agreements and a reduced emphasis on the 
centralised management of public services discussed in Chapter 2. Similarly, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board has resulted 
in the dismantling of the community safety infrastructure in the city, which has 
reduced the governing capacity available to community safety work. These 
factors, when considered together, present a fundamental challenge to the 
schemes of cooperation within the city, and the realisation of the transformative 
agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy.  In the absence of the centralised 
management of community safety, and without the resources formally provided 
by the community safety team, there are significant questions about how 
cooperation around community safety work is incentivised, and how the 
operational practices of community safety are coordinated. It is these issues that 
the remainder of this chapter focuses on. 
6.3 PARTNERSHIP WITHOUT THE PARTNERSHIP 
In considering the impact of the changes to the governing arrangements on 
cooperation in the city, it is worth reflecting on some of the points made at the 
end of Chapter 4. The most visible impact of the dissolution of the community 
safety partnership and its infrastructure, was the loss of the physical location of 
the multi-agency community safety team, which had formerly provided a central 
point for community safety enquiries and a site for the situation and 
development of community safety expertise. This also ended the co-location of 
police and local authority staff, as discussed in Chapter 4. This was problematic 
and was seen by some participants as a regressive step in the governing 
arrangements, and an added barrier to cooperation. This was evident during an 
interview with a police inspector responsible for community safety work who 
recalled the benefits of co-location between the police and the council: 
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[…] purely from a community safety aspect if we needed 
to discuss something around housing, for example 
problem tenants and anti social behaviour, may not be a 
council tenant but the council officers here would have 
access to the housing manager and the social landlords so 
all of that was a built in across the desk as opposed to a 
phone call or booking appointments, so that is a backward 
step in my view driven by finance. 
Police Inspector  
The importance of co-location for cooperation highlighted in this quote is 
consistent with Berry et al.’s (2009) claim that co-location was a key mechanism 
for effective partnership work and facilitating communication between partner 
organisations. The benefits of co-location were further recognised in a Home 
Office report which stated that co-located multi-agency arrangements ‘yielded 
benefits for speedier information exchange, information sharing, greater area 
engagement and facilitating the culture of joint working as working together in 
the same place fosters mutual respect among different agencies and builds trust’ 
(2013: 5). Therefore the absence of the community safety team, and the co-
location arrangements it represented, is problematic for partnership working 
between South Wales Police and Cardiff Council as it added barriers to 
communication and information sharing. Accordingly, the Police Inspector 
spoken to in this research, spoke of this change as a ‘backward step in my view 
driven by finance’.  
Alongside the ending of co-located arrangements, the dismantling of the 
community safety team has compromised the responsibility and coordination of 
community safety work. As with co-location, the presence of a clear 
coordinating role was noted as a core mechanism for effective partnership 
working by Berry et al. (2011: 22). For one policy officer, the community safety 
team, in particular the community safety coordinator and manager, were pivotal 
in providing cooperation between organisations and facilitating partnership 
work. Accordingly this practitioner was concerned that in the absence of this 
team, and the key individuals employed within it, nobody was in a position to 
coordinate activity and promote cooperation around community safety work. 
Another partnership team member mentioned this in relation to the 
neighbourhood management teams: 
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[…] before you had the community safety tasking 
manager who used to attend every neighbourhood 
management meeting so you had that link centrally across 
all neighbourhood management areas, you haven’t got 
that anymore, that coordination… and that’s the downfall 
of community safety see, because community safety to 
me, the community safety partnership was that linkage 
across all the agencies 
Partnership Officer 
A common thread in the concerns of the policy officers spoken to within the 
partnership team, and discussed by some practitioners, was that the lack of 
central responsibility for community safety was problematic for the coordination 
of activity and continued cooperation of partner agencies around particular 
agendas. The perception was that the community safety team was important for 
the schemes of cooperation within Cardiff and that the new arrangements had 
degraded the local bureaucratic and structural resources available to facilitate 
community safety work. This itself is an important finding, however what is of 
further interest, is the impact of this upon the operational activities of 
community safety work. What was apparent and what will be shown throughout 
the remainder of this chapter is that these operational activities have become 
increasingly fragmented. This fragmentation of community safety work was 
discussed by an anti-social behaviour practitioner who had worked in a similar 
capacity prior to the restructure in 2010: 
[…] when asked what they [the anti-social behaviour 
practitioner] thought of the changes to community safety 
in Cardiff their response was immediate, it was more 
‘disjointed’ and there was noticeably less coordination 
with other aspects of the council. They went on to argue 
that in previous arrangements there was a greater sense of 
strategic coordination between the activity groups, and 
that this coordination was provided by a tasking manager, 
a role which has since been lost. They outlined that now, 
the workstream activities are insular in their partnership 
working and were isolated from one another. As a result 
they aren’t really aware of what is happening elsewhere in 
regards to community safety, a problem that did not exist 
in the community safety partnership they argue. As an 
illustration of this problem they outline that the phone 
number used here in these offices is the same phone 
number used by the old community safety partnership so 
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they still occasionally get phone calls relating to 
community safety issues but because of the lack of 
responsibility or ownership of community safety issues 
they were unclear on where to forward these calls or who 
to direct enquiries towards 
Fieldnotes 3/09/14 
This fragmentation of activity into the varying workstream activities and the 
neighbourhood management teams had led to diverging operational practices, 
which are highly reliant upon the practitioners leading those activities. This 
divergence of operational practices and operational agendas is problematic for 
the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy and its appeals to ‘broad 
purposes’ (Stone, 2005) around inequality as part of a transformative agenda. 
The dependency of operational practices and agendas upon the people and 
priorities they are dealing with, rather than the strategic agenda of the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy, points to the greater influence of more immediate factors 
rather than the more nebulous appeals of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. As Stone 
states:  ‘given the bounded rationality of human beings, sustained purposes 
depend on the reinforcing support of networks’ (2005: 320). Considering this, 
the dismantling of the community safety team can be seen as compromising this 
‘reinforcing support’ that Stone refers to. In its absence the responsibility for 
coordinating partnership work had been left to the lead practitioners of these 
arrangements. Given this fragmentation of activity and the discontinuity of 
practices and agendas involved the following discussion is separated into the 
constituent workstream priorities of the safer and cohesive communities 
programme board before exploring the neighbourhood management teams.  
6.4 PROMOTING COOPERATION WITHIN THE SAFER AND COHESIVE 
COMMUNITIES PROGRAMME BOARD  
These changes to the governing arrangements for community safety work, and 
the dispersal of responsibility towards the individual workstream activity leads, 
has meant that these workstreams have adapted in different ways depending upon 
the particular pressures and people working within those areas. Therefore it 
makes sense for the following discussion of these workstream activities to be 
organised separately around each workstream activity.  
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6.4.1 HUMAN EXPLOITATION  
The human exploitation workstream was described by one policy officer as 
holding a ‘unique position’ as it was the only example of a new agenda item 
being incorporated into the safer and cohesive communities programme board. Its 
addition was largely brought about the drive of one practitioner who had 
championed the agenda as explored in Chapter 5. The importance of this lead 
practitioner for the workstream activity was highlighted during an informal 
discussion with a senior policy officer in the safer and cohesive communities 
programme board: 
When talking about the importance of particular people 
[the senior policy officer] states that yes while there is a 
significant amount of reliance placed upon the lead 
officers in driving forward partnership activity in 
instances where the activity is a statutory obligation the 
issue of staff turnover should not make a difference as the 
activity is required and would carry on regardless. 
However other cases are more reliant upon the work and 
drive of particular individuals’ interest and these 
examples are more at risk from staff turnover. In 
exemplifying this they refer to the work carried out 
around human exploitation, which they argue has been 
highly dependent upon the work of one key individual and 
therefore is at real risk of disappearing if that person 
should leave 
Fieldnotes 06/08/14 
This was further evidenced in a scrutiny meeting where one councillor, reviewing 
the activity of the workstream and concerned about the sustainability of the work 
asked the lead practitioner ‘what would happen to this work if you were hit by a 
bus tomorrow?’ The expansion of this agenda, discussed in Chapter 5, which 
developed over time from an initial focus on sex work, to encompass issues of 
human trafficking and child sexual exploitation, was described as a completely 
bottom up approach. However over the course of the fieldwork it was apparent 
that this approach to agenda setting had entailed a significant number of obstacles 
in getting the agenda recognised. In a meeting of the South Wales anti-human 
trafficking and slavery group, one police officer made the comment ‘that it was 
good to see [the workstream lead for Cardiff] without bruises on their forehand 
from knocking their head against a brick wall’ (fieldnotes, 13/05/14).  
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Conversely, the lack of direction offered from a strategic level has afforded 
greater discretion to the operational lead in choosing how to address the problem 
of human exploitation in the city. Influenced by their occupational background in 
the health service, the workstream has been structured around the minimal use of 
enforcement strategies, instead privileging the use of support services to prevent 
further disorder. These included addressing barriers faced by sex workers around 
housing, substance misuse and essential skills, but also longer-term 
considerations regarding social care provision and pathways into exploitation. In 
achieving these aims, the workstream was dependent upon the cooperation of the 
police, children’s services and a number of voluntary sector organisations. In 
promoting cooperation from partner organisations it was noted on numerous 
occasions, both by key practitioners, and a senior individual within the Cardiff 
Partnership Board, that due to limited financial resources, more informal 
approaches to promoting cooperation were necessary. This had led to focus on 
developing social capital and professional relationships, alongside appealing to 
shared goals and values, to encourage cooperation. This pursuit of improved 
relationships with local practitioners was observed often in meetings, in which 
the workstream lead shared an easy familiarity with practitioners from a number 
of organisations. During an interview with a leading practitioner within the 
workstream they made a point of highlighting the importance of fostering 
personal relationships with practitioners as a way of promoting engagement:  
[…] some of the things we’ve done have cost absolutely 
bugger all to do, so its not about cost, some of its about 
cost, but its not all about cost, and certainly getting people 
on board on the agenda and pooling resources is about 
getting people signed up to a common goal which you 
don’t need money for… I went to the practitioners, I went 
to people who cared, so this has been a completely bottom 
up approach 
Human Exploitation Workstream Practitioner 
Here it was argued that developing relationships with practitioners at the local 
level was crucial to the success of the workstream activity. However that success 
is entirely dependent upon the ability of the workstream lead to identify who 
would be motivated to help and encouraging them to do so. This was raised 
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during a conversation with a senior policy officer over lunch, who talked about 
the addressing human exploitation workstream: 
[policy officer] spoke about the importance of having 
someone who is able to see what is going on, where 
people might be addressing similar issues and how this 
work can be connecting joined up effectively and how 
important personal networks are in having the knowledge 
of who is doing what and where. In exemplifying this they 
refer to the work of [practitioner] in regards to addressing 
human exploitation and how [practitioner] is so effective 
at leading this activity as they have the social capital to 
know who is doing what and the social and personal skills 
to get these people together and mobilise them around the 
work [practitioner] wants them to do 
Fieldnotes 01/07/2014 
It is apparent that the schemes of cooperation within this workstream activity was 
reliant upon the social capital and social skills of the lead practitioner to 
encourage cooperation by appealing to those who work at the ground level and 
are personally invested in the work. However it is important to recognise that this 
approach to promoting cooperation has, in some part, only been possible due to 
the lack of contestation by other partners resulting from the lack of prioritisation 
as this as issue as noted by a practitioner working within the human exploitation 
workstream:  
No it’s not a priority for them [the police] you see so 
that’s why they’re not all over it like a rash, that’s why 
they’re not going out raiding parlours and stuff like that, if 
for one minute the policy changed and they said you’ve 
got to go out and shut down all of the parlours then we 
would be at war 
Human Exploitation Workstream Practitioner 
Here, the lack of prioritisation of this issue by other actors has circumvented 
some of the power struggles around leadership and control, which allowed 
greater affordance to the workstream lead in pushing forward their own agenda. 
Nevertheless this reliance upon developing local relationships in facilitating 
cooperation does have its limitations in pursing more radical and politically 
contentious changes as observed in a sex work steering group with plans for the 
diversion of street sex workers away from residential areas:  
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The most interesting point of discussion here though were 
plans to set up a ‘no tolerance’ approach to street sex 
work in residential areas through the diversion of sex 
workers to other areas where its impact would be less 
disruptive. While there were concerns about the safety of 
such proposals this approach was met positively by many 
in the meeting except the Police officers who were 
concerned about the legal and political implications and 
what they argued to be the tacit legalisation of sex work. 
Hesitant to agree to anything they argued that such issues 
could not be organised locally and required the green light 
from South Wales Police HQ. 
Fieldnotes 07/05/14 
The reliance on pursuing progressive alliances at the grass roots was 
problematic, as local practitioners did not have the power to pursue the more 
radical approaches to diversion due to its substantial legal and political 
repercussions. Despite these limitations, the addressing human exploitation 
workstream was an important example as it demonstrates the lack of institutional 
support provided to the agenda.  This placed greater reliance upon the lead 
practitioner in pushing forward the agenda and mobilising partnership activity.  
Therefore, this workstream highlights the role of particular actors and the shift 
from bureaucratic to more personalised modes of administration under the new 
governing arrangements, which have hollowed out the support capacity of the 
community safety team.  
6.4.2 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE  
Where the addressing human exploitation workstream was characterised by a 
lack of contestation, the provision of domestic violence services was more 
disputed. Throughout the fieldwork it was apparent that there were significant 
problems in the coordination of partnership activity around domestic violence. 
Early on during my immersion within the Policy and Partnership team, a 
conversation with a senior policy officer indicated some of the challenges around 
coordinating domestic violence provision in the city: 
Using the work around domestic violence as an example 
**** discusses the ‘complex delivery structure’ that has 
emerged in some areas of activity. In explaining this issue 
they refer to the reliance on the third sector in delivering 
this activity, and the presence of three competing third 
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sector organisations addressing domestic violence in the 
city.  The problem, they outline, is that these services 
aren’t cooperating effectively, even going as far to say 
that these services are actually in competition with each 
other due to the competition for external funding.   
Fieldnotes 17/04/14 
This extract indicates the problems facing domestic violence provision in the city 
due to its delivery predominantly being provided through three voluntary sector 
providers. This has provoked a sense of competition between the providers and 
inhibited coordinated partnership activity. Another policy officer raised this issue 
during an interview in which domestic violence provision was discussed:  
Things like domestic violence which really no ones got a 
sort of city wide handle of because the services are so 
disparate, y’know they’re delivered through a lot of third 
sector organisations there’s some services that are 
delivered by health or the council that there needs to be 
far more of a focus on something like  
Policy Officer 
What was evident regarding domestic violence provision in the city was the lack 
of coordination and cooperation from the various providers. Accordingly, over 
the course of research it was made apparent that the council wanted to take 
greater control in coordinating this activity, and, reflecting the increased 
importance on individual coordinators, the council tasked a member of staff 
within the housing team provide this coordination function. The introduction of a 
council employee to coordinate this activity is important when considering that, 
within the existing governing arrangements of the programme board, the position 
of workstream lead for domestic violence was occupied by an individual from 
one of the voluntary sector organisations. Therefore the tasking of a council 
employed member of staff represents an attempt to leverage greater council 
control of the disparate provision of domestic violence services. In furtherance of 
this point, I was invited and involved in a data subgroup meeting of domestic 
service providers. The meeting was convened to standardise the data recording 
practices of the various domestic violence providers to facilitate the more 
effective reporting of delivery and the coordination of resources. During this 
meeting attention was drawn to the problems unifying data recording practices: 
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When discussing why some providers collected certain 
data, and why others did not, the issue of contrasting 
sources of funding was raised. Much of the rationale for 
the recording of data, was connected to the monitoring 
requirements of different funding organisations, and due 
to breadth of funding sources for the providers this meant 
vastly different monitoring practices between agencies 
Fieldnotes 04/08/14 
The different monitoring practices adopted by the various providers, resulting 
from their own internal processes, and the requirements of funders, meant that 
the data being collected on domestic violence provision was inconsistent and not 
conducive to assessing activity between the varying organisations. This problem 
of data collection was further evidenced during my time within the Policy and 
Partnership team when a member of the team showed me the data they were 
receiving from domestic service providers:  
Putting the report cards on to the screen [partnership 
officer] goes through them and outlines various problems 
including contradictory and incomplete data. Pointing at a 
particular case [partnership officer] points out that while 
they indicate the number of clients they have they don’t 
outline what activity has taken place and how that is 
broken down by participants therefore obscuring what 
outcomes have actually taken place. [partnership officer] 
then goes on to say that some of the organisations are 
having problems using the RBA [Result Based 
Accountability] report card, pointing to a number of blank 
fields where none of the outcome measures have been 
filled in which [partnership officer] thinks is because they 
don’t collect any data that can correlate to the 
measurements included in the RBA performance 
scorecard.  
Fieldnotes 20/08/14 
These problems in the monitoring of the activities of domestic violence provision 
were a source of frustration for those in the partnership team as it inhibited their 
ability to identify the extent of the problem and the contribution of different 
services to addressing it. This was important when considering the longer-term 
plan of the council to introduce a commissioning process for domestic violence 
services. Again, this was framed in terms of resource efficiency and the greater 
control of service delivery to the council as discussed by one policy officer:  
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I think in terms of commissioning domestic abuse services 
it’ll go a lot further in terms of meeting the need because 
you can do a needs analysis for the needs of domestic 
abuse services in Cardiff and actually put that out into 
commissioning instead of the same services getting the 
funding year on year hopefully that’ll help towards 
bridging some of the gaps we’ve got at the moment 
Policy Officer 
In contrast to the addressing human exploitation work the domestic violence 
workstream was characterised by contestation and a lack of coordination. In 
seeking to rectify this, the council has sought to leverage greater control of this 
agenda through a number of means, such as introducing a dedicated coordinator 
of the activity, and improving data recording practices in anticipation of a 
competitive tendering process by which the council can influence greater control 
through the commissioning process.  
6.4.3 ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR  
The two key actors in this workstream were the council anti-social behaviour 
team, located within the council housing team, and the police. Other key partners 
included the youth offending service, the neighbourhood management teams and 
private housing associations. At a wider level, engagement was sought with 
children’s services, adult and mental health services, though it was acknowledged 
that cooperation with these services were ‘less joined up’ (ASB Workstream 
Practitioner). What became evident during the research was the increasing 
compartmentalisation of responsibilities for anti-social behaviour work. This was 
primarily seen in the retrenchment of local authority participation through its 
exclusive focus on anti-social behaviour involving council tenants as discussed 
by a senior council officer within the safer and cohesive communities programme 
board: 
[Senior officer] highlights that the council has a statutory 
requirement as social landlords to tackle anti-social 
behaviour involving council tenants. As this is where the 
legal responsibility lies for the council this is what they 
focus on and goes onto argue that the council can’t then 
be expected to engage with ASB in the neighbourhood as 
they don’t have the resources or statutory obligation to do 
so and therefore it is the responsibility of the police 
Fieldnotes 06/08/14  
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The financial limitations on the council, and the need to focus on incidents 
involving council tenants, were further highlighted by a senior practitioner 
involved with anti-social behaviour: ‘due to our financial costing we have to have 
the council tenant as a victim or a perpetrator’. This prioritisation of resources by 
the council, and the retrenchment of wider support, was described by a police 
inspector for community safety as a stepping back of partnership activity:  
[…] what we’re finding now is that they are withdrawing, 
I’ll give you an example, in one of the sectors in Cardiff a 
council tenant or the son of a council tenant is causing a 
lot of anti social behaviour in the local library which is 
owned and operated by the council, we’re looking to take 
an ASBO out against him, we’ve asked the council to 
manage that ASBO through the court process and we’ve 
had the answer back, no he’s not, it’s not against council 
tenants or council property, but it’s in a library where 
50% of the complaints have come from library staff, the 
other 50% of the street that have complained, and are not 
council tenants so the council have pushed that back to us, 
that is purely down to cost 
Police Inspector  
These extracts are important, as they demonstrate how cooperation between the 
police and the council is degrading as a result of the council’s exclusive focus on 
incidents involving council tenants. This pulling back of resources, and the 
territorialisation of responsibilities around anti-social behaviour stand in stark 
contrast to the ideals of shared working, and shared responsibility espoused in the 
‘What Matters’ strategy. These problems are indicative of a breakdown of the 
schemes of cooperation around this agenda. Illustrating this degradation of 
cooperation there was evidence of a discontinuity in the operational agendas of 
the police and local authority in relation to anti-social behaviour. The approach 
adopted by the council team centred on ideas of restorative justice and the 
avoidance of more punitive and exclusionary interventions, instead choosing to 
focus on the development of dialogue and understanding between those involved 
in offending and those affected, as noted by a senior practitioner involved within 
anti social behaviour work: 
A degree of our cases are clash of lifestyles and people 
not understanding and interpreting peoples’ behaviour, 
not incorrectly, but in a different way than it should have 
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been perceived. So with restorative approaches it’s more 
about discussing the reasons why people act in that way 
and how they interpret it… the idea is not to get to the 
point of eviction, we try to do everything we can to, you 
know we don’t want to make people homeless, and the 
idea is to resolve the ASB rather than evict people or 
move people on so we start with restorative approaches 
ASB Workstream Practitioner 
Consistent in the council approach was an attempt to avoid interventions that 
might have an exclusionary affect and the recognition of the longer-term 
repercussions of exclusionary approaches as seen in the ‘What Matters’ strategy. 
In this way the council approach was broadly progressive in its advocacy of a 
diversionary approach. Discussions with the police inspector for community 
safety also revealed an approach focussed on the diversion away from a criminal 
record, but where the council team focussed on restorative approaches, the 
police pursued approaches that favoured ideas of exclusion as seen in the 
following extract and the approaches to exclude problematic individuals from 
particular areas through the use of ASBOs and exclusion orders: 
[…] now under the Crime and Disorder Act we can give 
you a ticket which tells you you’re banned from a certain 
area, so we will give you a map on a Saturday night which 
shows you the city centre, and the ticket and section 35 of 
the crime and disorder act tells you that you’re leaving 
town and if you come back into that area you will be 
arrested so you don’t go to the police station, you don’t 
get a criminal record, we have a note of your name and 
address, if you don’t come in and don’t misbehave, it’s 
gone, if your behaviour is worse than that you get a ticket 
to leave but you also get a penalty notice for disorder  
Police Inspector  
This divergence between the approaches of the council and the police to anti-social 
behaviour is significant given the breakdown of cooperation around this agenda. 
Taken together, the division of responsibilities and work between the police and 
the council, alongside the different operational agendas adopted by these agendas 
indicate a lack of cooperation and coordination of activity around this agenda. In 
part this can be attributed to the ending of co-location arrangements, which 
restricted the sharing of expertise between organisations like the police and the 
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council on how problems, such as anti-social behaviour, should be governed. Also 
important, is the pressures of reduced financial resources which has resulted in a 
pulling back of council activity to focus only on statutory duties.   
6.4.4 REDUCING FIRST TIME ENTRANTS TO THE YOUTH JUSTICE SYSTEM  
The reducing first time entrants to the youth justice system workstream equated 
to the work of the youth offending team in Cardiff. The youth offending team 
was itself a separate partnership arrangement to the community safety 
partnership, but had also been affected by the changes to the governing 
arrangements in the city. A key aspect of this workstream was the identification 
of young people who had offended, or were at risk of offending, and diverting 
them from the criminal justice system. To realise this agenda, the youth 
offending team were reliant upon effective communication channels with a 
number of partner agencies to help identify those individuals at risk and act as 
referral routes into the youth offending team. Primarily this involved 
engagement with the police, probation, education and children’s services. As 
with the community safety arrangements during the national mandatory period, a 
key part of these arrangements were the co-location of these actors within the 
youth offending team’s offices through the secondment of staff from these 
partners. Unlike the community safety team, however, this co-location 
arrangement has not been compromised as part of the changes to the governing 
arrangements but it has been put under threat due to austerity:  
I had three police officers, we now have two, we had 
three or four probation officers we now have two, its 
substantial people power walks away because those 
statutory partners apart from children’s services don’t 
give me cash, they give us people and at the same time 
the local authority asks me to make some very substantial 
cuts which means I lose social workers and this place 
[gestures to building] to be as full as an egg, now all the 
spare desks about, so we are really contracted as a service 
And later in the interview: 
[…] it’s long term investment, that’s the whole point 
about prevention work that we sadly end up overlooking 
now because of the cuts coming from everywhere 
particularly for youth offending service which is a 
partnership in its own right and is dependent on, not so 
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much cash but people, secondments from the different 
agencies and that’s contracting 
Youth Offending Service Practitioner 
These extracts highlight the pressures facing partnership activities and the extent 
to which, sustained cooperation was problematised by the continued reductions to 
financial resources. This gradual degradation of partnership engagement with the 
youth offending team was problematic for the pursuit of its work which was 
dependent upon the accessibility of partner organisations to identify and refer 
those young people at risk of offending. This placed strain on the longer-term 
preventative capacity of the workstream as cautioned by the workstream lead: ‘if 
we’re really cut down to basics that we can’t afford to do the prevention work’.  
Alongside the impact of austerity upon the commitment of staff to co-location 
arrangements there was also evidence that the new governing arrangements for 
community safety work were inhibiting the engagement of the youth offending 
team in partnership work. The was apparent during a discussion with a senior 
individual within the safer and cohesive communities programme board who 
commented upon the lack of engagement from the youth offending team and 
their lack of cooperation under the new arrangements. This lack of engagement 
was observed throughout my fieldwork in which no officers from the youth 
offending team were seen during the neighbourhood management meetings I 
attended, nor were they present at the safer and cohesive communities 
programme board which was attended by a representative from every other 
workstream activity. The only meeting where they were present was at the anti-
social behaviour problem solving group meeting. Without specifically asking 
about this, this issue was raised during an interview with an individual from the 
youth offending team: 
It’s a very difficult one for my little service because there 
are six neighbourhoods, so there are six meetings and 
there are six problem solving groups underneath it 
although that may not be quite true, a couple are 
combined. Now we’ve just had to make decisions about 
what we can and can’t attend so we focus on the problem 
solving groups so that means that a lot of knowledge, 
information and ideas pass me by that might be discussed 
in the neighbourhood management meetings. So it’s 
 181 
become more complicated, it’s become larger. At one 
level I think yeah spot on as we all know that if you 
localise you are likely to get better engagement and better 
intelligence as the police would say, that you can do 
something with, but if you’re small like us you’re not seen 
around the table and in a way that was the beauty of the 
community safety partnership, I was there so the YOS 
was represented and I was visible and that’s, I’m far less 
so than I used to be so for us I don’t think it has worked 
Youth Offending Service Practitioner 
It is argued that the sheer number of possible meetings and commitments are 
problematic for the youth offending team due to its size, and the limitations of its 
resources in having the staff available to cover these meetings. In contrast, the prior 
arrangements of the community safety partnership were argued to be easier as they 
could ‘hit’ all of their relevant partners at the same time. Here then the diffusion of 
community safety, and the changes it has resulted to in the governing 
arrangements, have problematised the youth offending teams engagement with 
other actors and has incentivised a targeting of their limited resources and staff at 
particular meetings. This stands in contrast to the arguments of reducing 
complexity and streamlined partnership arrangements, and points to the barriers to 
securing the cooperation of partners presented under the new governing 
arrangements.  
6.4.5 MANAGING THE NIGHT TIME ECONOMY 
The night-time economy forms a significant component of Cardiff’s local 
economy, providing a major source of revenue and employment, yet it places 
particular pressures on the policing of the city centre.  As a result the night-time 
economy workstream was principally concerned with assisting the police. This 
was seen with the alcohol treatment centre, which was frequently held up as good 
practice by numerous individuals encountered during my fieldwork, particularly in 
its ability to free up local emergency services. Similarly the importance of street 
pastors, a Christian based voluntary organisation, was highlighted in terms of the 
assistance the offer vulnerable individuals but more importantly their role in 
freeing up police time:  
[…] the street pastors and you would have seen those, 
again they’re worth their weight in gold…before they 
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came on the scene, you know we [the police] would be 
left to look after those, because you know they’re a 
medical emergency 
Police Inspector  
Reflecting the discussions of Green and Johns (2011), the street pastors were 
described by the night time economy manager as the ‘moral conscience of the city’ 
and were seen to support and work with vulnerable individuals for the wider 
purpose of safety rather than that of crime prevention more specifically. Their 
engagement within this agenda was reliant on funds from Cardiff Council and the 
police, yet reflecting the work of Green and Johns (2011) details on these funding 
arrangements were difficult to trace. When asked about this, the night-time 
economy manager commented that the arrangements have been based upon 
donations rather formal funding arrangements:  
They’ve always relied on donations so they’ve never been 
funded by Cardiff Council, Cardiff Council has given 
donations to them in the past you know has donated 
money to them in the past to provide the services they 
provide  
NTE Workstream Practitioner 
A similar supporting role was also seen in the presence of taxi marshals, who were 
argued by many respondents to be an essential component of the social control 
apparatus within the night-time economy.  However, as a result of the 2014-15 
council budget, funding to these posts was reduced leading to ‘a reduction to the 
taxi marshalling service’ (Cardiff Council, 2014: 184). In itself, this reduction was 
important as it represented a degradation of governing capacity in the city centre 
and was highlighted as a detrimental decision by numerous stakeholders, including 
local councillors involved in scrutinising community safety activity, the police and 
the city centre manager. However, what was more interesting about the reductions 
to the taxi marshals is how this decision related to the changes to the governing 
arrangements discussed in Chapter 4. This was remarked upon by the night-time 
economy manager when discussing the redistribution of responsibility for the 
night-time economy to the economic development portfolio as part of the 
mainstreaming of community safety:  
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[…] the community safety aspect doesn’t really have a 
role to play within there…they’re not interested in that, 
you wouldn’t cut a certain role, you wouldn’t cut the taxi 
marshals if you knew the impact they have out there   
NTE Workstream Practitioner 
Here then, the mainstreaming of responsibility for community safety has meant 
decisions regarding community safety were being made in places where they held 
less weight than other policy concerns within the economic development portfolio. 
The issue of cuts to taxi marshals also illustrated the challenges of scrutinising 
these decisions when they are done as part of economic development rather than 
community safety as noted in observations of a scrutiny committee meeting:  
In recognising the importance of the taxi marshals the 
committee members discuss different funding sources to 
negate the need for a reduction to the taxi marshal service. 
This discussion is a brought to an abrupt end when the 
scrutiny officer informs them that the decision was made 
and agreed in the budget in February. This did not please 
the committee who were unhappy with the lack of 
consultation they received which inhibited their ability to 
argue against the reduction in provision. 
Fieldnotes 03/09/14 
These extracts were important as they denoted the fundamental problems of 
mainstreaming community safety, in that decisions were being made which were 
directly related to community safety work, but where community safety concerns 
were marginalised in favour of more pressing policy concerns. Related to this, 
these new decision makers may not possess the specific expertise or knowledge to 
appreciate the implications of these decisions on community safety work. In 
dispersing this responsibility, the scrutiny of these decisions have been made more 
problematic, as clear lines of decision making and responsibility for making and 
scrutinising these decisions are absent.  
In light of these reductions the night-time economy workstream has sought to 
leverage greater input and contribution from the private sector. Engagement with 
the private sector was centred around the pursuit of developmental agendas 
organised around risk. Cooperation with the private sector was largely achieved by 
developing relationships with licensed premises, but also, working with licensing 
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and trading standards to pressure licensed premises to engage in less problematic 
business practices. This responsibilisation of licensed premises resulted in the 
proliferation of situational prevention techniques to assist the police in the 
detection and identification of offenders. Alongside this, there were more 
fundamental attempts to alter the market within the city centre to encourage certain 
types of less problematic behaviour:  
[…] we have saturation policy areas and within those 
areas now we would not normally provide an alcohol 
license unless they can demonstrate they are going to 
actively contribute to that area… so you know where 
there are premises that want to cater for the mature, if you 
like, visitor or the more discerning visitor if you like, then 
we can do that in the regulatory structure that we have 
with regards to planning and licensing 
NTE Workstream Practitioner 
This extract demonstrates the frictions between the concerns of crime and 
disorder and that of economic development. By addressing the more problematic 
behaviours that exist in the night-time economy, by diverting them outside of the 
city centre, it enables the cultivation of a city centre that is more attractive to 
commerce and tourism. However such an approach contravenes the more 
inclusive agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy in its exclusion of certain 
activities, individuals, or groups, away from the city centre, which, far from 
representing a progressive approach to tackling the causes of these concerns, 
merely displace the problems of alcohol related violence and disorder. Here, the 
bounded rationality of local practitioners can be seen in that more immediate 
concerns of the management of the night-time economy and the management of 
problematic populations, superceded the broader purposes of inclusion within the 
‘What Matters’ strategy (Stone, 2005).  
Reductions in funding to the public sector have incentivised attempts to 
encourage more financial contributions from the private sector. Two of such 
attempts were discussed during a scrutiny committee meeting: the potential 
implementation of business improvement districts (BID) and the introduction of a 
night-time levy. While the committee was positive about the potential of 
leveraging such funds for community safety work in the city centre, discussions 
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with the night-time economy manger highlighted barriers to this approach. For 
instance, the implementation of a BID entails a financial contribution from local 
businesses, however, in order to generate enough financial resources the BID 
would need to include the retail sector potentially shifting the agenda away from 
concerns of crime and disorder. Similarly, while the night-time levy was aimed 
specifically at licensed premises open past midnight and would be used 
specifically for those purposes, there were concerns from the licensed trade that 
business rates in Cardiff were already high and any extra costs may act as a 
disincentive for new licensed premises as noted by the night-time economy 
coordinator. This was further highlighted by the chair of the licensees committee 
and licensees forum in an article for a local newspaper (Hutchinson, 2013). The 
chair raised concerns about the fairness of such a levy and the consequences that 
it might lead to, in terms of closures and premises seeking to avoid the levy by 
closing earlier thereby negating its purpose. These proposals outline the 
challenges of encouraging financial provision from the private sector without 
disincentivising private sector investment in the night-time economy.   
6.4.6 THE CONTEST STRATEGY 
The issue of terrorism, and the work of the CONTEST Board, was pushed to the 
forefront of concern following the radicalisation of a number of individuals in 
Cardiff, which captured the attention of both local and national media. While 
such attention posed difficult questions for the CONTEST board, the attention 
this media scrutiny offered was regarded by those involved in the CONTEST 
strategy as conducive to promoting cooperation from partners and communities, 
which were central to the agenda of the CONTEST strategy:  
[…] you only need something like a couple of local kids 
on a ‘YouTube’ video from Syria encouraging others to 
go and practice Jihad to focus minds and say ‘oh alright 
we need to prioritise this’ 
Senior CONTEST Practitioner  
The CONTEST strategy was reliant upon the engagement of partner 
organisations, the private sector and communities groups to provide intelligence 
to assist in the identification and mitigation of risk, which was central to the 
Prevent, Protect and Prepare strands of the CONTEST strategy. This point was 
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discussed with a practitioner involved in the Prevent strategy, who highlighted 
that the increased media attention had helped induce greater cooperation from 
practitioners within the education services – tellingly, the only occasion during 
this research where the cooperation of local education services was spoken of 
favourably. The participation of practitioners within the education service was 
perceived as crucial for the Prevent strategy, as those involved within educational 
services were regarded as a key source of information for identifying those at risk 
of radicalisation. In a similar way, communities and local religious groups were 
also mobilised to act as providers of information to assist in the risk management 
of radicalisation. Indicating the importance of engagement from education 
services, the prevent strategy did not just rely upon external pressures but 
actively sought engagement through a dedicated Higher Education coordinator 
employed to facilitate engagement with higher education institutions. This focus 
on identifying and reducing risk was met by resistance by the NUS (National 
Union of Students) over attempts to monitor speakers at higher education 
institutions and prevent certain speakers from appearing.  
Where the prevent strategy sought greater engagement from educational 
practitioners and communities, the Protect and Prepare strategies sought to 
develop relationships with the private sector. A key aspect of the protect and 
prepare strategies was the utilisation of situational preventative methods 
including rise and fall bollards to manage traffic access in important locations, 
CCTV and more resistance building materials to minimise the damage of an 
attack. These approaches to risk mitigation were reliant upon cooperation from 
the private sector in adopting these approaches. Accordingly emphasis was 
placed upon influencing new infrastructure developments so that such techniques 
were considered from the group up:  
We have discussed it a lot in the past and its not been 
terribly fruitful because planning applications etc. they go 
down a whole path where we wouldn’t even get a chance 
to look at them. But now as we’ve worked, I like to think 
because we’ve worked a long way with protect field that 
when the new BBC building is going to be constructed by 
the station we are going to be in at the bottom line there, 
we are in at the beginning, so hopefully along with 
WECTU we can influence how that’s developed so that 
could be a great example of how you can build things and 
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get, because the very nature of it is, the BBC will be next 
to a rail way station in a large public space, it has to be 
accessible but at the same time it has to be protected 
Protect and Prepare Workstream Practitioner 
This quote describes the approach to work with the new development of the BBC 
headquarters in central Cardiff, to ensure that target hardening techniques were 
considered from the beginning of the planning process and were embedded 
within the design of the building. However, this quote alludes to the historical 
problems of engaging with the private sector which relate to tensions between 
approaches to risk management and attracting private sector investment:  
[…] you have emerging economies which mostly are the 
driving force of all governments, and the desire to create 
more and more jobs if you are then saying to these people 
I want you to come to Cardiff, I want you to come to 
Swansea, I want you to open big buildings and this is 
talking about the Protect element of things, and then we 
say but we want you to provide rise and fall bollards, we 
want you to provide glass that is not going to shatter, we 
want you to provide a whole environment which is safe, 
secure and cohesive and they’ll say well I could go to 
Sweden and do that, or some other place, so we then as an 
emerging economy coming out of a recession what do we 
do, do we say well we’ll make this a terrorist friendly 
environment on the basis that we need growth, or do we 
put in, do we take the advice of the professionals, 
WECTU, local authority, other people who say no you 
should do this 
Protect and Prepare Workstream Practitioner 
What is apparent then, and similar to the management of the night-time economy, 
attempts to work with the private sector have largely been limited to encouraging 
the proliferation of situational prevention measures. Within the Protect and 
Prepare work such attempts involved working with new developments and the 
Welsh extremism and counter terrorist unit (WECTU) to incentivise the need for 
such measures. In both cases there has been a desire to balance the needs of risk 
management for concerns of crime and safety with the suitable conditions to 
attract private sector investment to the city.  This balance places constraints on 
what is possible when seeking to promote cooperation with the private sector.  
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6.4.7 SUMMARY 
These discussions show the varied ways in which the workstream activities of 
the safer and cohesive communities programme board were affected by austerity 
and the changes to the governing arrangements and the disappearance of the 
community safety team. Despite these differences, there is one point of 
commonality, which is that within all of the workstreams the disappearance of 
the community safety team had affected the schemes of cooperation and the 
ways in which partnership working was encouraged. The loss of central support 
and expertise provided by the community safety infrastructure resulted in the 
workstream activities becoming isolated and discrete partnerships with little 
operational support, the implications of which have manifested in a number of 
ways. For instance while this lack of structural support had been ameliorated 
within the addressing human exploitation workstream by developing social 
capital and local professional networks, in other workstreams this loss of central 
support and fragmentation of activity had been detrimental to cooperation and 
community safety work.  
6.5 MANAGING NEIGHBOURHOOD MANAGEMENT  
6.5.1 FACILITATING PARTNERSHIP 
As with the safer and cohesive communities programme board, the 
neighbourhood management arrangements have been directly affected by the 
creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board, and the mainstreaming of community 
safety in the city. Since its introduction in 2007, the neighbourhood management 
structure has played a key role in facilitating the cooperation of practitioners at a 
neighbourhood level. A key innovation of the neighbourhood management 
approach was its structure, which was designed to induce cooperation from the 
various directorates of the council in engaging with local community safety 
work:  
Neighbourhood management was set up years and years 
ago with the point of getting agencies to work together, 
not to spend money, not to spend extra money, and in this 
financial situation at the moment this is what it should be 
doing now, it should be working together with all the 
different agencies and saying instead of costing, the idea 
was initially when they put a different manager across the 
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city they’d have a street lighting manager in charge of one 
area, they’d have someone from parks in another area as a 
manager, someone else from another in an area, so the 
idea was that if that area had  a problem with street 
lighting that manager would go to that manager and go 
look I’ve got a problem with street lighting in that area 
could you sort it out for me, and he’d sort it out, then that 
one would say well I’ve got a problem with this hedge 
needs cutting in that area could you sort that out for me 
and he’d sort it out, and that was the idea of 
neighbourhood management  
Partnership Officer 
This quote describes a reciprocal relationship between the neighbourhood chairs, 
designed to facilitate partnership working without resorting to financial recourse, 
and to improve communication between the different directorates of Cardiff 
Council to streamline cooperation. The neighbourhood management teams were 
also seen to facilitate local partnership working by assisting the development of 
relationships between practitioners at a local level. This was achieved through 
the standardisation of local delivery areas for each partner organisation and the 
introduction of regular neighbourhood management meetings to bring people 
together. In doing so, these localised arrangements were designed to negate the 
need for the middle management of partnership activity in the city and to create 
more formal, yet sustainable, local arrangements.   This greater emphasis on 
local relationships in promoting partnership activity was discussed by one 
neighbourhood chair, in terms of the dispersal of knowledge of partnership 
working to more police officers, rather than relying on the a centrally located 
community safety team:  
[…] all the inspectors in Cardiff are far more partnership 
orientated than they would have been 10 years ago, where 
the inspectors would have been very police-y police-y 
police-y, and allowed community safety working in 
Cardiff Central [police station], as it would have been at 
the time, to be the ones who did all the liaising with the 
council… there’s been a flattening out, a spreading out of 
the knowledge and the different sorts of working together, 
the community sergeants would probably have more 
contacts within the council departments than they would 
have had 10 years ago 
Neighbourhood Chair 
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This quote illustrates how neighbourhood management has facilitated 
partnership working at a local level, by enabling local practitioners to identify 
local counterparts within other organisations and to develop their own 
professional relationships and contacts. The neighbourhood management 
structure is therefore an integral component of the approach to promote 
cooperation at a local level. It is important to note, that these neighbourhood 
management teams did not inhabit a permanent physical space within the 
neighbourhoods they were located, but instead, operated through a series of 
thematic meetings organised around particular issues on a regular basis.  
During the research it became apparent that partnership working in these 
arrangements was not assured through structure alone. It was clear that local 
partnership work was highly dependent upon the direction of the neighbourhood 
chairs, and the coordinating role of the six neighbourhood management officers, 
who were centrally located within the Policy and Partnership team. The six 
neighbourhood management officers were employed by the council, and were 
responsible for coordinating the day-to-day activity of the neighbourhood 
management teams. This coordination function was seen regularly during my 
time within the Policy and Partnership team, and usually involved the 
neighbourhood officer liaising with numerous practitioners as seen in in one 
typical example of the work: 
While sitting at my desk [neighbourhood officer], sitting 
opposite me, received and made a series of phone calls 
and was heard recommending a series of names and 
providing a number of solutions. Upon finishing these 
conversations [neighbourhood officer] turned to me and 
outlined that they had received an enquiry from a PCSO 
who wanted [neighbourhood officer] to get in contact with 
social care services and coordinate a package of care for a 
vulnerable individual and was asking [neighbourhood 
officer] for assistance in facilitating this 
Fieldnotes 16/09/14 
Although a relatively mundane extract, this exchange was important as it 
revealed the role of the neighbourhood management officers in providing a 
conduit for communication and facilitating partnership work. These 
neighbourhood management officers provided clear point of contact within the 
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neighbourhood management teams, and were equipped with the social and 
professional networks to coordinate local level problem solving. Therefore the 
neighbourhood management structure, and the neighbourhood management 
officers, played a key role in facilitating partnership work at a local level. 
However during the research it was apparent that the prioritisation of community 
safety in these arrangements was being marginalised following the broader 
structural changes within the Cardiff Partnership Board. 
6.5.2 A BROADENING REMIT AND COMPETITION FOR COMMUNITY SAFETY 
When first introduced in 2007, the neighbourhood management teams were 
solely tasked with facilitating partnership working around crime and disorder 
prevention. In 2010, along with the broader structural changes taking place 
within Cardiff, the remit of the neighbourhood management teams was expanded 
to encompass a broader range of local issues including health, environment and 
young people in addition to the focus on crime and safety. For some, this change 
was met positively as they argued that issues of crime and disorder were less 
prevalent in their area:  
So those are probably the three areas of crime but crime 
as I say in Cardiff North doesn’t feature highly on our 
action plan… 
And then later in the interview: 
So we use each of those pieces of information to, if you 
like validate each other and that’s how, that how we’ve 
come up with those three and I suppose that’s also how 
we’ve come up with the fact that they [anti-social 
behaviour, domestic violence and rogue trading] are not 
major priorities for the area  
Neighbourhood Chair 
As part of this broadening remit, the structure of the neighbourhood 
managements teams were adapted to include a second chair from another partner 
organisation. While not explicitly stated, it is reasonable to assume that a similar 
logic based upon reciprocity and the development of local professional networks 
was used when inviting creating these chairing positions for wider partner 
organisations to. During this research, the six council neighbourhood chairs were 
joined by six practitioners from the following organisations: 
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• Two practitioners from the local university health board 
• One Communities First6 cluster manager  
• One local police inspector 
• One local housing association manager  
• One partnership manager working who occupied a role jointly 
funded by the local health board and Cardiff Council  
The introduction of the additional chairs from these partner agencies, alongside 
the broadening of the remit of neighbourhood management, was perceived by 
one participant as a threat to the continued pursuit of community safety agendas 
within these teams, as it has shifted the focus of these teams away from 
community safety work to other policy areas:  
It’s gone, community safety within the partnerships 
[neighbourhood management teams] has fallen by the 
way, the problem you have is if you look across at the 
community partnerships across Cardiff, it depends who 
the chair is, like if you look at [neighbourhood 
management area] for example and look at their priorities, 
a lot of the priorities are health related because, who is 
there chair, a health related person. If you look at another 
area, I can’t remember the area but one of the other areas 
has got another health related person and a lot of the 
issues are health related so it depends on who your chair 
is as to what seems to be the focus but if you look at the 
action plans, there’s very little in those action plans 
regarding community safety issues 
Partnership Officer 
Here then there were concerns that competing agendas resulting from the 
broadening of the scope of the neighbourhood management teams were eclipsing 
community safety priorities. This side-lining of community safety was directly 
linked to the occupational capacity of the new neighbourhood management 
chairs and the professional knowledge and expertise that they brought to the 
table. These concerns, raised by the partnership team member, were further 
played out during the research. For instance a conversation with a policy officer 
                                                
6 Communities First is a community focused tackling poverty programme run by the Welsh 
Government 
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responsible for overseeing the neighbourhood management teams revealed a 
similar impression of the neighbourhood management work as noted in my 
fieldnotes:  
Just before [policy officer] left to attend the 
neighbourhood management meeting, they embarked on a 
lengthy and self-confessed rant about neighbourhood 
management. They described the meetings as talking 
shops where partners talked about what they were doing 
rather than organising a multi-agency approach to local 
problems. Admitting that this wasn’t the case for all of the 
neighbourhood management teams, they remarked that in 
some cases the neighbourhood chairs did not know what 
they were doing. As an example of this they referred to 
community safety work and how in the majority of cases 
the neighbourhood agendas have been copied from the 
city wide priorities negating the purpose of locally based 
partnerships in facilitating bottom up approaches 
Fieldnotes 15/05/14 
This observation indicates some of the frustrations associated with the 
neighbourhood management teams and their ability to deliver upon their 
purpose. Like the preceding quote from the partnership team member, this 
extract points to the potential abandonment of locally determined community 
safety agendas within the neighbourhood management teams, evident by the 
appropriation of broader citywide priorities. This appropriation of citywide 
priorities was further seen when looking at the neighbourhood action plans 
where there was a strong tendency towards priorities of anti-social behaviour, 
domestic abuse and addressing community perceptions of crime. While the 
presence of anti-social behaviour as a priority was hardly surprising given the 
breadth of activity it entails, the prioritisation of domestic violence within some 
of these areas was considered evidence of a broader problem with the 
neighbourhood management agendas:  
I’ve queried in the action plans, when you’ve got 
[neighbourhood management area] for example, as one of 
the main hotspots for burglaries and thefts in the area and 
there’s not a mention of burglaries and thefts within the 
action plan. That’s what I find, and they tend to do things 
like, things they’re not going to have much of an impact 
on, things like, for example domestic violence, yeah, I 
know domestic violence is important, I’m not saying its 
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not important but you have got specialist agencies within 
Cardiff who deal with domestic violence yet you get 
domestic violence raised as a priority within an area 
Partnership Officer 
This issue was also raised during an interview with one of the neighbourhood 
management chairs, who admitted that although domestic violence was a 
priority, they were not truly aware of its prevalence as they ‘were still doing 
research’ into the issue. What was apparent then within the neighbourhood 
management teams, was that while every neighbourhood management team had 
a community safety agenda, some of the identified priorities within these areas 
did not reflect actual practice, but were instead an appropriation of the city-wide 
priorities. In most cases the prioritisation of community safety issues seemed to 
be considered more of a procedural exercise rather than an indication of actual 
activity. This was reflected in one instance, when a neighbourhood management 
officer, writing a review document for their neighbourhood management area, 
was retrospectively trying to think of activities that they could say met the 
community safety priorities of their area.   Therefore, while community safety 
was stated as a priority for each neighbourhood area, in some instances this 
seemed to reflect lip service rather than a genuine commitment to locally 
determined community safety priorities. The extent of this issue varied across 
the neighbourhood management areas, depending on the neighbourhood chairs 
and the organisational expertise that they brought to the table. This was evident 
during interviews with the neighbourhood chairs where it was possible to 
identify diverging local agendas for community safety.  
 
6.5.3 DIVERGING AGENDAS FOR COMMUNITY SAFETY  
In three of the six neighbourhood management areas it was apparent that 
responses to issues of crime, disorder and safety were largely being left to the 
police. The reasons for this varied. In one area this was because one of the 
neighbourhood chairs was a local police inspector.  When asked about the 
neighbourhood management agenda, the neighbourhood chair simply referred to 
the policing priorities of the area and what the police were doing to respond to 
problems of crime, disorder and safety in the area. In another area, staff turnover 
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within the Council had resulted in the Council chair position being vacant, 
leaving sole responsibility for leading the neighbourhood management team with 
the other co-chair. This co-chair had no expertise and knowledge about 
community safety work, and as such was limited in their capacity to make 
effective decisions around the partnership agenda for community safety. This 
was regarded as weakness to the partnership arrangements by the chair: 
[…] in your day job you pick up on other issues within 
your own organisation and you make links between things 
that are happening within your organisation, a large part 
of the partnership agenda and the action plans that 
represent each of the neighbourhoods, a large part of it is 
council related business so personally I don’t make the 
links… I don’t get to hear about community safety or any 
of the other aspects through my own organisation and that 
probably is a weakness, so its a weakness if I’m left to 
chair a group on my own, its not a weakness if my council 
colleague is with me because the two of us make up a 
whole 
Neighbourhood Chair  
This extract alludes to a fundamental problem of the neighbourhood management 
arrangements and its reliance upon particular people and the knowledge and 
expertise that they contribute to the teams. In this case the absence of the council 
chair was detrimental to the partnership approach to community safety in this 
neighbourhood management area. In the absence of a clear partnership agenda, 
issues of crime and disorder in the area were delegated to the police who reported 
upon progress to the neighbourhood management team: 
[…] we do rely on police to come to the group and report 
on what they’ve been doing, so they do something like 
operation perception, they tell us they’re doing operation 
perception which is door knocking and asking people who 
answer the door a set of questions, they tell us they’re 
going to do it and give us an opportunity to feed into those 
questions, add to those questions and then they come back 
in so many months later and report back on their success 
and in the mean time they would have been back to the 
group, they would have told us how many doors were 
answered, how many responses they’ve got, and they 
would have analysis of that information at later data  
Neighbourhood Chair  
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These examples point to the absence of a clear neighbourhood management 
agenda around community safety, instead indicating a pushing back of 
responsibility for responses to crime and disorder to the police. This reversion to 
police led approaches to local problems of crime and disorder is reflective of 
Edwards and Hughes’ (2012) description of a maintenance agenda. These 
examples of maintenance agendas are in contrast to the transformative aspirations 
of the ‘What Matters’ strategy, which sought a wider ownership of issues of 
crime and disorder. In both of these cases, and consistent with the claims of the 
partnership team members, the absence of partnership agenda for community 
safety can be understood in relation to occupational capacity of the 
neighbourhood chairs.  
In the previous cases, the professional capacity of the neighbourhood chairs had 
stifled the pursuit of a clear partnership agenda for community safety. However, 
it was shown that the roles and expertise of the neighbourhood management 
chairs could also enable the pursuit of more encompassing approaches to 
community safety consistent with the aims of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. Of the 
six neighbourhood management teams, two had community safety agendas that 
were consistent with the transformative ideals of social inclusion highlighted 
within the ‘What Matters’ strategy. As with the discussions previously, these 
local agendas can be linked to the neighbourhood chairs of those areas. In one 
neighbourhood management team issues of crime, disorder and safety were 
framed as consequences of broader social factors.  This was evident in the action 
plan for this area, in which, unlike the other neighbourhood management teams, 
there was no specific categorisation of community safety priorities. Instead 
priorities of community safety were embedded within broader priorities around 
the ‘local environment’ and ‘young people’. This positioning of crime, disorder 
and safety within broader priorities, which was consistent with the framing of the 
‘What Matters’ strategy, was discussed during a conversation with the 
neighbourhood management officer during my fieldwork within the policy and 
partnership team: 
I asked [the neighbourhood officer] about community 
safety work in the area and they replied that community 
safety isn’t addressed in any one task group but rather is 
an issue that applies across all of the task groups. In 
 197 
exemplifying this they discuss issues of anti social 
behaviour in which the children and young people task 
group is important due to its focus on young people in the 
area. Equally the attractive neighbourhoods task group is 
important as there are issues around the renovation of old 
and disused land to which they refer to an example of a 
plot of land where needles and drugs have been a 
problem. Finally the social inclusion task group is 
important in promoting cohesion in the area due to the 
diverse communities that live there. For these reasons, 
they point out, community safety doesn’t have a section 
itself in the action plan as it is seen as an issue that 
pervades all of the task groups which they admit contrast 
to some of the other neighbourhood action plans 
Fieldnotes 27/08/14 
This extract provides a clear demarcation from the neighbourhood agendas 
discussed previously. Where previous discussions illustrated an absence of 
distinct partnership agenda for community safety, this neighbourhood 
management area had a clear partnership agenda for community safety and its 
integration across the task groups. This integration of community safety within 
broader agendas was observed during a meeting of a ‘promoting a clean and 
attractive environment’ task group, where issues of anti-social behaviour were 
discussed in relation to environmental considerations. Discussions moved 
towards the need for the rejuvenation of a particular street, which had been 
identified as a location for anti-social behaviour activity. Following discussion it 
was agreed that a local third sector organisation would organise a community led 
mural that would actively seek the engagement of local young people in its 
creation. This area demonstrated a consistency with the transformative agenda of 
the ‘What Matters’ strategy due to the framing of community safety within 
broader policy goals and to be delivered upon through the three task groups in 
the area. Unlike the areas discussed previously, one of the chairs in this area was 
experienced in partnership working and was situated in a role, which meant that 
they were familiar with the strategic context of the Cardiff Partnership Board 
and the ‘What Matters’ strategy. This was illustrated following a neighbourhood 
management meeting during a brief conversation with the neighbourhood chair 
about community safety work in the area: 
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Following the meeting I took the opportunity to ask [the 
neighbourhood chair] about the focus on issues of 
improving opportunities for young people, local 
inequalities and issues of social isolation that were so 
prevalent in the meeting. In response [the neighbourhood 
chair] replied that these are the problems that are 
precursors to crime and disorder and that if you want to 
address issues of crime in the areas these need addressing. 
They then made a point of connecting this to the broader 
preventative agenda of the Cardiff Partnership Board and 
the ‘What Matters’ strategy and its desire to be seen as 
progressive and why the issues of social justice are so 
within this area.  
 Fieldnotes 12/06/14 
Therefore these discussions illustrate the pivotal role played by the 
neighbourhood chair in influencing the agenda of the neighbourhood 
management area. In other areas, the lack of knowledge or expertise around 
community safety and partnership working had resulted in an absence of clear 
coordinated partnership agenda around community safety. In this area however, 
the occupational expertise and knowledge of the neighbourhood chair was crucial 
in aligning the neighbourhood agenda with the aims of the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy. The contingency of local agendas upon the neighbourhood chairs is 
reflective of the arguments of Foster and the importance of ‘people pieces’ for 
partnership work (2002). This was further demonstrated in another 
neighbourhood management area where there was evidence of an appreciation of 
a more holistic approach to addressing issues of crime, disorder and safety as 
discussed by the neighbourhood management chair: 
Its evolved very much over the last three years from a 
community safety focus, so very much around policing 
issues and anything that was supported through PACT 
meetings, to cover far broader kind of areas around, its 
probably a more holistic approach, an approach that looks 
at health, looks at learning, looks at children and young 
people and family units, not just looking at key issues 
around the number of, for example, anti social behaviour 
incidents in the area, so there’s been a real change in that, 
and probably one of the key factors in that is probably the 
evolution of the Partnership Board in Cardiff 
Neighbourhood Chair  
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In this area a more holistic approach to addressing issues of crime and disorder 
was seen in its emphasis on community engagement, co-production and attempts 
to mobilise community responses to problems. The neighbourhood chair referred 
to this as ‘valuing the kind of assets in the community, so doing with people not 
to people is really important’.  This emphasis on co-production and community 
engagement can be attributed to the fact that one of the chairs was a manager for 
a Communities First cluster.  Here, the occupational capacity and expertise of 
the neighbourhood chair has helped develop the neighbourhood management 
agenda around a transformative agenda, which privileged issues of civic 
participation and social inclusion. This was exemplified in the response to issues 
of motorcycle annoyance in the area. When speaking to the neighbourhood 
chair, it was acknowledged that attempts to police the issue had been 
unsustainable and ineffective. Therefore a more sustainable, and longer-term 
strategy was identified, which sought to work with those involved in the problem 
to identify a way forward. This was observed later in the fieldwork when 
attending a local problem-solving meeting alongside the neighbourhood 
management officer: 
In the car on the way to the meeting I had a lengthy 
discussion with [the neighbourhood officer] about the 
progress being made around motorcycle annoyance in the 
area through prolonged engagement with some of the 
individuals involved in the activity. [the neighbourhood 
officer] informed me of developments around creating a 
legitimate output for those involved in the activity through 
the formation of a formalised club and a legitimate 
location for the activity. These developments were later to 
be raised in the PSG meeting in which they were well 
received by the Police present who acknowledged the 
limitations of their capacity to deal with the problem 
Fieldnotes 03/02/14 
These discussions of the neighbourhood management teams have demonstrated 
how the broadening of its remit and the addition of the extra neighbourhood 
management chairs has had implications for local community safety work. 
Consistent with the claims of the partnership team members at the outset of this 
section, it was evident that the community safety agendas in these areas were 
directly linked to the occupational capacity of the neighbourhood chairs. In some 
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cases, the lack of awareness, knowledge and expertise around community safety 
work has resulted in an absence of clear partnership agendas for community 
safety resulting in the delegation of responsibility for crime and disorder to the 
police. In other areas, the occupational capacity of the neighbourhood chairs had 
allowed the development of more transformative agendas around community 
safety consistent with ‘What Matters’ strategy. These discussions point to the 
significance of the neighbourhood chairs, as important ‘people pieces’ (Foster, 
2002), whose expertise and resources impact upon how local community safety 
agendas and arrangements are determined. This dominance of the neighbourhood 
chairs in the neighbourhood management teams meant that engagement from 
communities and local councillors was limited. Recognising this the Cardiff 
Partnership board had sought to encourage greater engagement from communities 
and local councillors by further adapting the structure of the neighbourhood 
management teams. 
6.5.4 FROM NEIGHBOURHOOD ‘MANAGEMENT’ TO ‘PARTNERSHIP’ AND 
ENGAGING COMMUNITIES 
Towards the end of 2013, and shortly before commencing my fieldwork, the 
neighbourhood management structure went through further change. Reflecting 
the discussions that have just taken place, there were concerns that the 
neighbourhood management structure had become overly officer driven, and 
was not engaging adequately with the communities in which they were located. 
This was highlighted during an interview with one elected councillor:  
I think its improved, I have to be honest my first meeting 
that I went to, I found very difficult after just being 
elected because it felt very, very officer dominated and 
they were clearly doing a lot of valuable work but there 
didn’t seem much scope for members to have input into 
that, which is what they’ve tried to address, 
Local Elected Member 
These concerns are consistent with the arguments made by Edwards et al. (2007) 
regarding the tendency of officer driven arrangements within the local 
governance of crime and disorder and the minimal role of elected officials. As 
just seen, the power afforded to the neighbourhood chairs in formulating 
partnership agendas had resulted in vastly divergent agendas for community 
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safety. Recognising this, a number of changes were recommended to improve 
community engagement, and provide greater input from locally elected officials, 
in an attempt to shift power away from the neighbourhood chairs. This began 
with a process of rebranding, from ‘neighbourhood management’ to 
‘neighbourhood partnership’, to reflect the desire to move away from the officer 
driven management of local communities. The rationale for this was explored in 
a Community and Adult Services Scrutiny Committee meeting observed during 
my fieldwork: 
[…] the council officer highlighted that the terminology 
of neighbourhood management had the wrong 
connotations in that it signifies that neighbourhoods are to 
be managed rather than engaged with and that as a result 
had become overly officer driven. The change in rhetoric 
to neighbourhood partnership was meant to signify the 
desire for community engagement and participation. 
Fieldnotes 10/10/13 
This rationale was further exhibited in the neighbourhood management white 
paper with a recommendation to ‘re-launch and rebrand neighbourhood 
management as ‘neighbourhood partnerships’ to better reflect the role and 
activities that take place’ (Cardiff Council, 2013: 20).  The shift from ideas of 
officer driven management, to the engagement of communities and participation 
of local councillors, in these local governing arrangements is consistent with the 
‘What Matters’ strategy, and its focus on transformative ideals of civic 
participation. To encourage this shift, each neighbourhood management area was 
required to identify a local councillor to become a lead elected member to act as 
a representative of the local councillors. As the fieldwork progressed it became 
apparent that the input of local elected members was still limited and their 
integration into the neighbourhood management structure was still developing:  
[…] it’s only been going for less that a year, there hasn’t 
been the time for anybody to kind of get in the room and 
move from the old action plan, into the new process, into 
the new action plan… it is still probably driven more by 
officers than lead members at the moment 
Local Elected Member 
 202 
Despite attempts to increase the role of local elected members and to shift power 
away from the neighbourhood chairs, it was apparent that such shifts in power 
had yet to be achieved. In some cases the neighbourhood chairs had resisted the 
increasing role of elected members with one neighbourhood chair talking of ‘an 
attempt to take over the neighbourhood partnership groups by the elected 
members’. This friction between the elected members and the incumbent 
neighbourhood chairs was noted in relation to the agenda and how the elected 
members might encourage more short-term responses:  
I think that’s where, that’s the conflict between 
neighbourhood partnerships and local members, we tend 
to be talking about different things on occasions. And 
quite rightly, they need things short term, they need the 
vote for next time whereas some of the things in our 
action plan is going to take years to change, that’s not a 
vote winner if you like 
Neighbourhood Chair 
Therefore, despite the attempts to promote engagement from local councillors, 
there had been resistance to this from the neighbourhood management chairs, 
some of which viewed it as an attempt to usurp power and alter the agenda. This 
indicated a contestation of power within these arrangements between the 
neighbourhood chairs and the newly introduced neighbourhood councillors. 
During this research this contestation was still on-going with any shifts in 
responsibility to neighbourhood councillors yet to occur and the dominance of 
the neighbourhood chairs still remained. As a result of this continued contest of 
power there was evidence of an emerging dualism in local delivery. This was 
seen in the accounts of a local elected member of a neighbourhood management 
area who had pursued their own agenda outside of the neighbourhood structure:  
[…] what I’m doing in the [neighbourhood management 
area], and I’ll come back to that because I think it’s a 
good example, is not necessarily being done through the 
neighbourhood partnership groups, its being done through 
the housing department, and sports and leisure and as a 
initiative by myself 
Local Elected Member 
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Over the course of the fieldwork it was apparent that while attempts had been 
made to redistribute power away from the neighbourhood chairs and towards 
locally elected officials, this had yet to be achieved. Alongside difficulties in 
shifting power away from the neighbourhood chairs, there was evidence that 
despite the rhetorical change from management to partnership, community 
engagement within the neighbourhood management teams was limited. This was 
evident in the dominance of public sector organisations within the neighbourhood 
management meetings I attended. In addition to this, informal conversations with 
individuals who had attempted to engage with the neighbourhood management 
process illustrated frustrations with the process:  
When talking about their experience with the 
neighbourhood management team they said that 
engagement with the council was problematic and that 
often it felt like there were frequent barriers to 
cooperation due to the level of bureaucracy... they pointed 
out that there was a meeting tomorrow that they don’t 
plan to go to as and stated that the neighbourhood 
partnerships were just talking shops where not much 
really happens, and were of little benefit to the work they 
were trying to organise. When I asked why this was, they 
replied with the question ‘how much can they really be 
doing if they only meet every 6 weeks 
Fieldnotes 25/06/14 
These barriers, described by this individual, were most visible in the introduction 
of a competitive bidding process for a ‘neighbourhood fund’. Following the 
removal of annualised funding to many third sector organisations and local 
community groups from Cardiff Council, these same organisations were invited 
to enter a competitive bidding process for up to £5000.  This was framed as part 
of the shift towards neighbourhood partnership with the explicit aim of 
encouraging community participation. In practice, the move from annualised 
funding to the neighbourhood fund represented a significant financial reduction 
allocated to these groups. As part of my observations I attended an assessment 
panel of the bids. What was notable in this assessment panel was the criteria used 
to assess the bids submitted by local organisations. During this meeting, when 
reviewing bids that were regarded as poor quality, the review panel, who were all 
local practitioners, noted that the quality was hardly surprising as the 
 204 
organisation had little experience of writing competitive bids. Accordingly, many 
of the practitioners acknowledged that this process might be detrimental to those 
smaller community organisations with little experience of formal bid writing and 
applying for external funding.  A consistent criticism of this process was the level 
of bureaucracy involved for those applying for the fund:  
[…] you know you’ve had the local authority asking for 
funding applications and evidence for a few hundred quid 
for a ridiculous amount of paper work for that amount of 
money, so its that whole thing about the council being the 
one taking the risk, and trusting the community to get on 
and do and having a way of recording that and being 
happy with that rather than having a long winded process 
of grant application… 
Neighbourhood Chair 
Many involved in the application process remarked upon its flaws, in that it was 
overly bureaucratic and did not take into account the expertise and knowledge of 
the organisations applying for funding. Illustrating this, after the first of two 
rounds of funding, 5 of the 6 neighbourhood management teams had spent only a 
small amount of the £35000 available in each area. This was noted in 
conversations with neighbourhood management officers during my fieldwork and 
was raised by one neighbourhood chair: ‘you know we’ve got £21,000 left in 
ours out of £35,000. I think for people, its put a lot of people off from coming to 
the table’.  My immersion within the policy and partnership team also revealed 
that the neighbourhood management officers were critical of the amount of 
paperwork in that it occupied to much of their time, kept them in the central 
council offices and stopped them from engaging in activities that they perceived 
to be more beneficial.  
These discussions of the neighbourhood management teams demonstrate how 
they have been beneficial in improving the communication between practitioners 
from different organisations at the local level. However there is evidence that 
partnership agendas around community safety within these areas have become 
marginalised. This marginalisation of community safety within the 
neighbourhood management teams was connected with the broadening of the 
remit of the neighbourhood management teams. Under these conditions greater 
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dependency has been placed upon the neighbourhood chairs as important ‘people 
pieces’ (Foster, 2002) in dictating the development of local partnership agendas. 
This breadth of remit, combined with the dependency on the neighbourhood 
chairs, and the absence of dedicated support previously provided by the 
community safety team, had a varied impact upon community safety work in 
these areas. Some areas demonstrated an absence of partnership agenda around 
community safety resulting in the delegation of responses to crime and disorder 
to the police alone. In others areas there was evidence of local partnership 
agendas that were consistent with the transformative aims of the ‘What Matters’ 
strategy. Recognising this dependency on the neighbourhood chairs, there have 
been attempts within the Cardiff Partnership Board to reframe the role of 
neighbourhood ‘management’ towards neighbourhood ‘partnership’. This 
entailed an increased emphasis on community engagement and greater input from 
local elected councillors. However, given the early stages of this change it was 
apparent in this research that the neighbourhood management teams, were still 
highly reliant on the neighbourhood chairs and were still engaged in the 
management of neighbourhoods.  
6.6 CONCLUSION 
In summary, the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board and the mainstreaming 
of community safety had substantial implications for the schemes of cooperation 
for partnership working around crime, disorder and safety. The abolition of the 
community safety partnership, and the co-location arrangements it provided, had 
presented additional barriers to partnership working, and the reduction in the 
organisational and informational resources available for community safety work. 
Resulting from this, partnership practices at an occupational level had become 
increasingly dependent upon their lead officers. In the case of the workstream 
activities, this was the workstream activity lead, and in the neighbourhood 
management teams these were the neighbourhood chairs.  
Within the workstream activities, the dependency upon the workstream leads 
meant that there were varying levels of success in promoting cooperation from 
partner organisations. Due to the strong leadership provided within the human 
exploitation workstream, and the lack of contestation over that agenda, the 
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workstream lead was able to promote partnership activity by developing 
professional relationships with practitioners at a local level. Furthermore, due to 
the discretion afforded to the workstream lead, they were able to pursue a more 
progressive and transformative agenda for this work. Conversely, the 
workstreams relating to domestic violence and anti-social behaviour represented 
a more contested partnership arrangement, evidenced in competition for funding 
between the domestic service providers, and divergent practices between the 
police and the council over anti-social behaviour. Attempts to engage the private 
sector within the night-time economy and the Protect and Prepare strands of the 
CONTEST board, were limited due to the constraints of needing to attract private 
sector investment in the city. As a result cooperation with the private sector was 
limited to the proliferation of situational prevention methods to identify and 
mitigate risks in line with a developmental agenda.  
Similarly, within the neighbourhood management teams, the continued control of 
the neighbourhood management chairs meant that partnership practices within 
those areas were contingent upon the expertise and knowledge that each 
neighbourhood chair brought to the table. As a result, two neighbourhood 
management teams possessed agendas that sought more holistic approaches to 
responding to issues of crime and disorder. In one instance this was due to the 
capacity of one of the chairs as a partnership manager who was well versed in 
promoting partnership practices, in the other area the occupational background 
facilitated an agenda around community engagement. In the other neighbourhood 
management areas, coherent partnership agendas for crime and disorder were less 
prevalent, either resulting from a lack of perceived issues in the area or through a 
delegation of responsibility to the police to take the lead on local responses to 
crime and disorder.  
Consistent in both cases, was that without the operational support previously 
provided by the community safety team, the workstream activities and the 
neighbourhood management teams, had become isolated pockets of activity. This 
development of discrete partnership units had resulted in pursuit of diverging 
agendas and approaches to achieving partnership work with little sense of shared 
purpose. Considering the commitment to strategic governance and the delivery of 
the shared agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy, this variance of operational 
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activity is problematic. This discord between the strategic ambitions of the 
Cardiff Partnership Board and the operational practices of the workstream 
activities and the neighbourhood management teams indicates a collapsing of the 
schemes of cooperation in the city. This collapse of the schemes of cooperation 
for community safety work can be understood in relation to the dismantling of 
the community safety infrastructure in the city and the bureaucratised model of 
support it provided. In its absence, this chapter has shown how a more 
individualised model of partnership work has emerged. The implications of this 
degradation of the bureaucratised model of cooperation provoke important 
questions about the value of bureaucratic authority for local governance (Du Gay, 
2000), and the nature of the governing regime in Cardiff, as will be discussed in 
the discussion chapter. 
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7. DISCUSSION: THE CARDIFF REGIME 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The principal aim of this research was to examine the impact of Coalition 
Government policies of austerity upon community safety in Cardiff. Given the 
uncertainty in existing literature (Gilling et al., 2013; Fox et al., 2011) this research 
provides a critical test of four theoretical propositions drawn from this literature 
that posit a number of possible scenarios for community safety in an age of 
austerity. These propositions, outlined on pages 34-46, were used to guide the 
research and provided analytical points of reference for the examination of the 
Cardiff regime. These propositions will now be discussed in relation to my 
findings.  Below is a summary of the main findings of this research: 
i. At a rhetorical level, the Cardiff regime is characterised by a positive 
narrative of adaptation and progression in relation to the governing 
arrangements, and the pursuit of a transformative strategic agenda.  
ii. In practice, the operational activities of the neighbourhood management 
teams and the safer and cohesive communities programme board 
workstream are disparate and varied encompassing a wide range of 
operational agendas that stand in contrast to the rhetoric of a strategic 
agenda and shared delivery. 
iii. The disparity between the rhetoric of the governing regime and the reality 
of operational practice indicates the failure of the Cardiff regime to 
mobilise cooperation around the strategic agendas, and highlights the 
challenges of forming and sustaining a stable governing regime around 
transformative agendas in periods of austerity. 
iv. The failure of the Cardiff regime to realise its strategic agenda can be 
attributed to changes to the governing arrangements and the subsequent 
degradation of governing capacity for community safety, posing 
fundamental problems for the coordination and support of community 
safety work.  
These findings make an important contribution to our understanding of the 
localised and devolved period of community safety within England and Wales. 
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They shed light on how the Cardiff regime has reformed the local governing 
arrangements in pursuit of a transformative agenda, and the factors that have 
inhibited and frustrated the realisation of this agenda. This work also highlights the 
value of regime theory and case study research, in facilitating the recognition of the 
role of locally situated actors in actively determining how local governing agendas 
and arrangements are constructed in response to external political and economic 
constraints.   
This chapter is organised into three principal components. Firstly, the key findings 
are explored and considered in relation to the extant literature and propositions 
outlined in Chapter 2 (sections 7.2) and a fundamental distinction is made between 
the policy talk of the Cardiff regime and policy action (section 7.3). Secondly, this 
discussion considers how regime theory helps us better understand the pressures 
facing community safety (section 7.5) and the reasons that Cardiff can be seen as 
an example of regime failure (section 7.4). The third and final part of the chapter 
considers the analytic contribution of Cardiff to regime theory (section 7.6) and the 
methodological considerations, limitations, and next steps for this research (section 
7.7). 
7.2 THE RHETORIC OF THE REGIME: RADICAL CHANGE, STRATEGIC 
AMBITIONS AND A TRANSFORMATIVE AGENDA 
The first findings chapter (Chapter 4) provided an overview of the evolution of the 
governing arrangements in Cardiff, and, importantly for this thesis, the integration 
of the community safety partnership into the newly introduced integrated 
partnership structure of the Cardiff Partnership Board. This integration represented 
a radical reform to local governing arrangements, and a key juncture for the 
structuring of local governance in the city. Prior to this integration, Cardiff, along 
with other local authorities, had seen the gradual expansion of the community 
safety infrastructure and the development of specialist expertise around community 
safety (Hughes and Gilling, 2004; Edwards et al. 2007).  Indeed, the size of the 
community safety infrastructure in Cardiff during the national mandatory period 
could be described as a ‘maximal’ model (Edwards et al., 2007). As Edwards et al. 
note, maximal models of community safety benefitted from sizeable resources, and 
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were able to facilitate local partnership work for crime and disorder. Accordingly, 
community safety managers responsible for these larger community safety teams 
had access to significant governing resources that granted greater leverage in 
negotiating cooperation and engagement from other partner organisations for the 
pursuit of local community safety work (2007: 20).  
The disappearance of the sizable community safety infrastructure in Cardiff is 
therefore noteworthy. It raises questions about how partnership work around 
community safety could continue to be organised and incentivised.  However, as 
we have seen, the rationale for this change to the governing arrangements was not 
presented as a necessity resulting from austerity, but rather as a way to reduce 
complexity, improve efficiency, and deliver more holistic and joined up public 
services (Faulkner 2012).  This idea that simplification would lead to improvement 
is consistent with the recommendations of the Beecham inquiry (2006) that 
advocated a fundamental simplification of partnership arrangements to facilitate 
the wider engagement of partner organisations. More specifically, it has been noted 
that under New Labour, community safety arrangements had been dominated by 
the local police (Crawford and Evans, 2012), which, it can be argued, contributed 
to the ghettoization of community safety as ‘narrowly focussed crime prevention of 
one sort or another’ (Wiles and Pease, 2000: 25) and limited wider engagement.  
The integration of community safety into the Cardiff Partnership Board, therefore, 
was based on the premise that it would allow for the effective sharing of 
responsibility for community safety across agencies and directorates, and would 
reduce the dominance of the police. It was also argued that this redistribution of 
responsibility would facilitate greater collective action on issues of crime, disorder, 
and safety, and would allow for a more progressive and transformative governing 
agenda. This message was pervasive through the ‘What Matters’ strategy, where it 
was argued that the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board would facilitate a 
shared responsibility for social problems, and would enable the joined up delivery 
a single shared governing agenda. This attempt to mobilise a holistic response to 
social problems was evident within the ‘What Matters‘ strategy which 
foregrounded issues of inequality and social inclusion, in an attempt to appeal to 
what Stone (2005) refers to as, ‘broad purposes’ as a way of mobilising collection 
action. As Stone notes ‘the politics of investment-for example, of establishing 
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governing arrangements- requires bringing together substantial resources, both 
tangible and intangible, from a variety of players. Broad purposes deemed to be 
socially worth play a vital part’ (2005: 318-319).  
In addition to its role of appealing to a broad purpose agenda to mobilise 
cooperation, the emphasis on addressing social inequalities and promoting social 
inclusion is of further significance for the research as it denotes a transformative 
governing agenda with Cardiff (Edwards and Hughes, 2012: Edwards and Prins, 
2014).  Consistent with the ideals of shared delivery and responsibility, the task of 
addressing these inequalities was not allocated to any one agency or directorate, 
but rather was presented as a shared problem to which collective action was 
required. This sense of common purpose was distilled into seven ‘shared 
outcomes’ designed to cross organisational boundaries to further incentivise 
cooperation. Crime and disorder fell under the broader shared outcome of ‘people 
feel safe and are safe’. The conceptualisation of crime and disorder as a subsidiary 
concern to wider issues of safety is a key departure from the New Labour agenda, 
which saw safety subordinated as an issue of crime and disorder policy (Hughes, 
2002).  
The transformative narrative of the Cardiff regime was further evidenced in 
Chapter 5 through the establishment of a more diverse agenda that moved 
community safety beyond the explicit focus on crime and disorder (Wiles and 
Pease, 2000) to encompass broader notions of safety and exploitation.  The ‘What 
Matters’ strategy represents a substantial shift away from community safety 
agendas under New Labour, and points to the opportunities of localism and the 
greater agency afforded to local actors in pursuing more radical agendas for 
community safety. As recounted in Chapter 2, under New Labour community 
safety was part of a moral authoritarian communitarianism (Hughes, 2007), which 
foregrounded the role of local state apparatus in promoting stronger communities 
‘backed up by an authoritarian state’ (Gilling, 2007: 45). The emphasis on social 
justice and the shift in rhetoric towards a more inclusive agenda in Cardiff 
represents a departure from this moral authoritarian model of communitarianism, 
and is reminiscent of Hughes’ identification of a more progressive model of 
communitarianism, that of ‘civic and inclusive safe cities’ (1998: 146). This model, 
in foregrounding the ideals of social democratic participation and principles of 
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social inclusion (Hughes 1998), is consistent with the strategic agenda of the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy.  
According to the official policy discourse of the Cardiff Partnership Board, there is 
a clear commitment to a more transformative agenda orientated around ideas of 
social justice, social inclusion, and civic engagement. Radical changes to existing 
governing arrangements, through the integration of partnership structures, were 
presented as pivotal in facilitating this strategic aim. Freed from the intensive 
management of the local delivery of community safety under the New Labour 
Government (Gilling, 2007), the Cardiff Partnership Board has committed to 
pursuing a local governing agenda oriented around principles of social justice. It is 
clear that changes to local governing arrangements and the pursuit of a more 
transformative agenda are intrinsically linked within the Cardiff regime.  
In summary, the rhetorical narrative presented by the Cardiff Partnership Board 
best aligns with the fourth proposition outlined in Chapter 2. This proposition 
stated that the opportunities presented by localism would open up space for the 
pursuit of transformative agendas.  The strategic governing agenda in Cardiff has 
been labelled as transformative because it appeals to social justice and social 
inclusion. This distinguishes it from other governing regimes, notably the 
developmental agenda that arose in London under the stewardship of Mayor Boris 
Johnson (Edwards and Prins, 2014). As already discussed, the integration of 
partnership structures into the Cardiff Partnership Board was presented as a key 
mechanism for the realisation of this agenda rather than as a response to conditions 
of austerity and reducing financial resources. 
However, the validity of this narrative has been undermined throughout Chapters 
4-6, through an exploration of the ways in which the repositioning of community 
safety has contributed to the dismantling of community safety infrastructure within 
the city.  This has coincided with the diffusion of responsibility for community 
safety, which is notable when considering the key role formerly played by the 
community safety team in negotiating and facilitating cooperation with others 
actors.  Taken together, these changes fundamentally challenge the sustainability of 
a coherent community safety agenda, let alone more progressive and 
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transformative agendas for community safety work. This is the topic of the next 
section of this discussion.  
7.3 THE REGIME IN REALITY: OPERATIONAL ISOLATION AND 
DIVERGENT AGENDAS  
Building upon the work of both Pollitt (2001) and Brunsson (1989), this research 
sought to identify how and if the policy narrative of the Cardiff Partnership Board 
was being realised in operational practice through intensive ethnographic 
fieldwork. This fieldwork brought to light significant discrepancies between the 
narratives of the ‘What Matters’ strategy and the operational realities of the 
delivery of the community safety agenda. Instead of the coherent strategic agenda 
offered in the ‘What Matters’ strategy, in practice, the delivery of community 
safety work was characterised by operational variance and disparate agendas. This 
variance exemplifies the inability of the Cardiff Partnership Board to induce 
cooperation around the coherent shared agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy and 
challenges of using appeals to ‘broad purpose’ agendas (Stone, 2005) in times of 
more pressing and immediate concerns, such as those posed by austerity measures 
(Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). 
Returning to the propositions outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 can help us to interpret 
this variance. Proposition one laid out the potential for the degradation of 
partnership activity and a reversion back to police driven maintenance agendas. 
Proposition two speculated that reducing resources may lead to an increased 
emphasis on risk management and ‘smarter governance’. Proposition three 
envisioned the prospect of governing agendas organised around restorative justice, 
enabled by the greater engagement of the voluntary and community sectors. The 
fourth proposition, as already touched upon, explored the potential for 
transformative social justice agendas through the radical adaptation of local 
governing arrangements.  
At the level of policy talk, there was a clear parity with proposition four. However, 
at the level of operational practice, none of these four propositions is dominant. 
Contrary to the concerns of Lowndes and Pratchett (2012) summarised in 
proposition one, it cannot be said that partnership work around community safety 
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in Cardiff has degraded to the point that there has been a return to silo working and 
a reassertion of a maintenance agenda. That is not to say that elements of Lowdnes 
and Pratchett’s (2012) assertions are not apparent: while partnership work was 
valued and ongoing within the workstreams and the neighbourhood management 
teams, it was evident that partnership work around more routine criminality was 
less prevalent, with volume crime being framed as the responsibility of the police 
alone. Some neighbourhood management teams lacked a clear partnership agenda 
for crime and disorder, and as a result, issues of crime, disorder and safety were 
left to the police.  
Equally, it cannot be said that the operational practice of community safety is 
wholly reflective of proposition two, which was premised on the dominance of 
ideas of risk management and smarter governance through the targeted provision of 
services, as apparent in London (Edwards and Prins, 2014). Certain activities did 
demonstrate a preoccupation with risk, most obviously seen in the counter 
terrorism agenda of the CONTEST strategy. The ‘prevent’ strand of this strategy 
was entirely organised around principles of risk management through the 
identification of those at risk of radicalisation, and the reduction of that risk 
through the Channel project, an intensive ‘deradicalisation’ programme aimed to 
counter radical ideologies.  Likewise, the ‘protect’ and ‘prepare’ strands were 
unequivocally structured around ideas of situational risk management through the 
identification of vulnerabilities and the development of strategies to mitigate risk.  
This emphasis on risk within the CONTEST strategy cannot be attributed solely to 
the Cardiff Partnership Board, but rather reflects the broader preoccupation with 
risk in the national counter terrorism policies.  That being said, this fieldwork also 
identified examples of risk management in more locally produced agendas. For 
example, it is clear that the management of the night-time economy in Cardiff is 
heavily influenced by ideas of risk management. This is visible in the extensive use 
of surveillance techniques and the coercion of business practices through licensing 
boards. Variation also emerged in the way that particular actors, working around 
the same priority, responded to anti-social behaviour. While the approach of local 
authority actors was consistent with principles of restorative justice, the police 
response centred on ideas of risk management, the exclusion of problematic 
individuals from the city centre, and the smarter allocation of resources through 
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targeted patrols (Edwards and Hughes, 2012; Edwards and Prins, 2014; Taylor, 
Higgins and Francis, 2015).  
The fieldwork revealed a similarly patchy operational alignment to the third 
proposition, that of the pursuit of progressive agendas around restorative justice.  
Principles of restorative justice are evident in operational responses to sex work in 
the city, which sought to divert those involved in sex work away from the criminal 
justice system.  As has already been seen, in contrast to the police response, which 
centred on risk management, Cardiff Council’s approach to anti-social behaviour 
was underpinned by restorative ideals. It prioritised the facilitation of resolution 
and reconciliation between perpetrators and victims of anti-social behaviour. 
Within the neighbourhood management teams specific examples of restorative 
approaches in practice were limited, but there was evidence of appeals to 
restorative justice within neighbourhood action plans and the integration of 
neighbourhood resolution panels. Therefore, despite the intention of becoming a 
‘restorative city’ stated in the ‘What Matters’ strategy, a clear concerted agenda 
around ideals of restorative justice and diversion was absent within the operational 
practices of the Cardiff Partnership Board. 
In terms of the final proposition, that of transformative agendas and the 
foregrounding of issues of social inclusion, equality, and civic engagement, again 
these ideals were somewhat reflected in operational practices, but were far from 
routine and far from embedded. At one level, ideas of social inclusion in local 
democratic processes could be seen in the public engagement exercise of the 
Cardiff Debate. This was framed as a way of promoting public participation in 
local decision-making. However, conversations with policy officers and research 
officers suggest that the Cardiff Debate also served as a vehicle for bolstering local 
political resources for the defence of future funding cuts and future decisions about 
who should deliver public services. The aspirations of equal opportunity and access 
foregrounded in the ‘What Matters’ strategy have also been undermined by 
austerity and the associated cuts to sports, leisure and culture facilities in the city. 
A number of practitioners participating in this research noted their concerns about 
the impacts of these cuts upon young and disadvantaged people in the city.  
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At an operational level, the presence of the transformative agenda is sparse. Within 
the safer and cohesive communities programme board, examples of transformative 
ideals around social justice were limited, and only the workstream concerned with 
reducing human exploitation was discussed in these terms. Here, responses to sex 
work were not only diversionary, but also sought to actively identify and address 
the multiple barriers to other forms of employment faced by sex workers. These 
were wide-ranging and included housing, education, health, and substance misuse 
issues.  In seeking to move beyond the more immediate causal conditions of human 
exploitation, the agenda was beginning to encompass issues of social care, and the 
status of looked after children, as potential pathways into exploitation. However, 
within the neighbourhood management teams, only two of the six teams presented 
agendas that were consistent with the ideals of social justice and inclusion. One of 
these teams placed significant emphasis on civic engagement, co-production and 
working with communities, as exemplified in its response to the problem of 
motorcycle annoyance. The other team viewed local approaches to crime and 
disorder as the outcome of effective solutions to broader social issues relating to 
the environment, children and young people. This was evident in the inclusive 
framing of these issues by the neighbourhood chair and within the neighbourhood 
action plan.  
What we’re seeing is that despite the appeals to strategic thinking, shared 
outcomes, and more joined up delivery, the operational practices of community 
safety are discordant with this aim. While the governing agenda of the Cardiff 
Partnership Board presented a strategic vision organised principally around ideas 
of social justice and community engagement, in keeping with a transformative 
agenda, in practice this vision has been eschewed in favour of a diverse and 
divergent suite of operational agendas. These agendas range from developmental 
agendas orientated around ideas of risk, to transformative agendas targeting the 
social causes of crime and the engagement of citizens.  
7.4 COMMUNITY SAFETY AND THE CARDIFF REGIME  
It is fundamentally clear that the state of community safety in Cardiff during the 
period of fieldwork does not represent a retrenchment of partnership activity (as 
speculated by Lowndes and Pratchett 2012), at either the rhetorical or operational 
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level.  In fact, this research indicates that despite the fragmentation of community 
safety work, partnership working was still valued at both a strategic level, through 
the Cardiff Partnership Board, and at an operational level within the workstream 
activities and the neighbourhood management teams.  In line with arguments made 
by Houghton (2012) and O’Neil and McCarthy (2013), practitioners in this study 
surmised that a key incentive for partnership engagement and activity was the 
perceived potential for improved effectiveness and efficiency.  The neighbourhood 
management chairs also postulated that the changes made around neighbourhood 
management had facilitated local partnership work by developing professional 
contacts at the local level. One practitioner described this as a ‘flattening out’ of 
partnership knowledge and practice. These findings demonstrate that the pressures 
of austerity have not led to the abandonment of partnership activity around 
community safety, and that partnership work continues to be regarded as a valuable 
and effective way of working. However, that is not to say that the changes to the 
governing arrangements have not entailed a degradation of governing capacity for 
community safety in the city.  
To summarise, while partnership working has continued, the Cardiff regime has 
been unable to realise its transformative governing agenda outlined within the 
‘What Matters’ strategy and a disparity between rhetoric and operational practices 
has emerged. The rhetoric of social justice, civic engagement and social inclusion 
is reminiscent of the early aspirations for social crime prevention and Hughes’ 
description of a more progressive model of communitarianism around civic and 
inclusive safe cities (1998: 146). This is significant given the historical context of 
community safety in which, arguably, the more progressive and transformative 
potential of community safety work was stifled during the national mandatory 
period. Under New Labour the centralised control of community safety through 
intensive target setting, performance management and the principles of public 
management (Gilling, 2007) resulted in the dominance of developmental 
community safety agendas. Therefore the policies of localism and the greater 
agency afforded to local actors has opened up opportunities for more progressive 
and transformative agendas which seek not only to work within or augment 
criminal justice policy, but also to fundamentally alter how crime, disorder and 
safety is governed.  
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Counterpoised to this transformative rhetoric for community safety and the 
ambitions of strategic governance, the operational practices of community safety 
within the Cardiff regime present a more complex and variegated picture. This 
raises a fundamental point in relation to regime theory: a transformative regime is 
not merely the pursuit of a governing agenda organised around principles of social 
justice, but rather requires the mobilisation of resources and cooperation to realise 
that agenda. Therefore, the success of the Cardiff regime is dependent upon its 
ability to effectively encourage cooperation across the disparate aspects of 
operational practice and the more contested arenas of local delivery where more 
immediate concerns may take priority.  The discord between the unified rhetoric of 
the governing agenda and the varied operational practices discussed above is 
indicative of regime failure.  
In spite of a coherent and consistent governing agenda organised around the 
principles of social justice and social inclusion, the operational delivery of 
community safety work was characterised by multiple and divergent operational 
agendas with little indication of a shared and coherent strategic agenda. Therefore 
in practice what is evident in Cardiff is the fragmentation of community safety 
work into a number of discrete partnership projects, organised around specific 
citywide priorities or particular geographic territories.  
Given the ambitions of strategically led governance and the emphasis on joined up 
delivery and shared outcomes, this discrepancy between the strategic agenda of the 
‘What Matters’ strategy and the isolated project activity of operational practice is 
significant. With the ‘What Matters’ strategy we have the rhetoric of a governing 
agenda, but in the diverging operational practices it is evident that there has not 
been an effective mobilisation of cooperation around the objectives and outcomes 
of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. Relating back to the work of Stone (2005) and his 
discussion of the use of ‘broad purposes’ agendas in mobilising cooperation, it is 
clear that in Cardiff, the appeals of the ‘broad purpose’ agenda in the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy have been marginalised by the more immediate concerns of the 
operational practices. The lure of the more immediate concerns facing operational 
practitioners is unsurprising, for as Stone asserts ‘under the constraints of bounded 
rationality, human beings are focused on what is immediate’ and ‘it is easier to 
imagine one’s role and potential in a small purpose than a large one’ (Stone, 2005: 
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319) This discrepancy between the policy rhetoric and the operational practice is 
important in itself as it indicates the need for empirical research to consider not just 
the policy talk of governing regimes, but also to examine how and if the talk of 
governing regimes is translating into coherent delivery of governing agendas. 
Moreover, it opens up a discussion about the factors inhibiting the mobilisation of 
partnership working and the cooperation of governing actors around the strategic 
agenda.   
7.5 REASONS FOR FAILURE  
Given the challenges outlined in the literature review (Chapter 2), the outcome of 
regime failure in the Cardiff context is perhaps unsurprising. Indeed, as Edwards 
and Hughes (2012) point out, the prospect of regime failure is often a likely 
scenario given the challenges of mobilising activity around more radical agendas. 
It is here that the explanatory power of regime theory really comes to the fore in 
enabling an exploration of the reasons behind regime failure in this case study.  As 
has already been highlighted, this is the fundamental contribution that regime 
theory can make to discussions of local governance (Edwards and Prins, 2014).  
Given the focus of this research, it might be tempting to conclude that the failure of 
the Cardiff regime is reducible to austerity alone. However, this in itself is not 
enough to explain the disparity between the rhetoric and practice of community 
safety in Cardiff. Focussing on austerity alone obscures the agency available to 
local political actors in choosing how to respond to external conditions, as these 
responses are not predetermined (Edwards and Hughes 2012).  Therefore it is 
necessary to consider other factors that have inhibited the mobilisation of 
cooperation around the ‘What Matters’ strategy and its realisation in practice. In 
seeking to understand the failure of the Cardiff regime it is necessary to consider 
the changes to the governing arrangements and the impact that has had on the 
organisational and informational resources available to community safety work in 
Cardiff. In looking to explain regime failure in Cardiff, attention needs to be drawn 
to three factors: the absence of operational responsibility and oversight for 
community safety work, the degradation of community safety expertise and the 
increased importance of individual agency within operational practice. These three 
factors are discussed, in turn, below.  
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7.5.1 OVERSIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY 
As we have seen, while there was a clear transformative governing agenda for 
community safety in Cardiff at the strategic level, and a capacity and willingness to 
engage in partnership practices at an operational level, the integration and de facto 
removal of the community safety team meant that there was an absence of 
operational responsibility for community safety. As discussed in Chapter 4, under 
the previous governing arrangements the community safety team could be 
considered an example of Edwards et al.’s ‘maximal’ community safety structure 
(2007). This multi-agency team included staff dedicated to community safety 
work, ranging from operational support to more strategic roles entailing the 
operational oversight and coordination of community safety activity. The 
importance of multi-agency teams and the support and coordination functions they 
provide was recognised in two Home Office research reports which made 
recommendations around good practice in partnership working (Berry et al., 2009; 
Turley et al., 2012).  
Therefore, the dismantling of the community safety infrastructure as part of the 
creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board raises questions about the locus of 
responsibility and oversight for community safety work and how cooperation 
around community safety was incentivised under the new arrangements. Following 
the disappearance of the community safety team, responsibility for community 
safety became diffused, and subsequently coalesced upon the lead practitioners for 
the workstream activities and the neighbourhood management teams, who 
undertake these roles in addition to their day-to-day occupation. These individuals 
come from numerous occupational backgrounds spanning many organisations, and 
bring with them a range of vastly divergent experiences and expertise, which may 
not have relevance to community safety.  It is apparent that without dedicated 
community safety support, operational practices under these lead practitioners have 
become isolated pockets of partnership activity. Left to themselves to determine 
operational agendas, the lead practitioners have developed disparate operational 
practices.  
The new governing arrangements in Cardiff, and the associated degradation of 
organisational resources, are a significant problem for the realisation of the 
transformative agenda of the Cardiff Partnership Board.  Under these new 
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arrangements the coordination of local community safety practice has been 
undermined.  While quarterly meetings take place within the programme boards for 
the safer and cohesive communities programme board and the Neighbourhood 
Management team, the day-to-day coordination of community safety activity is 
absent.  This impacts upon the coordination of both operational agendas and 
partnership activity within and between operational partnerships.  This 
coordinating role, formerly provided by members of the community safety team, 
has been discussed by Hughes and Gilling (2004) in their study of the habitus of 
community safety officers, and by Edwards et al. (2007) in their discussion of 
‘maximal’ models of community safety. A key role performed by community 
safety managers, identified by Hughes and Gilling (2004), was the ability to 
identify potential overlaps of practice between different organisations and 
partnership groups, and the skills and capacity to incentivise cooperation between 
these groups.  For Edwards et al. (2007), the seniority of the community safety 
manager in ‘maximal’ community safety teams meant that they carried enough 
weight and power to push community safety as an agenda item, and to encourage 
cooperation from senior decision makers in partner organisations.   
Under the new arrangements, the identification and pursuit of potential avenues of 
collaboration has been left to the operational leads.  For some more entrepreneurial 
operational leads, this was possible at an operational level, but required a 
significant investment of time and resources to develop the relationships needed to 
facilitate collaboration. Such commitment was not possible in all cases, and many 
workstream leads accepted that they did not have the capacity or ability to identify 
potential collaborations, let alone commit the time and resources needed to 
facilitate cooperation. The establishment of collaborations was therefore highly 
dependent upon the motivation and ability of the individual.  These issues were 
compounded by a lack of central responsibility: the absence of a community safety 
team and manager added barriers to the facilitation of cooperation, and made the 
negotiation and navigation of the disparate but related elements of practice 
undertaken by the range of actors operating within Cardiff more challenging. 
7.5.2 COMMUNITY SAFETY EXPERTISE  
In addition to the deficits of oversight, responsibility, and coordination, the 
dismantling of the community safety team, has also led to a degradation of 
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community safety expertise in the city. Since the establishment of multi-agency 
partnership teams in light of the statutory duty set out in the Crime and Disorder 
Act, the emergence of a distinct professional identity and professional expertise for 
community safety has been frequently noted (Edwards and Hughes, 2002; Hughes 
and Gilling, 2004; Edwards et al., 2007). Although still contested, this expertise 
entails a breadth knowledge of the policy context of local government and 
community safety; from techniques for the social and situational prevention of 
crime and disorder to knowledge of communities and organisational culture, 
change and management. Community safety work is predicated on a number of 
specific skills for utilising this knowledge to affect change. These include 
facilitating cooperation through communication and negotiation with actors from 
various partner organisations.  
This expertise, and the skills and knowledge it included, are important considering 
that this research is concerned with understanding how partnership work is 
mobilised and how conflicting interests are negotiated. Clearly, a substantial 
component of this expertise is geared towards facilitating partnership working: 
through being cognisant of the different interests and power relationships within 
local governing arrangements, and how this awareness can be used to incentivise 
engagement and cooperation for community safety work.  Recognising the distinct 
expertise of community safety practitioners is important when considering the 
changes in Cardiff, which have led to their disappearance, and replacement with 
generalist partnership officers. While a few of the old community safety team 
remained within the partnership team, the majority of the partnership officers had 
no experience of community safety, were unfamiliar with its policy context, and 
lacked the specific knowledge of techniques to prevent and reduce crime.  This 
shift from dedicated community safety officer to a more generalist function 
represents a substantial degradation of community safety expertise and the 
informational resources it provides. This is not just a problem in the short term, as 
it represents a collapse of institutional memory within local government for 
community safety work as a particular area of policy expertise. This poses 
challenges in the longer term, in a time post austerity, when attempting to rebuild 
governing capacity around community safety, as there will be no expertise or 
capacity on which to develop. 
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As a result, the operational leads of the workstreams and neighbourhood 
management teams have had to operate without the technical expertise formerly 
provided by the community safety team. The significance of this was evidenced 
through the exploration of the variations in operational practice in Chapter 6.  The 
salience of this absence was particularly evident within the neighbourhood 
management teams, given their broad remit and the varying occupational 
backgrounds of each neighbourhood chair. There was some acknowledgement, by 
members of the partnership team and some of the neighbourhood chairs 
themselves, that some neighbourhood managers had little experience of community 
safety or of approaches to responding to crime and disorder.  In some of the 
neighbourhood management teams, this lack of expertise, combined with the 
absence of dedicated community safety support, resulted in a delegation of 
responsibility for responding to crime and disorder to the police alone. Similarly, 
while the operational leads of the specific workstream activities within the safer 
and cohesive communities programme board were typically well versed in their 
field, the broader policy context of community safety within Cardiff did not form 
part of their considerations. In these cases, while the lead practitioners were able to 
influence change within the existing partnership arrangements, the potential 
identification of new avenues of cooperation was limited by practitioners’ 
awareness of the broader structures and context of local service delivery.  
This degradation of community safety expertise is a fundamental problem inherent 
within the argument of mainstreaming and integration adopted by the Cardiff 
Partnership Board. As made clear by Moss and Pease (1999), advocates of 
mainstreaming seek to diffuse responsibility for community safety across 
governing actors.  As this research demonstrates, this diffusion necessarily 
obfuscates the potential for the development of community safety expertise, as 
there is no site or responsibility for its development. The consequence of this, in 
Cardiff, is the degradation of the informational and organisational resources 
afforded to community safety as a policy agenda within the Cardiff Partnership 
Board, and the loss of the expertise, and associated skills and knowledge, that 
facilitated cooperation between local governing actors for community safety work. 
Therefore, when considering the failure of the Cardiff regime to effectively 
 224 
mobilise cooperation around the strategic agenda for community safety, the 
degradation of this expertise is an important facet of this story. 
7.5.3 INDIVIDUALISATION OF RESPONSIBILITY 
The loss of operational responsibility and oversight and the degradation of 
community safety expertise in Cardiff have meant that greater pressure has been 
placed upon the operational leads of the workstream activities and the 
neighbourhood management teams. Indeed, a common refrain amongst participants 
was that the absence of strategic direction meant that operational delivery was 
highly dependent upon decisions made by lead practitioners. This indicates, then, 
that current governing arrangements have placed greater importance upon the 
individual agency of lead practitioners. Additionally, due to the absence of the 
community safety team, the governing structures of the Cardiff Partnership Board 
play a more minimal role in influencing operational practice.  The greater 
responsibility and discretion afforded to the operational leads enabled them more 
flexibility to pursue operational agendas of their own choosing. This operational 
discretion has opened up opportunities for more progressive and transformative 
agendas driven by some local practitioners, but has resulted in the pursuit of more 
developmental agendas by others.  
This operational discretion, and the subsequent variance of operational agendas, is 
linked to the structuring of the partnership arrangements in Cardiff and the 
diffusion of responsibility for community safety. As previously discussed, in place 
of the specialist expertise of the community safety officer, responsibility for issues 
of crime and disorder have been placed upon individuals with varying occupational 
backgrounds. Examples of this include: an individual with a background in housing 
management becoming the local authority lead for anti-social behaviour, and 
various neighbourhood management teams led by health practitioners, housing 
officers and senior managers from various council departments.  This diversity of 
actors taking responsibility for issues of community safety is important. Although 
diversity brings with it a wide range of skills and knowledge that could challenge 
narrow definitions of crime prevention, the occupational backgrounds of these 
actors also meant that they had negligible understandings of community safety and 
crime prevention. Whereas, previously, this diverse expertise was supplemented by 
dedicated community safety expertise and support, the disbanding of the 
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community safety team has placed greater pressure on individuals to take 
responsibility for the local of delivery community safety.  This helps us to 
understand the emergence of contrasting agendas, and in some cases, the buck-
passing of responsibility to the police.  
Furthermore, greater reliance upon individual agency has opened existing 
partnership arrangements up to significant levels of risk. This is due to increased 
reliance on the social capital and professional networks developed by individuals, 
and the danger that this knowledge would be lost should they vacate the role. This 
risk is not new to community safety; indeed partnership practices and effective 
cooperation have often been contingent upon particular ‘people pieces’ (Foster, 
2002), and key individuals and the social capital that they possess (Crawford and 
Evans, 2012).   However, the greater reliance on lead practitioners without the 
support of a community safety team intensifies this risk.   
7.5.4 DEGRADING GOVERNING CAPACITY 
It is evident that the rhetoric of progression and reduced complexity in Cardiff 
conceals a significant reduction to the governing resources afforded to community 
safety. The creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board has resulted in the 
degradation of governing capacity for community safety work, visible in the 
discordant practices of the various operational teams. This degradation is critical in 
understanding why the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy has failed to 
be realised in practice. These findings regarding the adaptations of the governing 
arrangements in Cardiff and their effects on the delivery of community safety work 
in times of austerity resonate with the claims of Gilling et al.:  
In some areas the CSP [Community Safety Partnership] 
model has been effectively abandoned as cash-strapped 
local authorities seek only minimal compliance with 
section 17 of the CDA [Crime and Disorder Act], which 
legally requires local authorities to mainstream crime and 
disorder reduction across their routine activities 
Gilling et al., 2013: 329-330 
It may be cynical to state that the positive narratives around the integrated 
partnership arrangements and the mainstreaming of community safety adopted by 
the Cardiff regime represent attempts to disguise the degradation of community 
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safety and minimal compliance with statutory legislation. Indeed, the changes 
adopted within Cardiff may represent a genuine attempt to take advantage of the 
opportunities presented by localism, to implement radical change and to realise 
more progressive and transformative agendas.  It is beyond the capacity of this 
research to make judgements about the intentions behind changes to the governing 
regime in Cardiff, so the discussion necessarily focuses on the outcomes of these 
changes instead.   
In Cardiff, changes implemented under the guise of mainstreaming and integration 
have not resulted in more effective joined up approaches to local governance, in 
fact, they have adversely effected the governing capacity for community safety. 
Indeed, the incorporation of the community safety partnership into the integrated 
partnership structure has resulted in the loss of responsibility and expertise around 
community safety, leaving those involved in the delivery of community safety 
work isolated, fragmented and without operational support. This fragmentation and 
lack of operational oversight and support is a major contributor to the disparity 
between the strategic aims of the Cardiff Partnership Board and the operational 
practices of community safety work. This disparity, in turn, indicates regime 
failure, and demonstrates the challenges entailed in attempting to mobilise the 
disparate practices of community safety around a ‘broad purpose’ agenda of social 
justice without the appropriate operational support and mechanisms formerly 
provided by the community safety team. As Stone highlights ‘sustained agenda 
(and purpose within those agendas) need ongoing protection against attention shift’ 
and in providing this ‘crucial role of networks as channels of communication and 
sources of reinforcement’ must be recognised (Stone, 2005: 319). Therefore, using 
the terminology of Stone, the dismantling of the community safety team, or 
network, has compromised the communication and reinforcement of the broad 
purpose agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy at an operational level, allowing the 
attention of operational practices to shift to more immediate pressures, such as the 
influence of lead practitioners evident in previous discussions. 
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7.6 THE ANALYTIC SIGNIFICANCE OF CARDIFF FOR REGIME ANALYSIS 
OF COMMUNITY SAFETY 
The overarching aim of this thesis was to identify how Coalition Government 
policies of austerity have affected the local governance of crime, disorder and 
safety in Cardiff.  Using Regime Theory, this investigation was structured around 
four analytic categories: the governing resources, agenda, arrangements, and 
schemes of cooperation.  This analytic framework was pivotal in structuring the 
ethnographic approach, analysis and subsequent findings.  Regime theory 
foregrounds the agency of local governing actors in determining local governing 
arrangements and agendas, but recognises the contested and fragile nature of these 
regimes, and the struggle to mobilise cooperation and engagement around a 
governing agenda. Using this approach, this study has provided answers to the 
research questions presented in Chapter 3 which, by way of reminder, were as 
follows:  
1. How have the governing arrangements for community safety in Cardiff 
changed and how can these changes be understood?  
2. How have the changes to the governing arrangements affected the 
governing agendas within Cardiff?  
3. How have these changes to the governing arrangements and agenda been 
realised in the actual delivery of community safety work? 
4. What do the changes to local governance say about the regime in Cardiff 
and how is this analytically significant for discussions of the local 
governance of crime, disorder and safety? 
Research questions one and two were concerned the governing arrangements and 
the impact these arrangements have had on the governing agenda.  As seen in the 
first of the discussion points in this chapter, community safety arrangements in 
Cardiff have undergone a significant change through the creation of the Cardiff 
Partnership Board and the integration of the community safety partnership under 
the guise of mainstreaming, reducing complexity, and increasing efficiency.  This 
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restructuring of community safety was framed as a way to facilitate more strategic 
approaches to local governance through the formulation of a shared agenda (the 
‘What Matters’ strategy), orientated around social justice and social inclusion.  In 
terms of research question three, the empirical evidence points towards a clear 
distinction between the progressive rhetoric of the Cardiff Partnership Board, and 
the operational practices of community safety work. It was apparent that despite 
the ambitions of strategic thinking, shared outcomes and joined up delivery, the 
operational activity of community safety work was fragmented. This resulted in a 
variety of operational agendas inconsistent with the unified agenda of the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy.   
In addressing research question four, it was argued that the disparity between 
rhetoric and operational practices indicates an inability to effectively mobilise 
cooperation around the ‘What Matters’ strategy, thereby constituting regime failure 
in Cardiff.  The impact of changes to the governing arrangements in Cardiff can be 
seen in the diminished governing capacity for community safety work, through the 
disbandment of the community safety team and the consequent loss of the 
associated expertise, skills and knowledge it had provided.  This degradation of 
community safety expertise and diminishing governing capacity undermined the 
coordination of community safety activity and cooperation between partners, 
which frustrated the realisation of the strategic agenda of the Cardiff Partnership 
Board. 
The analytical significance of Cardiff, and more specifically the Cardiff 
Partnership Board, as a case, can be found in its adaptation of local governing 
arrangements and its pursuit of a strategic agenda organised around social justice. 
The pursuit of a more progressive and transformative agenda in Cardiff demarcates 
it from previous community safety agendas under New Labour (1997-2010), which 
were narrowly focussed on crime prevention (Wiles and Pease, 2000; Gilling, 
2007).  This case outlines the opportunities that the Coalition Government’s 
policies of localism enable for the local reimagining of community safety.  It also 
draws attention to the agency of locally situated actors in actively choosing how to 
adapt to the external constraints of austerity.  The empirical evidence gathered in 
this research has shed light on how changes to the governing arrangements within 
Cardiff, necessitated by reducing financial resources, have altered the governing 
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resources available to community safety, and compromised the progressive and 
transformative agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy.  
These findings demonstrate how regime theory can aid our understanding of 
community safety work, by drawing attention to the agency of locally situated 
actors in producing new agendas, and adapting arrangements in an attempt to 
deliver upon these agendas.  This is important for future discussions of community 
safety beyond Cardiff, as it shows that local community safety agendas, and the 
governing arrangements for realising these agendas, are likely to be subject to 
greater local variation in light of the decentralisation of power, and the greater 
political agency available to local actors.  For instance the progressive and 
transformative agenda for community safety identified in this research can be 
clearly distinguished from the developmental regime in London under Boris 
Johnson (Edwards and Prins, 2014).  Therefore, these findings highlight the need 
for situating research in particular local economic and political contexts, to 
facilitate an understanding of why certain agendas are pursued in particular places 
and times, and what arrangements are implemented to deliver upon these agendas.  
It is here that the rich contribution that regime theory makes to these discussions is 
apparent: it provides insight into why, under certain conditions, some agendas are 
pursued and others are not, and how or if cooperation is mobilised around 
particular agendas.  This research has shown how changes to the governing 
arrangements have led to a fundamental reframing of community safety as part of a 
broader policy agenda around safety. Moreover, the formulation of the Cardiff 
Partnership Board has altered the balance of power towards Cardiff Council in the 
development and production of a transformative strategic agenda around social 
justice.  Both of these factors are helpful in understanding the departure from the 
crime focussed agendas of New Labour government.  Yet these same changes to 
governing arrangements in Cardiff have also resulted in the disappearance of the 
community safety team, and the failure to mobilise cooperation around this 
strategic agenda. These findings support the argument made by Edwards and Prins 
regarding the utility of regime theory for understanding the formation of governing 
regimes:  
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Regime theory recognises that governing coalitions inhabit 
economic as well as political environments that can enable 
as well as constrain their power to govern.  A key 
contribution of regime theory is to recognise this structural 
dimension whilst acknowledging the agenda of governing 
coalitions, the acumen, guile and leadership of coalitions 
which can, in turn, inform a comparative understanding of 
the uneven adaptation of urban governance to global 
pressures in the political and economic environment 
Edwards and Prins, 2014: 67 
The value of regime theory therefore lies in a conceptual framework that not only 
allows for an investigation into what regimes and governing agendas are 
formulated, but also a consideration of why certain regimes are formed, and how 
they may succeed or fail.  Given the context specific nature of this research, as a 
case study, it is not possible to make claims about how the findings generated here 
apply to other geo-political contexts.  However, this is not the point of the research, 
nor should it be, as the wider context of localism, greater local political agency and 
increased local variance do not lend themselves to ideas of generalisation. This 
research seeks instead to generalise to theory (Yin, 2003).  The conditions opened 
up by localism and the greater discretion and responsibility it affords to local 
authorities, in pursuing and forming governing coalitions and agendas of their own 
choosing, is reminiscent of the voluntary period of community safety described by 
Gilling et al. (2013). During this period the provision of community safety was 
characterised by local variation and divergence (Gilling et al, 2013). The fact that 
the findings of this research in Cardiff contrast with those of Edwards and Prins in 
London (2014) supports this assertion of local variation.  However further research 
utilising regime theory is required to explore how, and under what circumstances 
similar or contrasting governing agendas may be pursued, and how under different 
conditions these agendas may or may not be realised. 
7.7 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
As with any research, there are a number of methodological caveats and 
considerations to reflect on.  The limitations of this research were acknowledged in 
Chapter 3 (pages 73-74) and are revisited here in light of the preceding discussion.  
The first methodological point worth considering relates to the choice of the 
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Cardiff Partnership Board as the ‘case’.  More specifically, the decision that the 
research should be situated at the strategic level of the Cardiff Partnership Board 
rather than within specific operational activities, for example focussing on how 
austerity is affecting partnership working around domestic violence or anti-social 
behaviour.  The decision to look at a strategic level of governance within the city, 
rather than at particular operational activities, was taken to enable a more 
encompassing view of the Cardiff regime, its governing agenda and the partnership 
arrangements in place to facilitate that agenda.   
Such a decision unavoidably limited the level of detail that could be gathered, 
given the breadth of activity covered under the auspices of community safety 
within Cardiff.  This was reflected in my ethnographic fieldwork, and my interview 
sampling, which both focussed primarily on the lead officers responsible for 
leading on operational activities, rather than practitioners involved in the actual 
delivery of that work.  There is therefore the risk that the findings generated may 
not reflect the actual practices of partnership activity on the ground.  However, this 
was a necessary research strategy, as to become embroiled in the particular 
activities of a few operational practices would have inhibited an holistic emphasis 
on the Cardiff regime as a strategic governing body.  Moreover, to focus on 
particular operational activities would have undermined my ability to capture the 
disconnect between the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy and the 
agendas of the operational partnership teams discussed in this chapter and the one 
preceding it.  
Secondly, it is important to recognise the temporal nature of regime change as an 
ongoing process of negotiation. This poses obvious challenges to a time-bounded 
doctoral research study.  In his study of Atlanta, Stone (1987) charted 40 years of 
regime change through many years of study, examination of local records, and 
sustained residence and research in the city.  As discussed in Chapter 3, works like 
this have inspired and informed the methodology of this research, but with some 
necessary compromises and sacrifices.   
While the documentary analysis component of this study spans a significant period 
of time, from the early phases of community safety to the development of the 
‘What Matters’ strategy, the fieldwork element was mainly situated within the 
 232 
budgetary period of February 2014 to March 2015. The data generated during this 
relatively short period were then used to compare against the strategic vision of the 
‘What Matters’ strategy.  Consequently, the fieldwork endeavoured to capture the 
regime at a specific point in time under certain conditions, rather than the process 
of regime change. This needs to be taken into account when interpreting the data.  
While these findings demonstrate the situation in a particular period, they do not 
indicate whether this situation represents a progression towards, or a regression 
from, the vision of the ‘What Matters’ strategy.   
The sustained historical approach adopted by Stone (1987) would have some 
obvious benefits in providing direct comparisons between the Cardiff Partnership 
Board and the community safety partnership arrangements it replaced.  My ability 
to explore this transition was impeded by the fact that the changes to the governing 
arrangements had resulted in the changing of the guard for community safety in 
Cardiff.  Practitioners and policy officers who had experienced both arrangements 
were few and far between.  In overcoming these difficulties, whilst insights from 
key respondents were important, policy documents also provided more substantial 
points of comparison, as they were products of particular governing regimes and 
provided textual footprints of how problems were conceptualised as governable 
(Noaks and Wincup, 2004).  
Thirdly, there is an analytical consideration regarding what constitutes regime 
failure. The discussions of regime failure in this chapter have not described a 
wholesale failure of the Cardiff regime in its totality, but rather a failure of the 
Cardiff Partnership Board to realise the strategic governing agenda of the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy.  This raises an analytical question about whether this indicates 
regime failure, a regime in the process of failing but has not yet failed, or a regime 
that is suffering from ‘attention shift’ (Stone, 2005: 320).  One way of 
circumventing this issue is by stating that a ‘regime’ is intrinsically linked to its 
governing arrangements and agenda.  Consequently, in this case, the Cardiff 
regime is defined by the governing arrangements of the Cardiff Partnership Board 
and the agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy.  This is analytically useful as it 
provides analytic criteria for demarcating between failed, failing, and drifting 
regimes.  
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Looking forward, it is also notable that governing arrangements within Cardiff 
have been subject to further change as a result of Welsh Government legislation in 
the form of the Wellbeing of Future Generations Act.  As of April 2016, the 
governing arrangements of the Cardiff Partnership Board have been replaced by 
the Cardiff Public Services Board.  At the time of writing, the impact of this upon 
the actual governing arrangements and agenda in Cardiff is largely unknown.  
However there is an indication that there will be a less significant role for the 
police.  As noted on the webpage for the Cardiff Public Services Board (Cardiff 
Partnership Board, 2016b), the Chief Constable of South Wales Police has been 
relegated to the status of ‘invited partner’ alongside Welsh Ministers, the Police 
and Crime Commissioner, representatives from the National Probation Service and 
Community Rehabilitation Company, and the Cardiff Third Sector Council.  In 
their place, the statutory members of the Cardiff Public Services Board are Cardiff 
Council, Cardiff and Vale University Health Board, South Wales Fire and Rescue 
and Natural Resource Wales.  It is too soon to know what this means for 
community safety in Cardiff, however the potential downgrading of the role of the 
police raises questions about the statutory obligation put in place under the Crime 
an Disorder Act, and the continued engagement between the police, probation 
service, the community rehabilitation company and other governing actors, 
principally the local authority.  How these changing governing arrangements play 
out, and their impact upon the governing agenda, is worthy of further research.  If 
governing arrangements change substantially from those that have been evidenced 
in this research, then there is a more definitive argument for the failure of the 
Cardiff Partnership Board and the transformative agenda examined here.  
To summarise, this chapter has sought to bring together the key arguments of the 
thesis, and highlight the importance of this research to contemporary discussions of 
community safety.  It has demonstrated how the greater political agency available 
to local actors in this localised devolved period of community safety has allowed 
for the pursuit of a more transformative agenda in Cardiff, compared to the regime 
under New Labour (Gilling, 2007; Hughes, 2007).  Using regime theory, the 
research has shown how the Cardiff Partnership Board has failed to effectively 
mobilise participation around this agenda at the operational level. This is 
significant as it points to the challenges of inducing cooperation in times of 
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austerity (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; Edwards and Hughes, 2012).  In seeking to 
account for these findings, the discussion has drawn attention to a number of 
factors resulting from the changing governing arrangements, which have degraded 
governing capacity for community safety.  These findings have implications for 
wider discussions of how community safety is conceptualised as a policy agenda 
beyond Cardiff in this localised and devolved period of community safety, and how 
it should be researched.  It is these wider discussions that form the crux of the 
concluding chapter, which explores implications for policy and future research. 
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8. CONCLUSION  
 
The purpose of this research was to investigate how Coalition Government 
policies of austerity, localism and the introduction of regional Police and Crime 
Commissioners have affected local community safety work. In considering the 
contribution of this thesis to discussions of community safety in England and 
Wales, it is worth returning to the three phases of community safety identified 
by Gilling et al. (2013) discussed in Chapter 2, and specifically the distinctions 
between the national mandatory period of the Labour Governments of 1997-
2010 and the localised and devolved period for community safety that 
commenced in 2010. During the national mandatory period, in which 
community safety work was subject to intensive management from central 
government (Gilling, 2007), community safety was structured around 
developmental governing agendas driven by centralised performance targets and 
priorities as recounted in Chapter 2 and discussed in relation to Cardiff in 
Chapter 5. During the shift into the current period of ‘localised and devolved’ 
community safety, this centralised management of community safety has been 
superceded by arrangements that place primacy on local and regional actors in 
determining local arrangements and agendas for community safety. Crucially 
however, reducing financial expenditure in the public sector as a result of 
sustained austerity measures has presented a significant challenge to local 
governing capacity and continued partnership work (Lowndes and Pratchett, 
2012) 
This research makes an important contribution to contemporary discussions of 
community safety, which can be distilled into two key points. Firstly, it 
provides empirical evidence of how the increased agency available to local 
actors in Cardiff has allowed a reformulation of the local governing 
arrangements and agendas for community safety, indicating the potential for 
locally determined conceptualisations of community safety.  Secondly, in 
examining this, the thesis offers insight into the value of locally situated case 
study research and the analytical framework of regime theory in exploring how 
the political agency available to local policy officers is exercised and the factors 
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that frustrate or facilitate the formation of certain governing regimes. The 
conclusion now attends to each of these points in turn, beginning with a 
summary of the key findings of the research. 
8.1 RETHINKING COMMUNITY SAFETY IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY 
This case study has examined an attempt by the Cardiff regime to pursue a 
strategic agenda, the ‘What Matters’ strategy, which prioritises principles of 
social justice, social inclusion and addressing social inequalities. The emphasis 
of this agenda on principles of social justice demarcates it clearly from the more 
risk orientated and narrowly focussed agendas on crime prevention prevalent 
under the central management of community safety by New Labour. However 
this research found evidence of a discord between the rhetoric of the Cardiff 
regime and the operational practices of community safety work in the city. 
Where the ‘What Matters’ strategy posited a shared agenda for all partnership 
work, the operational practices of community safety were characterised by 
multiple and divergent operational agendas. This operational divergence was 
driven by the discretion afforded to lead practitioners involved in the delivery of 
community safety work that took precedence over the ‘broad purpose’ agenda 
of the ‘What Matters’ strategy (Stone, 2005).  
This discrepancy between the rhetoric of the governing agenda and the 
divergent operational practices of community safety indicate a failure of the 
Cardiff regime to mobilise cooperation around the ‘What Matters’ strategy. In 
seeking to understand this, the research found evidence that the changes to the 
governing arrangements in Cardiff have had a detrimental impact upon the 
governing capacity for community safety.  Presented as a simplification of 
partnership arrangements and a reduction of complexity, it was argued that the 
assimilation of the various partnership structures into the integrated Cardiff 
Partnership Board was a progressive and beneficial adaptation to public service 
delivery and would facilitate more holistic and joined up service delivery. 
However the findings of this research indicate that this integration of the 
community safety partnership has compromised the coordination and 
facilitation of community safety work. This is due to the obscuring of clear lines 
of responsibility and operational oversight following the dismantling of the 
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community safety team, the degradation of community safety expertise, and 
subsequently the greater responsibility placed upon locally situated practitioners 
in determining and coordinating local practice.  
These findings are important when considering the conceptualisation of 
community safety in this localised and devolved period in which its local 
organisation is driven not by the intensive management of central government, 
but rather by locally situated actors working within particular local political and 
economic contexts. The transformative agenda and the adaptations made to the 
local governing arrangements signify a radical departure from the discourses of 
community safety prevalent under New Labour. This indicates the importance 
of locally situated actors in actively determining how they respond to the 
external political and economic conditions and the potential for more 
progressive and transformative local agendas for community safety.  Equally, 
the failure of the Cardiff regime to effectively mobilise cooperation around this 
agenda indicates the challenges posed to local governing actors in attempting to 
incentivise partnership working around a ‘broad purpose’ agenda in the absence 
of central government steering and reduced financial resources, which 
incentivise a focus on more immediate concerns (Stone, 2005).  
This recognition and evidence of the role of locally situated actors actively 
involved in determining and adapting local arrangements and agendas for 
community safety in the localised and devolved period of community safety is 
important. In the absence of centralised management of community safety, there 
is now greater potential for more divergent local conceptualisations of 
community safety, driven by the local socio-economic and political contexts in 
which local actors are situated. This presents both potential for the emergence 
of more progressive and transformative agendas as seen here in Cardiff, but also 
for developmental and maintenance regimes. Moreover as this research shows, 
how cooperation and partnership is incentivised around these agendas is 
dependent upon the arrangements implemented within these local regimes. 
What is apparent then, is the potential for greater variance in the formation of 
local community safety regimes, their agendas and the governing arrangements 
utilised to achieve them.  
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This potential for greater variation in the local conceptualisations of community 
safety is further reinforced through wider regional, national and international 
political, economic and social changes. As Gilling et al. (2013) note the 
introduction of elected Police and Crime Commissioners raise important 
questions about their impact upon local community safety agendas and will 
contribute to the local variation of community safety work. This research found 
evidence of an emerging tension between the transformative agendas of the 
Cardiff Partnership Board, and the more developmental agenda of the Police 
and Crime plan. Moreover there was evidence of a migration of local 
partnership arrangements within Cardiff towards the Police and Crime 
Commissioners office, pointing to the potential gradual regionalisation of 
community safety work. Similarly, broader national factors will further 
reinforce the potential for diverging agendas and practices for community safety 
work. The ‘dragonisation’ of social policy within Wales has been noted as a 
consequence of the devolved politics of Welsh Government (Edwards and 
Hughes, 2009; Haines, 2009; Drakeford, 2010). This research demonstrates the 
influence of the managerialist tendencies of the Welsh Government in 
advocating more effective public service delivery and the development of the 
Cardiff Partnership Board. Equally the social justice agenda of the ‘What 
Matters’ strategy shows a clear parity with the drive for a distinct agenda within 
Wales around social justice driven forward by the Welsh Government.  
More widely, global economic and political conditions will further impact upon 
local conceptualisations of community safety. Increasing concerns around 
migration resulting from the European financial crisis and growing unrest in the 
Middle East has fuelled the rise of right-wing nationalist parties across Europe 
and in the UK, and was a contributing factor to the British public’s vote to leave 
the EU in June 2016. Alongside this, a series of terrorist attacks across mainland 
Europe have fuelled concerns about terrorism and the role of migration in 
facilitating this. In the wake of these factors growing antipathy towards 
migrants presents significant challenges for issues of community cohesion; 
indeed plenty of anecdotal evidence is emerging in the national media of rising 
numbers of hate crimes in the few weeks after the referendum (Dodd, 2016; 
BBC, 2016) and locally within Cardiff (Wightwick, 2016).  
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Thinking more specifically about the future of community safety, the value of 
this research lies in its elucidation of the opportunities and challenges facing 
community safety in this localised and devolved period (Gilling et al., 2013). 
On the one hand, the research sheds light on the opportunities presented by 
localism and the greater autonomy afforded to local actors in pursuing more 
progressive and transformative agendas for community safety (Edwards and 
Hughes, 2012). This was evident in this research in the ‘What Matters’ strategy 
and its appeals to social justice, and the attempt to promote a ‘broad purpose’ 
(Stone, 2005) agenda around addressing issues of inequality and social 
exclusion. Counterpoised to the opportunities presented by localism, the 
research demonstrates the challenges facing local governance as a result of 
sustained austerity measures, which severely constrain and inhibit the choices 
available to local governing actors in exercising this new found freedom. This 
was evidenced in this research in the degradation of governing capacity for 
community safety work in the city, which was seen in the dismantling of the 
community safety infrastructure, and the decimation of local community safety 
expertise.  
Of relevance here is the work of Du Gay, who, noting the increasing 
managerialist tendencies towards issues of efficiency and the modernisation of 
public services, highlights the value of the bureaucratic ethos in providing 
‘enough skill, status and independence to offer frank and fearless advice about 
the formulation and implementation of distinctive public purposes and to try to 
achieve purpose impartially’ (2000: 146). This is salient to these discussions, as 
the dismantling of the community safety team was promoted under the guise of 
reducing complexity and a drive towards efficiency. As Du Gay notes, this drive 
for efficiency obfuscates the value of bureaucratic structures, such as the 
community safety team, and the expertise that they provide in influencing 
decision-making and implementing policy agendas impartially. Therefore, the 
degradation of governing capacity is of fundamental concern for future 
discussions of community safety. As seen in this research, the absence of a 
dedicated community safety infrastructure compromises the effective 
coordination and delivery of community safety work, and raises questions 
around the sustainability of local community safety agendas. This degradation 
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of community safety capacity, also poses longer-term challenges as it is 
producing a collapse of the ‘institutional memory’ around community safety 
work within local government. This is important for future discussions of local 
governance post-austerity, in which attempts to re-establish local governing 
capacity for community safety work will be hindered by the absence of 
institutional memory.   
This degradation of local governing capacity and the erosion of institutional 
memory of community safety expertise is crucial given continued austerity 
measures, the PCCs, and the challenges to community cohesion in the wake of 
broader international pressures. In the absence of governing capacity for 
community safety how will continued partnership work be sustained, and more 
importantly, what will be the impact of this absence upon future community 
safety agendas? This research has shown the challenges of realising social 
justice agendas under such conditions, consistent with the assertions of Edwards 
and Hughes (2012). This is important for future empirical research, which is 
able to identify how, and under what conditions, certain regimes are formed, 
and how, within these regimes, cooperation is mobilised around particular 
governing agendas. Recognising this, this thesis makes an important 
contribution to the methodological discussions of how such a programme of 
research could be achieved. 
8.2 RESEARCHING COMMUNITY SAFETY IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY  
These discussions of the opportunities and challenges facing community safety 
arrangements raise important methodological questions for future research in to 
community safety. The crucial question for research into community safety 
during this period is not how have Coalition Government policies affected 
community safety work, but rather, how have local community safety 
arrangements adapted to current economic and political conditions? This 
framing of the problem recognises the role of locally situated actors in actively 
determining how local governing regimes adapt to wider political and economic 
changes. In doing so it draws attention to the local power relationships that are 
important in understanding the governing agendas of particular regimes, what 
partners are involved in the pursuit of these agendas, and how cooperation is 
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incentivised and governing resources mobilised around these agendas. Such an 
approach facilitates the examination of why certain agendas are pursued within 
particular places and times, and what factors contribute to the realisation of 
these agendas. This opens up space for the role of critical social science in 
contributing to these developments by identifying the factors that frustrate and 
inhibit the realisation of more progressive governing agendas for community 
safety.  
To do this, a programme of research is needed which is able to identify how, 
and why, certain governing regimes are formed and sustained. This research has 
demonstrated the value of regime theory in providing an analytical framework 
for examining governing regimes in relation to community safety. Using the 
four components of regime theory  (the agenda, the governing arrangements, the 
resources available to the regime, and the schemes of cooperation) this research 
identified how changes to the governing arrangements in Cardiff has degraded 
the governing capacity available to community safety and compromised the 
realisation of the transformative strategic agenda. In doing so this research 
shows how regime theory can be used to examine “how the variegated 
governing arrangements indicated by partnerships of state and non-state actors 
in local political economies enable or frustrate” particular agendas (Edwards et 
al., 2015: 216)  
In doing so, regime theory facilitates an understanding of how and why certain 
regimes succeed or fail, as seen in Cardiff with the failure to mobilise 
cooperation around the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. This 
utilisation of regime theory prioritises the understanding of the political and 
economic context of local governance, and the distribution of power between 
actors that affect how regimes are formed. Therefore the research highlights the 
value of locally situated case studies in achieving this understanding, and 
facilitating an understanding of local power relationships and their impact upon 
the formation of particular governing regimes. Moving forward, the research 
demonstrates the importance of multiple embedded case studies to identify and 
understand how local governing agendas and arrangements for community 
safety are developed in different contexts and under different local conditions. 
Through such a programme of research it would be possible to distinguish 
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between the political agency open to local policy actors and the external 
constraints placed upon them in contemporary discussions of community safety.  
In summary then, the findings of the research can be distilled into two 
contributions. Firstly, the findings of the research provide empirical evidence of 
how local governing regimes are actively responding and adapting to the 
conditions of austerity and the decentralisation of power and point towards the 
potential for more variegated local agendas for community safety. In doing so, 
however, the findings of the research also indicate the challenges to governing 
capacity, evident in the degradation of the infrastructure and expertise for 
community safety work in the city. The second key contribution of the research 
is the demonstration of the value of regime theory and multiple embedded case 
studies for future research for understanding why, and how, certain governing 
agendas are pursued, and the factors that frustrate or facilitate the realisation of 
particular governing agendas for community safety. Such a programme of 
research opens up space for the role of critical social science in contributing to 
the local developmental of community safety work, and the potential for more 
progressive framings of community safety practice. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
Position	   Response	   Transcribed	  
Anti-­‐Social	  Behaviour	   Completed	   Yes	  
Youth	  Offending	  Service	   Completed	   Yes	  
Night	  Time	  Economy	  Manager	   Completed	   Yes	  
Human	  Exploitation	  	   Completed	   Yes	  
Prevent	  	   Completed	   Yes	  
Pursue	  	   No	  Response	   n/a	  
Protect/Prepare	  	   Completed	   Yes	  
Community	  Cohesion	  	   Completed	   Yes	  
Cardiff	  Council	  	   Completed	   Yes	  
National	  Probation	  Service	   Completed	   Yes	  
Cabinet	  Member	  Community	  
Safety	   No	  Response	   n/a	  
Cardiff	  Third	  Sector	  Council	   No	  Response	   n/a	  
City	  and	  South	  Neighbourhood	  
Chair	   No	  Response	   n/a	  
City	  and	  South	  Neighbourhood	  
Chair	   Completed	   Yes	  
South	  East	  Neighbourhood	  
Chair	   No	  Response	   n/a	  
East	  Neighbourhood	  Chair	   No	  Response	   n/a	  
East	  Neighbourhood	  Chair	   No	  Response	   n/a	  
North	  Neighbourhood	  Chair	   Completed	   Yes	  
North	  Neighbourhood	  Chair	   Completed	   Yes	  
West	  Neighbourhood	  Chair	   No	  Response	   n/a	  
West	  Neighbourhood	  Chair	   Completed	   Yes	  
South	  West	  Neighbourhood	  
Chair	   No	  Response	   n/a	  
South	  West	  Neighbourhood	  
Chair	   Completed	   Yes	  
City	  and	  South	  Elected	  
Member	   Completed	   Yes	  
East	  Elected	  Member	   No	  Response	   n/a	  
South	  East	  Elected	  Member	   Completed	   Yes	  
North	  Elected	  Member	   Completed	   Yes	  
West	  Elected	  Member	   Completed	   Yes	  
South	  West	  Elected	  Member	   No	  Response	   n/a	  
Policy	  Officer	   Completed	   Yes	  
Partnership	  Officer	   Completed	   Yes	  
	  
TOTAL	   20	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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Document	  Title	   Type	   Author	   Year	  
Late	  night-­‐Levy	  Would	  put	  
Bars	  out	  of	  Business	  Warns	  
Cardiff	  Publican	   Local	  Media	   Western	  Mail	   2013	  
Community	  Safety	  
Mainstreaming	  -­‐	  
Neighbourhood	  Management	  
Model	  
Scrutiny	  
Report	  
Cardiff	  Community	  
and	  Adult	  Services	  
Scrutiny	  
Committee	   2009	  
Progress	  Report:	  Community	  
Safety	  Inquiry	  Report	  
Scrutiny	  
Report	  
Cardiff	  Community	  
and	  Adult	  Services	  
Scrutiny	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APPENDIX 3: INVITATION TO INTERVIEW 
 
 
 
Dear  
 
 
I am a PhD student at Cardiff University looking into partnership working and 
community safety in the city of Cardiff. As part of my research I am working 
with the Partnership and citizen focus team in County Hall but I would also like 
to conduct interviews with key individuals. Due to your role as          for          I 
would greatly appreciate the chance to talk to you about this work.  
I am writing this email to see whether you would be happy participating in an 
interview about               . I anticipate that this should take sometime between 30 
and 45 minutes. I am hoping to conduct these interviews over the next couple of 
months, but I would appreciate it if you could let me know when be convenient 
for you so we can arrange a meeting. 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
Many thanks, 
 
Tom 
Tom Cartwright  
PhD Researcher  
School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University 
Top Floor, 1-3 Museum Place 
Cardiff 
CF10 3BD 
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Participant information sheet:  
Doctoral Research into the organisation of community Safety in Cardiff 
 
 
What is the project about? 
 
This project aims to explore how partnership working and community safety is 
achieved in the city of Cardiff in these challenging times of stringent budget 
cuts. In particular, it seeks to examine: 
 
• What the priorities of the city are;  
• How these priorities are addressed;  
• What partners are involved with addressing these issues? 
 
The views of people involved with the Safer and Cohesive Communities 
Programme and the Neighbourhood Partnership teams are therefore central to this 
research.  
 
Who is conducting the research? 
 
The research is being conducted by a doctoral research student at Cardiff 
University called Tom Cartwright as part of his PhD thesis. This project is 
supervised by Adam Edwards and Gordon Hughes at the Cardiff School of 
Social Sciences, and funded by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC).  
 
What am I being asked to do? 
 
As part of the research I would like to conduct interviews with key individuals 
involved with partnership working and community safety issues in the city. 
These interviews are anticipated to last between 30 and 45 minutes and will be 
digitally recorded.   
 
What will happen if I do agree to take part? 
 
If you agree to be interviewed a date will be arranged at your convenience; no 
preparation is required. All attempts will be made to anonymise your responses 
and your name will not be used, however complete anonymity cannot be 
guaranteed. This is something we can discuss further if you have any concerns.  
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What if I change my mind? 
 
If you change your mind you can decide not to take part at any point before, 
during, or after the interview. You do not have to give a reason for withdrawing 
from the study, and upon doing so all data pertaining to your interview will be 
destroyed.  
 
What will happen to the data? 
 
The recordings will be transcribed and stored in a password protected file to 
ensure confidentiality. Hard copies will be kept in a locked filing cabinet and 
will only be read by myself and my supervisors. Extracts from the interviews 
will be used in the PhD thesis for analytic purposes. Parts of what you say in 
interviews may also be incorporated into conference presentations, and included 
in subsequent journal articles arising from the research. It is also university 
policy to publish a copy of completed theses online in a digital repository.  
 
Contact Details 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this research please don’t hesitate 
to contact me. 
 
Email: CartwrightT@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
Post:  School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University 
          Top Floor, 1-3 Museum Place 
          Cardiff 
          CF10 3BD 
 
Supervisors:  
 
Adam Edwards: EdwardsA2@cardiff.ac.uk  Gordon Hughes: HughesGH@cardiff.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX 5: CONSENT FORM 
  
 
 
Consent Form  
I,	   ............................................	   agree	   to	   take	   part	   in	   this	   research	   project	  
exploring	  how	  partnership	  working	  in	  community	  safety	  achieved	  in	  the	  city	  of	  
Cardiff,	   being	   conducted	   by	   Tom	   Cartwright	   from	   Cardiff	   School	   of	   social	  
Sciences.	  	  	  	  
Please	   initial	   each	   box	   to	   confirm	   that	   you	   have	   read	   and	   understood	   each	  
section	  
	  
I understand that participation is entirely voluntary, and that 
if I wish to withdraw from the study, I may do so at any 
time, and that I do not need to give any reason or 
explanation for doing so. 
 
I understand that the study involves an interview that will be 
audio recorded. 
 
I understand that because of this study, there could be 
violations to my privacy. To prevent violation of my own or 
others’ privacy, I will not talk about any of my own or 
others experiences that I would consider too personal or 
revealing. 
 
I understand that all the information I give will be 
confidential to the greatest extent possible, but in some 
cases anonymity cannot be guaranteed due to the public 
nature of some roles in the council. 
 
The researcher has offered to answer any questions I may 
have about the study. 
 
I have read and understood this information and I agree to 
take part in the study. 
 
 
 
Signed:............................................................ 
Date:............................................................... 
 
 
Cardiff University 
School of Social Sciences 
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APPENDIX 6: GENERIC INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Participant Name: 
Role/Responsibility: 
 
Section 1: The Work 
• Can you tell me a bit about your role? 
o What does your role entail 
o How did you come to occupy this role? 
 
• What would you say is the purpose of [the activity] and what should [the 
workstream/neighbourhood management team] achieve? 
 
• What are the priorities in this [activity]? (Probe for community safety issues if 
not mentioned) 
o On what basis have they been identified 
 
• How are these priorities addressed? How should they be addressed? 
o Why is this approach taken? 
o Can you provide some examples? 
 
• How much autonomy do you have in your position? 
Section 2: Partnership Arrangements 
• Can you describe the governance structure of [the activity in question]?  
o Who are you accountable to? 
o Where does responsibilities for decision making lie in this activity?  
§ Who has input the decision making process? 
§ On what basis are these people involved? 
 
• What partners are involved in this [activity]? 
o What is the nature of their involvement? What do they contribute? 
o Why are they involved? 
o Is there anyone who doesn’t participate but you think should? 
§ Why should they be involved, what would they offer?  
§ Why aren’t they involved? 
 
• How is partnership working achieved? 
o How is it organised? How does it happen? 
o What incentives are there for co-operation? 
o What barriers exist for co-operation? 
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• What is your opinion on how partnership working is structured in Cardiff? 
Section 3: Current Context 
• Have reduced financial resources within the council affected this activity? 
o Reduction of services? 
o Less provision for young people in the city a problem?  
 
• How do you think this is affecting partnership work in the city and who is 
involved? 
o Role of public sector?  
o Role of private, voluntary or communities? 
 
• What do you think are the big challenges going forward? 
 
